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Preface 

PREFACE 3 
This thesis concerns a search for expert knowledge in the psychodiagnostic 
domain. In particular one important aspect of psychodiagnostics, the class-
ification of problem behaviors, is addressed. The study is part of a research project 
that aims at the development of expert systems for the psychodiagnostic domain. 
The referral of a child to a diagnostician is the start of a complex information-
processing and problem-solving process where decisions are continually being 
made, implicidy as well as explicidy. The diagnostician has to find out what is 
going on, what the problem is exacdy, and what can or has to be done. Research 
on clinical decision making has shown the fallibility of this decision process (e.g., 
Pijl, 1989; IJzendoorn & Bus, in press). In view of the large amount of 
information involved and the complexity of the task, this is not astonishing. As 
early as in 1954, Meehl proved the superiority of statistical formulae over clinical 
intuition and advocated the use of statistical formulae in personality assessment. 
Research trends favouring the actuarial method have exerted almost no influence 
upon clinical practice, and clinicians still prefer to use their heads rather than 
formulas (Dawes, Faust & Meehl, 1989; Kleinmuntz, 1990). The heuristics and 
biases described by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) are referred to as causes 
of the poor performance in clinical decision making (Achenbach, 1985; 
Nurcombe & Fitzhenry-Coor, 1986). To improve diagnostic practice it seems 
necessary to develop (computerized) diagnostic decision support systems (De 
Bruyn, 1988). Especially the expert system as a decision aid is thought to offer 
promising possibilities for improving the quality of current psychodiagnostic 
practice (Ruyssenaars & De Bruyn, 1987). 
Before one starts with the construction of diagnostic knowledge systems, it is 
important to determine the weaknesses and strengths of the clinical decision 
making process of the diagnostician in order to find out which parts of the process 
are in need of support. Thus, the study of clinical judgement, particularly the 
reasoning process of the expert, becomes an important research topic. 
In the development of expert systems for psychodiagnostics, it seems 
important to evaluate the clinical knowledge used (Carroll, 1987). The 
descriptive modeling of clinical judgement, an approach that is often used in the 
development of expert systems, will otherwise preserve, reinforce, and perhaps 
even magnify, existing cognitive biases, since the judges being modelled may not 
be cognitively competent (Kleinmuntz, 1990). In many domains research on the 
value of expertise has focused on differences in knowledge characteristics and 
problem solving methods between persons with different levels of expertise 
(Boshuizen, 1989; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Kolodner, 1984; Kolodner & Simpson, 
1986; Shanteau, 1988, in press). The added value that one in general assumes 
experience to provide, is not always demonstrated in studies. Therefore it can and 
should be called into question for the different tasks in the assessment process. 
Following De Bruyn (1985,1990), we view psychodiagnostics or clinical assess-
ment as a cyclic process comprising four stages: (a) complaint analysis, (b) prob-
lem identification, (c) formulation and testing of hypotheses, and (d) treatment 
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formulation. This study focuses especially on the second component of this 
process, problem identification. During this stage, the diagnostician has to form a 
global representadon of the problem on the basis of his or her knowledge and 
experience. He or she has to collect, select, combine and integrate information 
from different sources (parents, teachers, the child, etc.). A large amount of 
information has to be ordered or classified. 
We first directed our study at the public knowledge available for this task, i.e. 
the sort of knowledge that can be found in textbooks and articles. Two important 
classification systems in the domain of child psychopathology were reviewed 
(DSM-III-R and the CBCL system). To determine whether the CBCL is a good 
candidate to be used as a data base in a (computerized) diagnostic knowledge 
system, we studied the representativeness of the CBCL system for the domain of 
problem behaviors of children in the age range of 6-11 years. 
Next we addressed private psychodiagnostic classification knowledge, i.e.rules 
of thumb or heuristics the diagnostician actually uses when he or she has to solve a 
classification problem. Aiming to detect heuristic classification rules, we 
investigated the classification behavior of diagnosticians in two different 
classification tasks and validated the private classification knowledge. We also 
investigated the role of experience for this task. We compared experts' and 
novices' classification processes and the outcome of these processes. We also 
studied what classification structures develop in the minds of diagnosticians as a 
result of experience and how these structures relate to empirical classification 
structures. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: In Chapter 1 we present some issues 
related to the construction of expert systems. We address the notion of an expert, 
review research on clinical reasoning, focus on expert-novice differences, and 
address the role of experience. 
In Chapter 2 we describe the psychodiagnostic process, discuss the importance 
of classification, and review some classification approaches. We conclude that the 
CBCL can be used as a data base for a diagnostic knowledge system. 
The empirical studies are presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In Chapter 3 we 
present a study on the representativeness of the CBCL system for the domain of 
problem behaviors of children in the age range of 6-11 years. 
In Chapter 4 we describe an empirical study of the psychodiagnostic class-
ification process in expert diagnosticians and we compare experts and novices 
with respect to both this process and the result of the process. 
In Chapter 5 we address the classification structures as developed in the minds 
of diagnosticians as a consequence of experience and examine the empirical 
content of these structures. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we evaluate our research and discuss the conclusions and 
implications of the study for the development of expert systems, future research, 
and diagnostic practice. 
PREFACE 5 
Chapter 3 is a revised version of an article that has been published in the Dutch 
Journal for Child Rearing and Educarían (NederUnds Tijdschrift voor Opvoeding, 
Vormingen Onderwijs). The empirical study on the content validity of the CBCL 
has also been reported as a letter to the editor in the Journal of the American 
Academy of Child'and'AdolescentPsychiatry. In both instances E.E.J. De Bruyn was 
the second author. Chapter 4 is an extended version of a paper that was presented 
at the SPUDM-13 conference in august 1991 and is accepted for publication in 
Acta Psychologica, E.E.J. De Bruyn and J.H.L. van den Bereken were co-authors 
of this paper. The extension involves mainly the Results section, in which the 
outcomes of the symptom classification task are reported. 
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This chapter presents some issues related to the development of expert systems for 
the psychodiagnostic domain. We start with the vital question "What is an 
expert?" Then we review research on the reasoning processes of expert clinicians, 
focussing especially on differences between experts and novices and on the role of 
experience. 
The terms problem solving, diagnosis, decision making, reasoning prediction, and 
judgement all refer in one way or another to the task of the diagnostician and are 
used interchangeably in this chapter. So are the additions intuitive, clinical, and 
subjective in contrast to statistical, mechanical, and actuarial, all of which describe 
how the tasks are performed. 
1.1 What is an expert? 
Expert systems are knowledge-based computer programs that can solve real-life 
problems which require a considerable amount of expertise when solved by 
humans (Jackson, 1987). The knowledge that expert systems can include can be 
roughly divided into two types: public and private knowledge. Public knowledge 
includes the types of information found in textbooks or hand-books: definitions, 
facts and theories. Private knowledge consists of rules of thumb or heuristics that 
enable experts to make educated guesses when necessary. 
The idea of constructing expert systems for a particular domain presupposes 
the existence of experts in that domain. But what is an expert? In artificial 
intelligence research, experts are those people who are considered to be the best at 
solving a particular problem (Shanteau, 1988). They have acquired this ability 
through the practice of the art, through experience. According to Kolodner, 
experts not only know more about their domain, but they have learned from 
experience how to apply and use that knowledge effectively (1984). Following this 
viewpoint, we distinguish two components in the use of the term expert in this 
thesis. We define an expert as someone (a) who has finished his or her professional 
education and is familiar with the public knowledge in the domain and (b) who 
has gained clinical experience and from this experience has learned how to apply 
and use that knowledge. In research it is this experience in particular that 
distinguishes experts from novices Shanteau (1988) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) present more detailed distinctions. 
In our study we use the term novice'm contrast with expert to refer to someone 
who has not finished his or her professional education and who has no clinical 
experience. The term expert refers to an experienced diagnostician or clinician. 
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1.2 Clinical reasoning 
An expert system can be seen as a model of the reasoning process of an expert 
clinician in the form of a computer program. The construction of an expert 
system thus requires a detailed analysis of the problem-solving method or 
reasoning process of the expert. It is therefore not surprising that the idea of 
developing an expert system for the (psycho)diagnostic domain has revived 
interest in the reasoning processes of the clinician (Dowie & Elstein, 1988; Turk & 
Salovey, 1988). 
As early as 1954, Meehl studied clinical reasoning - in particular how good 
clinicians are at making judgements - and started the debate about clinical or 
intuitive versus statistical prediction. Results from 20 empirical studies in which 
the actual predictive efficiencies of the two methods were compared showed that 
statistical prediction outperformed intuitive prediction. Only in one case was 
intuition better than statistics. Later, in 1965, Meehl was able to tally the box-score 
of 51 empirical investigations, of which 33 were judged to demonstrate the 
superiority of statisdcal over clinical data combination, 17 demonstrated 
'approximate equality' of the two approaches, and only one study favored clinical 
over statistical prediction (see Wiggins, 1973). According to Meehl "it almost 
looks as if the first rule to follow in trying to predict the subsequent course of a 
patients behavior is carefully to avoid talking to him, and that the second rule is 
to avoid thinking about him"! (1973, p. 64) In a noteworthy review Kleinmuntz 
stated that the main contribution of Meehl over the years has been to place 
judgement at center stage, to provide a sound rationale and empirical evidence for 
the scientific scrutiny of judgement (1990). 
One main approach within the study of clinical reasoning is the problem-
solving approach, which studies clinical reasoning from an information-
processing standpoint (Elstein & Bordage, 1988). This information-processing 
view records and analyzes the steps and thoughts of the clinicians as they attempt 
to solve clinical problems. The goal is to describe the process associated with the 
particular task and to explain it in terms of basic psychological elements and 
principles. 
A psychological principle basic to the understanding of clinical reasoning is the 
concept of bounded or limited rationality (cf. Newell and Simon, 1972). This 
principle emphasizes that limits exist to the human capacity for rational thought. 
In considering clinical reasoning, the most relevant limit is the relatively small 
capacity of working memory compared to the essentially infinite size of long-
term memory. According to Elstein and Bordage this means that, 
in a brief time, we cannot work efficiently with all we know about a problem or all 
the data that could be collected Some common features of good and poor clinical 
reasoning are consequences of efforts to cope with this limitation. Given the limited 
size of working memory, one is literally required to process data serially, to select 
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data carefully, to represent a clinical problem in simplified ways, and to work as 
rationally as possible within these simplified representations. (1988, p. no) 
The reasoning of chess players (De Groot, 1965), neurologists (Kleinmuntz, 
1968), special educators (Bus & Kruizinga, 1989; IJzendoorn & Bus, in press), 
psychiatrists (Nurcombe & Fitzhenry-Coor, 1986) have been studied using this 
approach. Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka studied the reasoning of a group of 
experienced internists as they performed on a number of medical and non-
medical problems (1978). They used thinking-aloud techniques and employed 
the problem solvers verbalizations as data. From these data they identified three 
units of analysis: cues, hypotheses and information search units. It was found that 
clinicians during the diagnostic process elicit salient cues from the patient. These 
cues are combined so as to delineate a clinical problem. Clinical problems are 
then resolved through a process of hypothesis generation and verification. 
Elstein et al. (1978) also found that a small set of hypotheses are generated very 
early in the clinical encounter, when only limited data are available. The number 
of hypotheses rarely exceeded five. Comparable studies showed that clinicians 
generated an initial hypothesis in less than 1 minute after the first contact with the 
patient and that the average number of hypotheses was six. A limited set of 
alternative explanations seemed to simplify the search for data. 
Elstein and Bordage remark that while principles used to simplify problems are 
often useful, they can nevertheless lead to certain errors, for example over-
emphasizing positive findings or excessive data collection. Many heuristics and 
biases related to judgement under uncertainty are described in the volume edited 
by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982). Nurcombe and Fitzhenry-Coor (1986) 
illustrate some base rate errors in clinical psychiatry, for example the over-
estimation of the probability that a disease is present as a result of previous 
experience (e.g., an encounter with a serious case), without adequately taking the 
base rates of the disease and or the finding into account. Also a phenomenon 
called illusory correUtion can bias accurate judgement in clinical assessment 
(Achenbach, 1985; Kleinmuntz, 1990). This phenomenon was uncovered by 
Chapman and Chapman who reported that people, including clinical psy-
chologists, tend to see a correlation between two events as being stronger than it 
actually is (cf. 1982). They showed that both clinicians and naive students saw 
massive illusory correlations between patients' traits on the one hand and their 
behavior on projective tests on the other hand. One example is the association 
between the drawing of atypical eyes with suspiciousness. They explained this 
finding by the same mechanism they discovered in an earlier study, i.e. the fact 
that subjects tend to see words with strong associative connections as occurring 
together in experimental presentations. In this earlier study people read word 
pairs (e.g., bacon-tiger, bacon-eggs) and were later asked about the word pairs. The 
subjects claimed that the pairs with a strong semantic association (e.g., bacon-
eggs) occurred more often than the others (e.g., bacon-nger), even though in fact 
every word-pair appeared as often as every other. 
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In view of the cognitive biases that influence the decision making processes of 
expert clinicians and the poor performance of experts in the domain of clinical 
psychology (Shanteau, 1988) it seems important to evaluate clinical knowledge 
before using it for expert system development. Now if we could determine an 
optimal response or answer to a diagnostic task, we could observe the extent to 
which expert responses deviate from the optimal responses and thereby evaluate 
the knowledge and clinical reasoning of the experts. Unfortunately, in clinical 
assessment and other so-called poor performance domains no reliable objective 
standards are available; this makes it difficult to define the optimal answer or 
response (Shanteau, 1988, in press). Therefore, in many domains research on the 
value of expertise has focused on differences in knowledge characteristics and 
problem solving between persons with different levels of experience. 
1.3 Expert-novice differences 
Research on expert-novice differences with respect to diagnostic reasoning in the 
psychiatric domain showed that experienced diagnosticians generate hypotheses 
earlier, are more consistent in evaluating them, and are more likely to provide 
rationales for inquiry plans. They also reach more accurate conclusions (Nur-
combe & Fitzhenry-Coor, 1986). Kruizinga and Bus (1990) compared the diag-
nostic problem solving of advanced and beginning practitioners in the field of 
education. Their results contradict the expectation that advanced practitioners 
would work direcdy towards a conclusion. The advanced practitioners didn 't 
hypothesize more in the beginning, nor did they seek information more 
efficiently later in the diagnostic process. In sum, this study did not confirm the 
hypothesis that advanced practitioners are more selective and flexible than 
beginners in solving problems. Reviewing medical expertise, Boshuizen (1989) 
reported studies that show that increasing knowledge and experience did not 
affect the time in which the first hypotheses were generated or the way in which 
they were verified or falsified. 
Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, and Parad (1981a) examined the prototypes of 
three kinds of "problem child" formulated by experts or by returnees or novices. 
They found that the prototypes generated by returnees and novices were similar 
to those of experts but contained fewer features. The experts mentioned the 
largest number of prototypic features, while the novices mentioned the fewest. 
Garb (1989) reviewed 5$ studies which examined the effect of training and 
experience on judgement tasks relevant to clinical psychology. Neurologists who 
were reputed to be experts made more valid ratings than other judges, but expert 
psychologists making personality assessments were not more accurate than other 
judges. Experienced clinicians (not reputed to be experts) were never more 
accurate than less experienced clinicians. Similarly, clinicians almost never made 
more valid judgements than did graduate students. 
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Research findings certainly do not confirm the naive expectation of differences 
between experts and novices. Instead, research offers an inconsistent picture of 
the relationship between experience, problem solving, and expertise. These 
findings raise questions about the role of experience. Does experience make an 
expert? 
1.4 The role of experience 
Research discussed so far has not explained why some clinicians reach expert 
status while others with equal training and experience do not. Why doesn 't 
experience always provide expertise? The role of experience in the experts 
reasoning processes has been studied by Kolodner (1984). Aiming to understand 
expertise in the domain of psychiatry, she examined the evolution from novice to 
expert. According to Kolodner and Simpson (1986), experience plays two 
important roles in problem solving. The first role of experience is to refine and 
modify the reasoning process. Successful experiences reinforce already known 
rules or previous hypotheses, whereas failures require analysis of the reasoning 
and knowledge that was used and modification of faulty rules and knowledge. 
The second role of experience is to provide exemplars upon which to base later 
decisions. Analogies to previous cases guide and focus later decision making. 
These two roles of experience are illustrated by the following example : 
Dr. X sees a patient who shows classic signs of Major Depression. She has previously been diagnosed as 
Depressive and was treated In a mental hospital with antidepressants. She was sickly as a child, has had a 
drinking problem, and has had some unexplained physical Illnesses. Dr. X concludes that she is suffering 
from Major Depression, Recurrent, without Melancholia and treats her with antidepressants. They seem to 
work, but the woman comes back complaining of additional major physical dlsorders.Taklng a further 
history, the doctor finds that her unexplained medical problems have been numerous. Realizing that this Is 
an Im portant consideration, he makes a second diagnosis of Somatization Dlsorder.(Adaptedf rom Kolodner 
& Simpson. 1986, p. 100.) 
Kolodner and Simpson report that Dr. X should learn from this case that it is 
important to consider medical history in choosing predominant clinical features 
and that Depression can camouflage Somatization Disorder. He should refine his 
rules for choosing predominant clinical features, i.e. modify his reasoning process 
(the first role of experience). When Dr. X sees a second patient diagnosed for 
Major Depression who also has unexplained medical problems, Kolodner and 
Simpson expect him to transfer his knowledge from the previous case to the new 
one and to consider whether the new patient might also have Somatization 
Disorder. This illustrates the second role of experience, providing exemplars. 
An essential prerequisite for learning from experience is feedback (Kolodner, 
1984; Shanteau, 1988). According to Garb (1989) one of the reasons why 
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experienced clinicians fail to make more valid judgements than less experienced 
clinicians is that they have trouble learning from experience. For some tasks 
feedback is unavailable; when available, it is often distoned because of biased 
cognitive processes like (a) inadequate hypothesis testing strategies, (b) the 
fallibility of memory, and (c) hindsight bias. Garb suggests that clinicians should 
be more willing to entertain alternative hypotheses and to revise their initial 
impressions of a patient. They should reduce their reliance on memory and 
instead keep good records and periodically review records. He urgues clinicians to 
rely more on their training (e.g. what they have read in the professional literature) 
and on decision-making aids (e.g. computer programs) than on their own 
experience. 
1.5 Conclusion and Implication 
Summarizing the different issues addressed in this chapter, we come to the 
conclusion that in the domain of psychodiagnostics it is difficult to define 
objective criteria to validate expert knowledge. Research on clinical reasoning has 
shown that the approach of modeling the clinical expert, an approach often used 
in expert system development, requires caution. The exploration of private 
knowledge in the domain of psychodiagnostics presupposes a validation of that 
knowledge. In two studies of this thesis (presented in chapters 4 and 5) we will 
explore private knowledge in the domain of psychodiagnostic classification and 
we will address the issue of the validation of this private knowledge. 
But first we focus in the next two chapters on the public knowledge available in 
the domain of psychodiagnostic classification. 
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This chapter addresses the public knowledge that is available in the domain of 
psychodiagnostic classification. Besides the place of classification in the 
psychodiagnostic process, we will focus on the purpose and principles of 
classification and discuss two important classification systems for child 
psychopathology. 
2.1 Definition of terms: 
clinical assessment, psychodiagnostics, classification, and diagnosis 
Clinical psychology still lacks a standardized vocabulary and many terms are not 
well-defined. We will therefore present our definition of some terms that will 
figure importandy in this chapter and the rest of this thesis. 
Following Woody (1980), we define clinical assessment as a set of procedures 
for human services professionals, primarily designed to support idiographic 
problem solving. Clinical assessment is closely related to psychodiagnostics, which 
we define as a systematic decision procedure in which, simply stated, the problem 
of the client has to be examined and a decision has to be made as to what must be 
done (De Bruyn, 1985). So the terms psychodiagnostics and clinical assessmenthoth. 
refer to the conglomeradon of activities that starts when someone is referred to a 
mental health service. In this thesis these two terms are used interchangeably. 
Classification refers to any systematic grouping or ordering of features into 
groups or types. Classifying is the activity, i.e., of arranging features in classes or 
assigning them to categories. Different terms are used to describe the outcome of 
classifying, depending on the particlular scientific discipline involved: group, 
type, category, class, syndrome, dysfuncnonal behavior cluster, disorder, or diagnosis. 
The terms diagnosis and classification are often used interchangeably in the 
literature. For instance, in the DSM-HI-R classification system a diagnosis is 
made if a case meets the criteria of a category. A case may elicit, e.g., the diagnosis 
"conduct disorder" - i.e., the patient is classified as having a "conduct disorder". 
We restrict the term diagnosis to referring to "a statement or conclusion 
concerning the nature or cause of some phenomenon" (Woolf, 1977, p.313). 
Diagnosing refers to the activity, the investigation or analysis of the cause or 
nature of the phenomenon. 
Classifying and diagnosing both take place in psychodiagnostics. This thesis is 
concerned with psychodiagnostic classification, defined as the ordering or 
grouping of problematic behaviors (the phenomena) of the individual case into 
syndromes (the groups or types). 
In the next section we analyze the role of classification in psychodiagnostics. 
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2.2 Classification in the psychodiagnostic process 
In literature on psychodiagnostics, more and more attention has been focussed 
on the diagnostic process (De Bruyn, 1985, 1988, 1990; Rispens, Carlier & 
Schoorl, 1984; Van der Kooij & KnijfF, 1986). De Bruyn (1985, 1990) has 
developed a normative framework for the diagnostic process. This model is based 
on the general methodological concept of the empirical cycle as formulated by de 
Groot (1961) and on the logico-normative approach to the diagnostic process as 
formulated by Westmeyer (1972). The structure of the diagnostic cycle is shown 
in Figure 2.1. 
1 
complaint 
analysis 
treatment 
recommendation 
2 
.>- problem 
identification 
diagnosis 
Figure 2.1: The structure of the diagnostic cycle 
According to this framework, the diagnostic process starts with an analysis of the 
complaints of the client (1). The complaint analysis is followed by the problem 
identification (2). In this stage the task of the diagnostician is to sort the 
subjective complaints into empirically or theoretically based clusters of 
dysfunctional behavior. In the third stage, diagnosis, the clinician has to generate 
and test hypotheses about which conditions either elicit or sustain the identified 
problem. The fourth component is the recommendation of treatment. In this 
stage the diagnostician has to assess which criteria for therapy are applicable to his 
client and has to choose between alternative treatments by integrating the 
information gathered in the previous steps. If the diagnostician has not reached 
an acceptable level of certainty at the end of each of the components he or she can 
repeat some parts of the diagnostic sequence or even the entire sequence (De 
Bruyn, 1990). 
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We want to stress that this diagnostic cycle must be viewed as a prescriptive model 
and not as a representation of the diagnostic process in actual clinical practice. 
Research has shown that actual psychodiagnostic practice deviates from this 
model (Bus, 1989; Costello, 1988; De Bruyn, Pijnenburg & van Kessel, 1986). 
In the above-mentioned model, classification takes place during the second 
phase of the diagnostic cycle problem identification. During this phase the 
diagnostician is confronted with all sorts of data from different sources such as 
parents, teachers, and the child. In order to process this large amount of 
information efficiendy and to avoid an overwhelming cognitive overload, the 
diagnostician has to reduce and simplify the information. Achenbach, following 
Mischel, refers to this problem as one of cognitive economics (1985). The 
diagnostician thus has to select, combine and order the information. He or she 
has to bring structure into the description of the problem. 
Despite the fact that classification as a cognitive process has received litde 
attention in research on psychodiagnostics, classification systems have been 
developed to assist the diagnostician during this task. These systems provide 
categories into which the information can be ordered. While in medical practice 
classification systems are considered important and doctors are trained in using 
them, their usefulness is still questioned by clinicians in psychodiagnostic 
practice (Rispens, 1986). Clinicians are not always aware-or seem to forget- that 
they also use what Rutter has referred to as private classification systems. The 
criteria on which these private classifications are based remain vague and unclear, 
as does the impact of this classification on the generation of hypotheses. 
According to Rispens, a clinician cannot withstand the tendency to situate a 
client in the whole of his or her knowledge from experience, ordered in one way or 
other (1986). Achenbach reports that from the many features that characterize a 
case, clinicians abstract a few features and form a conceptual abstraction intended 
to capture important features of the case that link it to similar cases (1985). 
Individuals and disorders can be classified in multiple ways, depending on the 
attributes and principles chosen as a basis for classification. According to 
Achenbach (1985, 1988), taxonomy involves the grouping of cases according to 
their distinctive features. Classification comprises groupings based on extrinsic 
criteria as well as those based on features of the cases themselves. For example, "a 
clinic may assign cases to therapists who have therapy hours when the cases are 
referred. Thereafter, the clinic may classify each case according to the child's 
therapist. This system may be convenient for billing, record keeping, and 
assignment of clinical responsibilities, but it does not reflect intrinsic differences 
among the cases" (Achenbach, 1985, p.152). 
According to Achenbach, each category of a taxonomy represents a 
hypothetical construct defined by attributes that are singled out from all the other 
attributes that characterize individuals. 
We use the terms classification system and taxonomy interchangeably. 
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2.3 Methodological principles of classification systems 
The basic principles of classification systems for child psychopathology, along 
with their purposes and requirements, have been reported repeatedly in literature 
(Achenbach, 1985, 1988; Blashfield, 1984; Rispens, 1986; Rutter, 1975; Rutter & 
Gould, 1985; Rutter, Tuma & Lann, 1988). The general purpose of classification 
systems is to provide "a kind of language-an agreed set of terms-by which 
clinicians and research workers can describe the disorders they investigate and 
treat. Only if there is uniformity in the usage of descriptive and diagnostic terms 
can meaning be attached to clinical reports, research findings or hospital 
statistics" (Rutter and Gould, 1985, p.304). In the diagnostic process the use of 
classification systems is recommended as aids in mapping the relations between 
the diverse behaviorial aspects of the problem and in describing the problem 
behavior. 
Rutter and Gould have proposed basic requirements for an adequate class-
ification system for child psychopathology, including the following: The 
classification system should be based on facts, not on theories or concepts, and it 
should be defined in operational terms. The terms must be used in the same way 
by different clinicians, in other words, the system should be reliable. 
Furthermore, the system should classify disorders or problems, as opposed to 
children. To illustrate this criterion, one often makes a comparison with the 
medical classification of disorders, where we do not talk about a measly child but 
about a child who h¿is the measles (measles being the disorder). It is better not to 
talk about a neurotic child but about a child who has a neurotic disorder. (Note 
that the DSM-III-R manual discourages the use of expressions such as "a 
schizophrenic" and suggests using an expression like "a person with Schizoph-
renia" instead) .The classification must also take into account the fact that the 
child is a developing organism. The same abnormality can manifest itself in 
different ways at different ages. The system should provide adequate coverage, so 
that important disorders are not omitted. The differentiations between categories 
should be valid and should have meaning in terms of aetiology, symptomatology, 
course, response to treatment, or other variables. 
Rutter and Gould conclude that at the moment there is no really satisfactory 
classification system for child psychopathology. 
2.4 Approaches to classification 
In the field of child psychopathology, different taxonomie or classification 
systems have been developed. Both Blashfield (1984) and Achenbach (1985,1988) 
have extensively discussed the leading taxonomie approaches, such as the 
Kraepelinian and the multivariate approach and the classification systems related 
to it. If one looks at the impact of these systems, two systems seem to be most 
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important for the domain of child psychopathology, i.e. the DSM-III-R system 
and the CBCL system. In a preliminary stage of the present research project, 
Traudes (1987) discussed and compared the different approaches in view of the 
question of which system was the best candidate for implementation in a 
diagnostic knowledge system. He concluded that the CBCL system was the best 
suited. Consequendy it was decided to concentrate further research on the CBCL 
system. To document this decision, we describe both DSM-III-R and CBCL and 
compare them with respect to some general issues. For a more detailed discussion 
and comparison, we refer to Traudes (1987). 
2.4.1 A Kraepelinian taxonomie approach: DSM-III-R 
The Kraepelinian taxonomie approach arose through the application of the 
nineteenth-century medical nosology to mental disorders. It was based on the 
assumption that clinical descriptions would permit the identification of 
syndromes for which organic causes would eventually be found. All current 
versions of Kraepelinian taxonomies of childhood disorders (e.g., DSM) have 
based their categories on clinical constructs for which descriptions were 
formulated by processes of discussion and negotiation, i.e. on so-called armchair 
theories according to Rutter. 
The DSM taxonomy follows the Kraepelinian approach of categorical 
nosology. The most recent versions of the DSM no longer include aetiological 
theories. Since the first edition in 1952, the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) 
has been revised repeatedly. The latest version, the DSM-III-R, was published in 
1987. 
In DSM-III-R a mental disorder is conceptualized as 
α clinically significant behaviorial or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs 
in a person and that is associated with present distress (a painfiil symptom) or 
disability (impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a 
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, oran important loss 
of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable 
response to aparticuUr event, e.g., the death of a hved one. Whatever its original 
cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation or a behaviorial, 
psychohgical, or biological dysfunction in the person. (APA, 1987, introduction, 
xxii.) 
The DSM-III-R system is a multiaxial system and consists of five so-called axes. 
The first three axes constitute the official diagnostic assessment. Axis 1 contains 
clinical syndromes and the V codes; the latter represent behaviorial or psychol­
ogical problems that may appropriately be a focus for professional attention or 
treatment even though these are not attributable to a mental disorder. Axis II 
contains personality and developmental disorders. Axis III lists physical illness, 
Axis Г provides ratings of psychosocial stress, and Axis V provides ratings of the 
persons highest level of adaptive functioning during the previous year. It contains 
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a special section concerning childhood disorders. 
The definitions of the disorders are limited to descriptions of the clinical 
features of the disorders. The text of the DSM-III-R describes each disorder in 
terms of current knowledge in the following areas: essential features, associated 
features, age at onset, course, impairment, complications, predisposing factors, 
prevalence, sex ratio, familial pattern, and differential diagnosis. 
The DSM-III-R provides specific diagnostic criteria and rules for each 
disorder. Most childhood disorders contain three or four types of criteria (not all 
criteria are always applied to the disorders): (a) a list of descriptive features of 
which a specified number must be present; (b) a minimum period during which 
the behaviors must be present, e.g. 6 months; (c) an age criterion, e.g. onset before 
age of seven; (d) criteria for excluding a particular disorder if it is "due to" certain 
other disorders. These criteria and rules are meant to improve the reliability of the 
classification process and are based on clinical judgement. 
An example of the diagnostic criteria for Oppositional Defiant Disorder is given 
below: 
Diagnostic criteria for31B.81 Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
Note: Consider a criterion met only If the behavior Is considerable more frequent than that of most people of 
the same mental age. 
A. A disturbance of at least six months during which at leastf Ive of the following are present: 
(1) often loses tern per 
(2) often argues with adults 
(3) often actively defies or refuses adult requests or rules, e.g., refuses to do chores at home 
(4) often deliberately does things that annoy other people, e.g., grabs other chllderen's hat 
(5) often blames others for his or her own mistakes 
(6) Is often touchy or easily an noyed by others 
(7) Is often angry and resentful 
(8) Is often spiteful orvlndktlve 
(9) often swears or uses obscene language 
Note: The above Items are listed In descending order of discriminating power based on data from a national 
field trial of the DSM-III-R criteria for Disruptive Behavior Disorders. 
B. Does not meet the criteria for Conduct Disorder, and does not occur exclusively during the course of a 
psychotic disorder, Dysthymla, or a Major Depressive, Hypomank, or Mank Episode. 
Criteria lor severity of Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
Mild: Few, If, any symptoms In excess of those required to make the diagnosis and only minimal or no 
Impairment In school and social functioning. 
Moderate: Symptoms or functional Impairment Intermediate between 'mild* and "severe" 
Severe: Many symptoms In excess of those required to make the diagnosis and significant and pervasive 
Impairment Inf unctlonlng at home and school and with other adults and peers 
(Adapted from the DSM-III-R manual, p.57.) 
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2.4.2 The multivariate taxonomie approach: 
The CBCL system (empirically based assessment) 
The multivariate approach uses statistical procedures to identify taxonomie 
groupings of features or attributes. Multivariate analyses are used to measure the 
actual covariation between attributes. Subjective judgement is involved in 
selecting the samples and attributes to be analyzed, the analytic methods, and the 
mathematical criteria. Multivariate studies have shown considerable similarity 
among independently derived syndromes of behavior problems in child 
psychopathology despite differences in rating instruments, subject samples and 
analytic methods (for a review of this work see Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978). 
REVISED CHILD BEHAVIOR PROFILE 
Behavior Problems—Boys Aged 6 - 1 1 
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Figure 2.2: Example of the child behavior profile for boys aged 6-11 (reprinted from the CBCLmanual, 1983, p. 21). 
Achenbach and Edelbrock have developed a classification system based on 
multivariate findings, the empirically based assessment approach. This approach 
followed 
psychometric principles, including the use of standardized procedures, multtple 
aggregated items, normative-devehpmental reference groups, and establishment of 
reliability and validity. This approach does not dictate nor preclude рагпсиЫг 
theoretical explanations for the phenomena to be assessed. It makes use of multiple 
sources of data to avoid the limitations anabioses affectingeach source of data taken 
alone (Achenbach &McConaughy, 1987,р.іб). 
Achenbach in fact started with this approach in 1966 by developing a stand­
ardized instrument to rate children's problem behaviors. This resulted in the 
Child Behavior Checklist, a standardized format to record the behaviorial 
problems and competencies of children as reported by the parents. 
Syndromes of behavior problems were identified through principal com-
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Flgure 2.3: Profile pattern typesfound for boys aged 6-11 (reproduced from the CXCL manual, 1983, p. 78 
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ponents analyses of the CBCL behavior problems rated by parents of children 
referred to outpatient mental health services (for detailed information on 
different statistical analyses performed, see the CBCL manual, 1983). Separate 
analyses were performed for children of each sex at ages 4 through j , 6 through 11, 
and 12 through 16. For each sex/age group, eight or nine behavior problem scales 
were found, and these were given descriptive labels. To provide a comprehensive 
view of the behavior problems, these scales are combined in the Child Behavior 
Profile ( see figure 2.2). Using CBCL ratings from parents of randomly selected 
children who had not received mental health services for at least the preceding 
year, the behavior problem scales were standardized. 
Cluster analyses of the profiles of clinically referred children have identified either 
six or seven profile types, replicated across two randomly selected clinical samples 
(see figure 2.3). 
The cluster analyses revealed profile patterns with peaks on several syndrome 
scales. For instance, for boys aged 6 through 11 a profile pattern showed peaks on 
depression, social withdrawal and aggression: Profile patterns with a peak on a 
single syndrome scale, such as hyperactivity, were also found. 
Verhuist adapted the CBCL system for the Dutch population. He replicated both 
the empirical grouping of problem behaviors in a Dutch clinical population and 
the standardization of the behavior problem scales (Koot & Verhulst, 1990; 
Verhulst, 1985; Verhulst, Koot, Akkerhuis & Veerman, 1990). 
2.5 Some general issues 
2.5.1 Categorical vernis dimensional systems 
A question often raised in the classification literature is whether the classification 
scheme should be categorical or dimensional. In a categorical classification 
system, symptoms are assigned to one or more categories, e.g., a child is classified 
as having a depressive disorder. The DSM-III-R system is often given as example 
of the categorical classification approach, one whose categories are not mutually 
exclusive, in that the symptoms of a subject can be assigned to more than one 
category (Rispens, 1986). The ICD-9 is based in the assumption that in most 
cases there is just one syndrome (Rutter & Turna, 1988). 
By contrast, the dimensional classification model represents the symptoms of 
subjects in terms of all of the dimensional continua included in the model. An 
example of this approach is Eysencks three-dimensional model of psycho-
pathology, which comprises the dimensions psychoticism, neuroticism, and 
introversión-extraversión (see, e.g., Eysenck, i960). Eysencks factor-analytic 
studies of personality with psychiatric patients showed, e.g., that hysterics were 
not only extremely high on the extraversion dimension: they were also high on 
neuroticism (Blashfield, 1984). The Child Behavior Profile of the CBCL system 
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also reflects the dimensional approach. For instance, a child who scores high on 
the depression dimension might also score high on the aggressive dimension and 
low on the hyperactive dimension. 
The fact that in the dimensional approach more of the acquired information is 
retained is considered an important positive feature. Another advantage of 
dimensional models is that they are generally tied to sophisticated measurement 
systems for psychopathology. The categorical approach is often associated with 
traditional psychiatric classification and consequendy also with its drawbacks. 
Few attempts have been made however, to explicate the categorical model; 
consequently the class of categorical models includes a number of possible 
structural variations (Blashfield, 1984). According to Blashfield, it is futile to 
decide which model is superior without a better understanding of categorical 
models. Rutter and Tuma (1988) believe that the most appropriate classification 
scheme is likely to be a mix of the categorical and dimensional approaches, rather 
than an pure form of one or the other. They point out that for some disorders the 
dimensional approach doesn't apply, e.g., developmental language disorder and 
nocturnal enuresis. 
2.5.2 Categories versus prototypes 
The distinction between categories and prototypes is related to the issue of 
category membership in the classification system. In a classification system based 
on categories such as those embodied in the DSM-III-R, a clinician decides 
whether or not the subject meets the criteria for a disorder. Category membership 
is viewed as an "all-or-none" decision. This approach corresponds with what may 
be called the "classical" view in the study of concepts and categories. This classical 
view holds that something is a member of a particular category because it satisfies 
the set of necessary and sufficient condidons which constitute the category's 
defining properties (McCauley, 1987^.289). For example an object is categorized 
as a chair if it exhibits a certain set of defining features, e.g., four legs, a seat, a 
back, and arms. 
The work of Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Bream (1976) 
demonstrated experimentally that natural categories have a graded structure, i.e. 
include more or less typical exemplars. Within a given category, some members 
are usually regarded as especially good or typical examples; the very best are called 
"prototypes". Other members of the category are reladvely more marginal, and 
the category boundary is often poorly defined. For example the prototypical chair 
is the four-legged straightbacked kind often seen in a dining room. Modernistic 
single-pedestal armchairs are much less typical ofthat category (example adapted 
from Neisser, 1987). According to Neisser this "graded structure" appears in every 
kind of category. 
The problems Rosch et al. (1976) described in conforming object categor-
ization to the classical view are also recognized for psychiatric categorizadon: 
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there are no agreed-upon defining features for diagnostic categories, and the 
existence of borderline cases is assumed (Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 
1980). By asking 13 experienced clinicians to list "clinical features that characte-
rize the prototypical patient", Cantor et al. (1980) demonstrated that the 
prototypical view of categorization is in correspondence with the way clinicians 
actually think about and use diagnostic categories. According to Achenbach 
there is litde reason to assume that most childhood disorders actually exist in 
categorical form. He suggests viewing disorders in terms of quantifiable proto-
typic syndromes, thereby avoiding forced choices between categories and 
diminishing the risk of neglecting features that do not conform to the most 
salient category (1988). The empirically based assessment method (i.e., the 
CBCL) represents this prototypical view of categorization. It consists of empirical 
prototypes derived through multivariate analyses of features scored in samples of 
individuals containing features that co-occur together. Conceptual prototypes 
contain features people think of as occurring together. 
The prototypical view of categorization can also be applied in a categorical 
classification system. The use of severity criteria for some disorders in the DSM-
III-R system represents a minor adaptation to a more prototypical view of 
categorization. 
2.5.3 Reliability 
In discussing the reliability of the Kraepelinian approaches such as the DSM, 
Achenbach refers to the fact that most studies have focused on agreement 
between judges in categorizing cases in which the judges obtained identical 
assessment data. The reliability of the assessment data itself is neglected in 
Kraepelinian taxonomies. For instance the DSM lacks standardized procedures 
for obtaining the necessary assessment data. The lack of an empirical data base for 
DSM categories of childhood disorders may contribute to the poor reliability 
often found for them, according to Achenbach (1989). Although the DISC 
(Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children) was developed to assess specific 
DSM-III criteria via structured interviews with children, the test-retest reliability 
of the children's responses was poor (Edelbrock & Costello, 1988). 
Most multivariate taxonomie approaches employ standardized assessment 
procedures, such as checklist ratings. Numerous studies have reported reliability 
and stability of scores for multivariate syndromes (Achenbach and Edelbrock, 
1983; Achenbach, 1985: Verhuist et al., 1990). 
2.5.4 Validity 
The lack of substantive knowledge about childhood disorders makes it difficult to 
validate the categories of the classification systems. The categories or groupings in 
the DSM-III-R represent the disorders that a group of experts have thought of. 
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They were not derived from data on actual samples of children. The defining 
features and cutoff points for DSM diagnostic categories are not based on 
demonstrated discrimination between a clinical and a nonclinical sample, and 
the DSM criteria have not been empirically calibrated for different ages. 
According to Rutter and Gould, for many child psychiatric disorders in DSM III 
research evidence is lacking, with the consequence that "criteria have had to be 
pulled out of the air for conditions not adequately validated" (1985, p. 316). In a 
preliminary report of the DSM-IV work group, it is recognized that revisions of 
the categories should be mosdy based on empirical data and that "unsupported 
'expert' opinion" will not be sufficient (1990). The relation between empirically 
derived syndromes and the DSM-III syndromes has been studied, and some 
DSM-III syndromes correspond to CBCL syndromes (see Achenbach, 1985; 
Vermande, 1991). 
A classification scheme is often validated by relating it to other variables, such 
as course or response to treatment. For most DSM categories the diagnostic 
criteria have not yet been fiilly validated with respect to important correlates such 
as clinical course, outcome, family history and treatment response (APA, 1987). 
The validity of the empirically derived syndromes has been demonstrated by 
studies that showed significant correlations between syndrome descriptions 
made using different instruments (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Achenbach, 
Conners, Quay, Verhuist, & Howell, 1989; Rutter & Gould, 1985). The fact that 
multivariate studies of the CBCL in different countries obtained similar 
groupings of features supports the validity of these groupings (Achenbach, 
Althaus, Baron, & Verhuist, 1987; Verhulst, Achenbach, Althaus, & Akkerhuis, 
1988). Discriminative validity of the empirically based syndromes has also been 
reported (Achenbach, 1985; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983; Verhuist, 1985; 
Verhulst et al., 1990). 
2.6 Conclusion 
Evaluating the two classification systems in view of our ultimate goal, the 
construction of a diagnostic knowledge based system, we come to the conclusion 
that the empirically based assessment approach is the most solid one to be used as 
a database for such a system. Although the DSM-III classification system can be 
called an "expert" system in the sense that it is based on the judgements of 
prominent clinicians, its has some important shortcomings. The systems lacks 
well-validated operational definitions for childhood disorders, has no 
standardized assessment instrument, and needs a better empirical basis for the 
grouping of the features. This diminishes the expert status of the system as a 
classification scheme for childhood disorders. 
Despite the favourable judgement of the empirically based assessment 
method, we considered it appropriate to investigate the item base of this method 
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for our domain in more detail. The reason for this investigation and the 
presentation of the empirical study will be found in the next chapter. 

3 
щУ The content validity of the CBCL 
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3.1 Introduction 
One of the necessary components of a computerized diagnostic knowledge 
system to support the assessment of behavior problems in children is an 
empirically based, standardized, and reliable classification system for behavior 
disorders. As argued in chapter 2, the assessment procedure developed by 
Achenbach and Edelbrock (1983) and applied in the Netherlands by Verhuist 
(1985) seems to be a good candidate for implementation 
But using a standardized classification system as a fixed component of a com-
puterized diagnostic knowledge system involves certain risks. A comprehensive 
diagnostic knowledge system can suggest, albeit unintentionally, that the entire 
domain of clinical problems has been captured. If certain problem behaviors are 
not represented in the classification system, (in this case the CBCL), they will not 
be detected in any case to which the system is applied. As regards the quality of the 
classification system as a declarative data base, one of the simplest and most 
primary concerns is that of its representativeness of the domain, or, in other 
words, its content validity. According to Farteli (1984), this type of validity is 
perhaps one of the most important desiderata for computerized assessment 
systems. 
According to Drenth (1975), content validity is a disputed concept in the 
testing literature and is difficult to verify empirically. It is often determined 
through a rational analysis of the content of a test, on the basis of individual, 
subjective judgement, it is therefore more subject to error than other types of 
validity. We refer to content validity in its most strict sense, namely "the extent to 
which the content of a test is a good representation of the behavior domain for 
which the score of a test is intended" (De Bruyn, 1985, p.181; translation by the 
present author). Content validity depends on the adequacy of the representation 
of the domain. It has been repeatedly stated in the literature (Allen & Yen, 1979; 
De Bruyn, 1985; Drenth, 1975) that it is difficult to determine this type of validity. 
This would require an exhaustive enumeration of the domain of behaviors to be 
measured. Only then can one check whether the items of the test reflect the total 
domain of behaviors adequately. 
If the CBCL is to be used as declarative data base in a computerized diagnostic 
knowledge system for the assessment of problem behaviors, it is supposed to 
reflect the domain of problem behaviors for which children are referred to mental 
health services. In view of this purpose, it is necessary to examine the 
representativeness of the CBCL items for this domain. We will do this by 
reviewing the development of the item pool of the CBCL and by presenting and 
discussing an empirical study. We examined only the 118 behavior problem items 
of the CBCL, because our focus is on symptoms reflecting problem behaviors. 
The social competence items of the CBCL were not examined. For practical 
reason we limited our domain to problem behaviors of children aged 6-11. 
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3.1.1 Development of the item pool of the CBCL 
Content validity depends on the care with which a domain of content has been 
represented in the test and on the scope of the sample, i.e. whether the items 
broadly sample the domain. Achenbach reports (1966, 1978a, 1978b) that the 
development of the behavior problem items of the CBCL was based on a 
symptom checklist he used in a factor-analytic study of case history data. To 
collect data for an empirical grouping of attributes, he used a procedure in which 
he attempted to minimize the influence of systematic biases in the observer. He 
sought "symptom categories which were objective, and required as litde inference 
as possible" (1966, p.7). He constructed a checklist from items which "regularly 
appeared in previous studies which seemed to involve minimal inference, which 
could be considered mutually exclusive with regard to specific observations, and 
which were not excessively molecular" (1966, p.7). To obtain more symptom 
categories, 40 case histories of a child psychiatry unit of the university were 
analyzed. Finally, a list of 91 symptoms was constructed. "Symptom" referred to 
deviant behaviors, postures, attitudes, or verbalizations accepted as reasons for 
psychiatric concern. This original checklist was adapted to be used by parents by 
simplifying the words, by expanding the response alternatives, and by adding new 
items in consultation with clinicians. Pilot editions were further revised on the 
basis of item analysis and feedback from parents, clinicians and paraprofessionals 
(1978a). In this way the final problem behavior list, the Child Behavior Checklist 
(CBCL), was constructed, containing 118 problem behaviors. 
In view of the large number of case histories used, (1,000 child psychiatric 
patients, 1978a), one might suppose that the behavior problem items of the 
CBCL adequately represent the aforementioned domain. But as already stated, it 
is difficult to check for this type of validity. In the manual of the CBCL its content 
validity is justified through reference to the fact that, on nearly all of the items in 
the list, the clinically-referred children received higher scores than the non-
referred children (1983). This fact however points to the discriminative validity of 
the CBCL, which has also been demonstrated for Dutch children by Verhuist 
(1985). The representativeness of the item pool of the CBCL for a Dutch clinical 
population has to our knowledge not been checked. 
Achenbach and Edelbrock themselves stress the fact that "prospective users 
should judge whether the content of the CBCL is appropriate for their particular 
purposes"(1983, p.51). In view of our purpose ( the design of a computerized 
diagnostic knowledge system), we cannot fail to check the elementary aspect of 
the content validity of the CBCL. We decided to investigate whether the item 
sample of the CBCL broadly covers the domain of problem behaviors due to 
which children aged 6-11 are referred in Dutch clinical practice. 
Two studies addressing this issue are reported in the present chapter. 
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Study ι: The content validity of the standard CBCL 
In this study we attempted to assess whether the items of the CBCL appropriately 
represent problem behaviors of children aged 6 to n as reported in clinical 
practice. Following Achenbach (1966) we collected descriptions of problem 
behaviors from case histories. Subsequendy, we compared these descriptions with 
the items of the CBCL. 
Study 2: The content validity of an expanded CBCL 
The results of Study 1 led to an expansion of the CBCL and to a study with this 
expanded behavior checklist in a practical diagnostic situation. In this study 
it was examined whether the problem behaviors that appear in a specific clinical 
group, namely children with motor dysfunctions, can be determined with the 
expanded behavior checklist. Futhermore, the added value of the CBCL method 
above an open-question during the phase of problem identification method was 
analyzed (Ten Cate & Hoge, 1989). 
3.2 Study 1 : The content validity of the standard CBCL 
5.2.J Method 
Samplingprocedure 
The population consisted of case histories of children who had been clinically 
referred because of behavior problems. A sample was drawn from a file of 
standardized diagnostic reports of a Dutch professional organization for 
diagnosticians, the NVO. Diagnosticians who want to obtain a professional 
registration within this organization have to submit five completely diagnosed 
case histories. As a result, this organization has at its disposal a file consisting of 
hundreds of standardized reports obtained from several different mental health 
services. One of the standard requirements for the reports submitted is that the 
diagnostician has to give a clear and complete description of the child's problems. 
This gready facilitated the collecting of the descriptions of problem behaviors in 
the present study. From all of the reports submitted by the 128 diagnosticians 
registered between 1980 and 1987,582 case histories formed a pool from which the 
sample to be used in the present study was drawn. 
The sample was obtained as follows: First, the original file was stratified 
according to the different mental health services involved. Reports submitted by 
diagnosticians who worked in settings that were not primarily concerned with 
treating problem behaviors of intellectually normal children were disregarded; 
similarly reports in which the diagnosticians place of work was not mentioned 
were omitted. For the remaining cases, information was collected about the 
child's age and sex.These steps yielded a file consisting of 324 case histories, 
involving 97 girls and 227 boys, aged 6-11. In Table 3.1. the distribution of the 
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diagnosticians over different mental health services and the distribution of boys 
and girls over the case histories is given. 
Finally, a sample was taken from this file conforming to the gender distribution 
and to the distribution of mental health services. It consisted of 93 case histories, 
involving 26 girls and 67 boys, all aged 6 to 11. 
Table 3.1 
Overview of cases from whkh the sam pie for Study 1 
Ambulant servkes 
1. RIAGG /MOB 
2. Team VroegTijdige Onderkenning 
3. GGenGD 
4. OBD/SBD/SAD 
5. Ambulatorium Orthopedagogiek 
6. РАО-Cursus Pedodiagnostiek 
7. Jeugdhuis en adviesburo 
8. Büro voor Pedagogische hulp 
9. Stotterproject 
10. Privi praktijk 
11. School-beroepskeuze buro** 
(Seml)-Fesldentlal services 
12. Dagcentrum voor schoolgaande 
jeugd 
13. Medisch kindertehuis 
14. Medisch kleuterdagverblijf 
15. (Kinder)ziekenhuis(5) 
Epilep$iecentrum(1) 
16. (Poli)kliniek kinderpsychiatrie 
17. Behandelingstehuis(5) 
Kindertehuis(l) 
18. Pedologisch instituut 
19. Behandelingstehuisvoorvisueel 
gehandicapten** 
20. (Semi)residentiele voorziening 
voor geestelijk gehandicaptenb 
2 1 . Schoolinternaat voor licahmelijk 
gehandicapten jongeren** 
Special schools** 
2 1 . LOM/MLK/ZMLK 
22. Internaatsschool 
Worksetting not ment ioned** 
Total 
was drawn. 
Diagnosticians 
20 
1 
3 
30 
6 
13 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
б 
7 
Б 
4 
4 
3 
1 
5 
1 
12 
134*** 
Girls* 
15.4% (IS) 
0.0 % (0) 
3.0 % ( 3 ) 
38.1 % (37) 
5 . 1 % (5) 
9.2 % (9) 
1.0 % ( 1 ) 
2.0 % (2) 
1.0%(1) 
2.0 % (2) 
0.0 % (0) 
4.1 % (4) 
0.0 % (0) 
3.0 % (3) 
6.1 % (6) 
7 . 2 % (7) 
2 . 0 % (2) 
100% (97) 
Boys** 
16.7% (38) 
0.4% (1) 
3 . 8 % (9) 
35.6 % (81) 
6.6% (15) 
12.7 % (29) 
0.4 %(1) 
0 . 8 % (2) 
1.7% (4) 
0.0 % (0) 
1.7% (4) 
0.8% (2) 
0.8% (2) 
5.2% (12) 
2.6 % (6) 
6 . 1 % (14) 
3.0% (7) 
100 % (227) 
* Each percentage is relative t o the total number of cases for the column. Absolute numbers are given in 
parentheses. 
* * These mental health services were omitted f rom the file f rom which the sample was taken. 
* ** There were 128 diagnosticians involved, 6 of w h o m had worked for 2 different services. 
Data base definition 
From the 93 case histories, the problem descriptions were extracted. In the reports 
the problem behaviors were described under different headings, such as problem 
description, complaint analysis, or analysis of problem area. Therefore all text in 
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the report preceding the formulation of one or more hypotheses (the next phase 
of the diagnostic process) was analyzed. Only problem behaviors of the child itself 
were taken into account; problems that other persons had with the child (e.g., the 
mother panics if child doesn't come home on time) were disregarded. The 
description was copied literally from the report; no interpretation or weighting 
was allowed. For example, if the problem description characterized the child as 
"naughty" , this was taken literally as the problem description. 
Subsequendy, we compared these problem behaviors with the items of the 
CBCL by writing the corresponding item number of the CBCL (the Dutch 
version, adapted by Verhubt) behind each of the collected problem behaviors as 
shown in the following example: 
Description of problem behavior CBCLItemnumber 
Is very nervous 45 (= nervous, high-strung, or tense) 
Panics easily if he cannot succeed 
Weak concentration 8 (= can't concentrate, can't pay attent ion for long) 
No special instruction was given as to whether the two characterizations had to be 
literally, or semantically equivalent. 
Problem behaviors that could not be matched to one of the CBCL items were 
examined more closely. Problem behaviors considered to involve specific learning 
problems (e.g. "has difficulty with visual analysis and synthesis") or problem 
behaviors clearly related to school situations were omitted, because the CBCL 
was not developed to assess these kinds of problem behaviors. On the base of 
semantic equivalence we combined the remaining descriptions. For example the 
following nine problem descriptions, literally copied from different case 
histories, were combined to one description, i.e., "fantasizes much, tells fantasy 
stories": (a) much fantasizing, (b) tells fantasy stories, (c) cannot separate fantasy 
and reality, (d) mixes fantasy and reality, (e) implausible stories, (0 tells many 
fantasy stories, (g) has a lot of fantasy. These aggregated descriptions represent 
problem behaviors presumably belonging to the domain covered by the CBCL 
but not listed in it. These aggregated descriptions will be referred to as non-
assigned items. We checked how often the CBCL items and the nonassigneditems 
appeared in the 93 reports (i.e., the prevalence rate of the two types of items). 
Reliability 
To study the reliability of the procedure just described, we randomly divided the 
93 reports into three groups of 31. Three raters, recent graduates in education 
(Rater B), clinical psychology (Rater C), and research psychology (Rater D), each 
independently analyzed a set of 31 reports. Guided by a written instruction 
illuminating the aforementioned procedure, they also extracted the problem 
behaviors from the reports and compared them with the CBCL items. Their 
results were compared with that of the author (Rater A) who had analyzed all 93 
reports. 
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The percentage of agreement between Rater A and the other three raters was 
determined for the extraction of the descriptions from the reports, and for the 
comparison of these problem descriptions with the CBCL. 85%, 82% and 89% of 
the behavior problems extracted by Rater A were also extracted by Rater В, С and 
D, respectively. 
The average percentage of agreement for Rater A with the other three raters 
with respect to the assignment of reported problems to CBCL was .77. The 
agreement between A and В was .83, between A and С it was .75 and between 
A and D it was .71. We only checked whether two observers agreed on assigning 
an extracted problem behavior to the CBCL, not whether they assigned it to the 
same CBCL item. Our main purpose was to check whether an extracted problem 
behavior could or could not be assigned to the CBCL. If two raters assigned an 
extracted problem behavior to different CBCL items, at least they agreed that it 
belongs to the domain covered by the CBCL. 
j.2.2 Results 
From the 93 reports, 811 problem behaviors were extracted by Rater A. 687 of 
these were also extracted by Rater B, C, and D together. The rate of assignment of 
these 687 behaviors to the CBCL Ís shown in Table 3.2, for each rater pair 
separately as well for Rater A with Raters B,C and D combined. 
Table 3 J 
Comparisons of the assignment of the 
three raters. 
Rater В 
Rater С 
Rater D 
-
assigned 
not assigned 
assigned 
not assigned 
assigned 
not assigned 
extracted problem 
Rater A 
assigned 
134 
7 
141 
118 
13 
131 
99 
19 
118 
behaviors to the CBCL between Rater A and the other 
not-assigned 
35 
71 
106 
44 
56 
100 
41 
50 
91 
169 
78 
247 
162 
69 
231 
140 
69 
209 
assigned 351 120 471 
Raters B.C. 
andD not assigned 39 177 216 
together 
390 297 687 
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The table shows that 71 of the 247 reported behaviors judged by both raters A and 
В (i.e., 29%) were not assigned by either of them to any CBCL item. The 
corresponding figures for Raters A and С are $6 (24%), and for Raters A and D 5o( 
24%). In all, 177(26%) of the 687 extracted problem descriptions were not 
assigned to the CBCL by either of the raters who judged them. 
Of these 177 problem descriptions, 30 were mainly related to a school situation or 
were considered to concern a specific learning problem. On the basis of the 
remaining 147 descriptions, 47 nonassigned items were formulated, each of 
which characterizes one or more of the nonassigned problem behaviors. The 
description of these items is given at the end of Table 3.3, which also shows (in the 
first column) the prevalence of each item. 
Table 3.3 
Prevalence rate of the CBCL Items and the 47 nonassigned Kerns In different problem behavior samples.* 
NVO OQI Expanded 
reports CBCL 
CBCL Items: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2 1 . 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
3 1 . 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Acts too young for his/her age 
Allergy 
Argues a lot 
Asthma 
Behaves like opposite sex 
Bowel movements outside toilet 
Bragging, boasting 
Can't concentrate, can't pay attention for long 
Can't get his/her mind off certain thoughts:obsessions 
Can't sit still, restless, or hyperactive 
Clings to adults or too dependent 
Complains of loneliness 
Confused orseemstobeina fog 
Cries a lot 
Cruel to animals 
Cruelty, bulling, or meanness to others 
Daydreams or get lost in her/her thoughts 
Deliberately harms self or attempts suicide 
Demands a lot of attention 
Destroys his/her own things 
Destroys things belonging to his/her family or other children 
Disobedient at home 
Disobedient at school 
Doesn't eat well 
Doesn't get along with other children 
Doesn't seem to feel guilty after misbehaving 
Easily jealous 
Eats or drinks things that are not food 
Fearscertain animals, situations or places otherthan school 
Fears going to school 
Fears he/she might think or do something bad 
Feels he/she has to be perfect 
Feels or complainsthat no one loves him/her 
Feels others are out to get him/her 
10 
0 
20 
0 
1 
4 
3 
43 
1 
27 
5 
0 
3 
8 
0 
0 
10 
1 
16 
1 
2 
13 
1 
6 
10 
0 
2 
0 
4 
0 
1 
2 
0 
4 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
10 
0 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17 
3 
13 
2 
1 
4 
15 
22 
13 
12 
11 
5 
4 
1 
1 
2 
7 
0 
16 
1 
1 
8 
4 
9 
4 
5 
7 
0 
8 
0 
3 
13 
1 
2 
* The first column represents the sample from the 93 NVO reports. The second column represents the sample 
from the open-question inventory (OIQ) at 28 parents of physically handicapped children. The third column 
represents the inventory from the expanded CBCL at the same 28parents. 
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35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
4 1 . 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81 . 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91 . 
Feels worthless of inferior 
Gets hurt a lot.accident-prone 
Gets in many fights 
Getsteasedalot 
Mangs around kinds who get in trouble 
Hears things that are not there 
Impulsive or acts w i thout thinking 
Likes t o be alone 
Lying and cheating 
Bites fingernails 
Nervous, high-strung, ortense 
Nervous movements or twi tching 
Nightmares 
Not liked by other children 
Constipated, doesn't move bowels 
Too fearful or anxious 
Feels dizzy 
Feels too guilty 
Overeating 
Overtired 
Overweight 
Physical problems wi thout known medical cause; 
a. aches or pains 
b. headaches 
с nausea, feels sick 
d . problems w i t h eyes 
e. rashes of other skin problems 
f. stomachaches or cramps 
g . vomiting, throwing up 
e.other 
Physically attacks people 
Picks nose, skin, or other parts o f body 
Plays w i t h own sex parts in public 
Plays w i t h o w n sex parts t o o much 
Poor school work 
Poorly coordinated or clumsy 
Prefers playing w i t h older children 
Prefers playing w i t h younger children 
Refuses t o talk 
Repeats certain acts over and over, compulsions 
Runs away f rom home 
Screams a lot 
Secretive, keepsthing t o self 
Sees things that are not there 
Self-conscious or easily embarrassed 
Sets fire 
Sexual problems 
Showing off orclowning 
Shy or t i m i d 
Sleeps less than most children 
Sleeps more than most children during days and/or night 
Smears or plays w i t h bowel movements 
Speech problems 
Stares blankly 
Steals at home 
Steals outside the home 
Stores up things he/she doesn't need 
Strange behavior 
Strange ideas 
Stubborn, sullen, or irritable 
Sudden changes in mood or feelings 
Sulks a lot 
Suspicious 
Swears or uses obscene language 
Talks about kill ing self 
NVO 
reports 
0 
13 
0 
9 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
0 
3 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
20 
4 
0 
4 
1 
0 
0 
2 
14 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
6 
0 
0 
1 
9 
0 
5 
3 
0 
9 
0 
4 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
OQI 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
12 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
7 
0 
2 
0 
Expanded 
CBCL 
5 
13 
13 
17 
0 
0 
0 
11 
14 
10 
13 
10 
10 
5 
0 
THECONTENTVAÜDITYOFTHECBCL 41 
92. Talksorwalksinsleep 
93. Talks t oo miKh 
94. Teases a lot 
95. Temper tant rumsorhot temper 
96. Th inksaboutsex toomixh 
97. Threatens people 
98. Thumb-sucking 
99. Too concerned w i t h neatness or cleanliness 
100. Trouble sleeping 
101. Truancy, skipsschool 
102. Underactive, slow-moving, or lacks energy 
103. Unhappy, sad of depressed 
104. Unusually loud 
105. Uses alcohol or drugs 
106. Vandalism 
107. Wets self during the day 
108. Wets the bed 
109. Whining 
110. Wishes to be of opposite sex 
111. Withdrawn, doesn't get involved w i th others 
112. Worrying 
NVO 
reports 
0 
0 
3 
14 
0 
0 
1 
0 
9 
2 
8 
7 
3 
0 
0 
1 
5 
0 
0 
16 
4 
OQI 
0 
0 
1 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
3 
0 
0 
0 
Expanded 
CBCL 
3 
14 
7 
10 
0 
0 
4 
6 
3 
0 
8 
2 
6 
0 
0 
2 
4 
2 
0 
2 
3 
Added Items 
1. Fantasizes a lot, tells fantasy stories 
2. Messy work 
3. Failstofinishthingshe/shestarts 
4. Defiant, impudent answers 
5. Strongly opinionated, talks back often 
6. Forgetful, can't rememberthings 
7. Is or plays alone of ten 
8. Needs constant supervision during play or work t ime 
9. Defiant, refuses to do what heorshe is to ld 
10. Inconsiderate t o others, insensitive 
11. Hates school, doesn't like to go t o school 
12. Afraid t o make mistakes, fear of failure 
13. Behaves irresponsibly 
14. Shows few emotions 
15. Sneaky 
16. Unusual playing behavior 
17. Gets easily angry if she or he can't have her or his own way 
18. Impatient 
19. Gives in easily, not assertive 
20. Is not affected by rules or norms 
2 1 . Has difficulty adapting 
22. Imitates others 
23. Escapes f rom certain situations and/or problems 
24. Bossy 
25. Has difficulties w i th motor movements 
26. Doesn't do homework 
27. Irritable 
28. Lacks self-confidence 
29. Avoids physical contact 
30. Needs help w i th eating, washing, and/or dressing 
3 1 . Panics easily 
32. Materialisticallyoriented 
33. Continues trying t o have things his or her own way 
34. Rejects help f rom mother 
35. Doesn't participate in competitive games 
36. Doesn't seem t o be afraid, shows no fear 
37. Can't handle demands 
38. Sensitive, easily hurt 
39. Hesitates often, can't make up his or her mind or make choices 
40. Naughty 
4 1 . Minds everyone's business 
10 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
2 
0 
1 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
5 
1 
3 
1 
0 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
1 
9 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
7 
16 
9 
11 
В 
22 
6 
4 
7 
2 
17 
3 
7 
3 
3 
20 
15 
10 
5 
β 
8 
14 
9 
23 
2 
7 
15 
3 
17 
12 
3 
17 
3 
9 
15 
12 
22 
12 
20 
13 
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42. Homesick 
43. Talks a lot about death 
44. Can't stand losing 
45. Strongly wants contact with others 
46. Behavesaggressivelytowardcertain persons 
in his or her environment 
47. Can't stand being alone 
NVO 
reports 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
OQI 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
Expanded 
CBCL 
7 
9 
19 
24 
3 
9 
These results show that in psychodiagnostic practice many problem behaviors are 
reported that are not represented in the item sample of the CBCL. 
3.3 Study 2: Content validity of an expanded CBCL1 
This study was designed to establish whether the problem behaviors that appear 
in a specific clinical group, namely children with motor dysfunctions, can be 
determined with the CBCL and the 47 nonassigned items. Furthermore, the 
added value of the CBCL method above an open-question method during the 
diagnostic phase of problem identification was analyzed. 
J . J . J Method 
In this study 28 parents of children with motor dysfunctions aged 6-14 took part. 
On the basis of the open question "which behaviors of your child do you think are 
problematic", parents gave written reports of problem behaviors. About 2 
months later the same parents filled in the CBCL, expanded with the 
aforementioned 47 items. The problem behaviors that emerged from this 
method were compared with the problem behavior descriptions that emerged 
from the open-question method (for more details we refer to Ten Cate & Hoge, 
1989). 
j.3.2 Results 
140 behaviors were reported by the parents with the open-question method. 
From these behaviors 20 could not be scored in the expanded CBCL. After 
similar behaviors were combined 13 problem behaviors remained. In Table 3.4 the 
open-question method and the expanded CBCL method are compared in terms 
of the number of problems found. 
Results show that more than six times as many problem behaviors were 
inventoried with the expanded CBCL (975) as with the open-question method 
(140). Of the total amount of inventoried problem behaviors (975+140), 
regardless of the method, the expanded CBCL covered over 87%. The CBCL 
without the 47 supplementary items covered 48%. Column 3 of Table 3.3 shows 
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which CBCL items and nonassigned items were filled in by the parents. Twelve 
items of the CBCL were filled in by more than thirteen parents. Fifteen of the 47 
supplementary items were also filled in by more than thirteen parents. 
Table 3.4 
Comparison of the number of Inventoried problem behavlore using the open-question method, the CBCL and the 
expanded CBCL 
Number 
Behaviors inventoried w i th the open-question method 140 
Represented in expanded CBCL 
Not represented in expanded CBCL 
Behaviors inventoried w i th the expanded CBCL 975 
Filled in on the standard CBCL items 
Filled in on the 47 supplementary items 
Total number of inventoried behaviors 1115 
3.4 Discussion 
This two studies demonstrate that the items of the CBCL do not cover the broad 
range of problem behaviors that are mentioned in diagnostic reports. Of course, 
no checklist can ever represent every exact symptom which might possibly occur 
to any child. The dysfunctionality of behavior depends on cultural and 
sociological conditions and varies over time. But we may question whether the 
CBCL is representative enough to be used as a data base in a computerized diag-
nostic knowledge system. 
It is interesting to speculate about possible explanations for these findings. 
One can argue that the problem behaviors collected in this study are not relevant 
with respect to the content validity of the CBCL. Is it justified to use diagnostic 
reports as an information source to determine the content validity of an 
instrument that parents fill in themselves? To what extent do the reports reflect 
what the diagnosticians consider to be a problem, and not what the problem is 
according to the parents? But the fact that the reports came from professional 
registered diagnosticians give us confidence in the accuracy of the reproduction 
of the problems parents had reported to them. The registration committee 
requires a concrete description of the problems of the client in the diagnostic 
report. Note also that the items of the CBCL were developed through an 
extensive study of child psychiatric case histories (Achenbach, 1966). 
In this study, problem behaviors were not collected in natural settings of 
mental health services. Instead, we presumed that the file of case histories of a 
Dutch organization of diagnosticians would represent the diversity of the 
diagnostic practice. It is difficult to check the representativeness of this file since 
120 
20 
507 
468 
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there is no appropriate overview of mental health services for children with 
behavior problems. However, even if the file does not reflect the diversity of 
problems existing in the clinical field, it does not affect the conclusion that the 
CBCL, at least for Dutch clinically referred children aged б-іі, does not represent 
all the relevant problem behaviors. 
All problem behaviors collected in this study were reasons for clinical referral. 
Some of the nonassigned or supplemental items may look unimportant or 
infrequent to many a diagnostician. But that is also true for some CBCL items. 
Achenbach himself remarks that "many of the problem behaviors are not 
intrinsically pathological, but are exhibited to some extent by most children and 
youth" (1985, p.17). The behavior becomes problematic by virtue of the frequency 
with which it is exhibited by the child. In column 1 of Table 3.3 one can see that 43 
CBCL items did not appear as problematic behavior in the report sample. 19 
CBCL items appeared once in the report sample. 
It is difficult to decide about the clinical relevance of problem behavior. In the 
reports written by the parents fewer problems were always mentioned than when, 
the CBCL was filled in. One can infer from this fact that probably in the reports 
only the most striking and therefore relevant problem behaviors were mentioned. 
During the phase of identification of problem behaviors it is important not to 
dismiss information too quickly as being irrelevant. Column 3 of Table 3.3 shows 
that the added items were frequently filled in by the parents of the children with 
motor dysfunctions. Further empirical research should provide an answer to the 
question of the discriminative validity of the added items. 
While preparing this manuscript we were informed by T.M. Achenbach and 
F.C. Verhulst (personal communication, June 1989) that Achenbach, Conners 
and Quay have constructed an expanded behavior checklist (ACQ behavior 
checklist for ages 4-16) which contains one hundred items more than the CBCL. 
We can only agree that our empirical findings also strongly support an expansion 
of the item base of the CBCL and the need for empirical research comparing this 
list with the CBCL. This does not imply that we question the factor structure of 
the CBCL, as revealed in its empirical syndromes. But it raises the question 
whether the added items or symptoms are part of the syndromes that have already 
been empirically derived. This question can only be answered by research in 
which old and new items are submitted to factor analysis.2 
For now it can be concluded that if the CBCL is intended to be used as a 
standardized assessment instrument in a knowledge system, according to our 
findings a number of items should be added. 
3.5 Implications for further research 
Results from this study show that the clinician regularly is confronted with 
individual problem behavior that is not mentioned in an empirical classification 
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system such as the Achenbach system. One can advocate empirical research to 
determine whether these problem behaviors or symptoms are part of the 
syndromes that have already been empirical derived. But this approach cannot 
solve the more important functional problem in the use of classification systems, 
namely how to deal with individual problem behavior that doesn't fit into the 
classes of the system. How does or can a diagnostician decide whether the 
symptom or problem behavior is part of a class or a syndrome? To obtain practical 
guidelines for solving this classification problem, we focused the rest stage of our 
research on the classification processes of experienced diagnosticians. How do 
diagnosticians classify behaviors, and in particular, the special cases not found in 
an actuarial system? A study on psychodiagnostic classification will be reported in 
the next chapter. 
1. We especially want to thank Dr. E. van Aarlefor providing the idea of examining 
the expanded checklist in a practical diagnostic situation and for his guidance during 
the execution of this study. 
2. Some of the questions raised here have in the meantime been more or less answered 
because Achenbach has reported that empirical research with the ACC¿ failed to 
identify any syndromes that were not identified by the CBCL. Furthermore, the ACQ 
discriminated less well than the CBCL between referred and non-referred samples 
(Achenbach, 1989). To our best knowkdge the co-occurrence of 'the added items or 
symptoms with the already empirically derived symptoms has not been reported in the 
literature. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Classification of dysfunctional behavior is an important task in clinical decision 
making (Achenbach, 1985; De Bruyn, 1985; Rispens, 1986; Rutter, Tuma, & Lann, 
1988). Whether the diagnostician intends this or not, it focuses or guides the 
generation of hypotheses concerning the conditions that elicit or sustain the 
identified problem. It narrows down the field in terms of causes, treatment, and 
prognosis and, as noted by Rutter (1975), it provides a short-hand language for 
communication with other professionals. 
Several classification systems have been proposed to systemize and support this 
diagnostic task, for example DSM-III-R (1987) and the CBCL system (Achen-
bach & Edelbrock, 1983). Whatever classification system the diagnostician is 
using, he or she will inevitably be unable to classify all observed problematic 
behaviors with the system at hand. Krol and De Bruyn (i99oa;i99ob), for 
example, screened a nationwide sample of diagnostic files for characterizations of 
behavior problems in children. Forty seven problems, many of which were 
frequently mentioned in the files, were not included in the standard list of 
Achenbach's classification system (cf. the previous chapter). 
One might argue that it is not feasible in principle to design classification 
systems that cover all manifestations of problem behavior. The definition, the 
dysfunctionality, as well as the manifestation of problem behavior seem to 
depend both on conditions in nature and on historical, cultural and sociological 
conditions. Therefore, diagnosticians will inevitably observe instances of 
problem behavior that are missing in the database of the classification system at 
hand. This does not imply that it is impossible to formulate decision rules that 
may help the diagnostician to solve such a classification problem. But where do 
such rules come from? 
When diagnosticians are confronted with instances of dysfunctional behavior 
not included in a classification system, they have to solve the problem on their 
own. If we assume that experienced or expert diagnosticians have developed 
internal classification rules, we can try to extract these rules from them, formalize 
these rules, and add these to the existing classification system. Such an approach 
was followed as early as in 1968 by Kleinmuntz, who was able to extract the 
decision rules of an expert classifying MMPI profiles. According to Kolodner 
(1984), the ability of experts to deal with exceptional or novel cases develops as a 
result of noticing failures and successes, as well as differences and similarities 
between "cases". Her model of the development of expertise proposes two steps in 
the evolution from novice to expert. "First, knowledge is built up incrementally 
on the basis of experience. Facts, once unrelated, get integrated through 
occurrence in the same episodes. Second, reasoning processes are refined, and 
usefulness and rigidity of rules is learned" (1984, p.96). Experience reorganizes the 
structures of both the reasoning process and the domain knowledge 
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According to Kolodner's model, experience with the "art" of classification, is 
continously refining the reasoning process of diagnosticians. As a consequence, 
we expect to find differences between experts and novices in their reasoning 
processes during classification. To get a usable description of this reasoning 
process, we use the method of analyzing thinking-aloud protocols. This method 
seems to be particularly suited for detecting implicit cognitive operations 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1984). Our study focuses on the description of the cognitive 
operations involved in classification and investigates whether experts and novices 
differ in their use of cognitive operations during the classification of behavioral 
problems. 
The model of Kolodner also implies that experience, or the observation of co­
occurrences of symptoms in "cases", reorganizes the relationships between objects 
(i.e., symptoms and categories) in the domain knowledge. With respect to the 
field of clinical diagnostics, this means that experts should differ from novices in 
both the range of syndromes in which they organize symptoms, and in the ways in 
which symptoms within a syndrome are related to each other. In turn, differences 
in the range and internal organization of syndromes will lead to differences in the 
extent to which a dysfunctional behavior unit reflects the character of a 
syndrome, that is, the extent to which a particular symptom is typical for a 
syndrome. Thus, the second question we address in this study is whether experts 
and novices differ with respect to the outcome of the classification, in particular 
the typicality ratings of symptoms. 
In studies on decision making, task effects have often been demonstrated 
(Hamm, 1988). Therefore, we also investigate whether the reasoning processes of 
experts are influenced by the nature of the task: we compare the reasoning 
processes on two classification tasks, classifying new symptoms into a given 
classification system versus intuitive clustering of symptoms. 
To summarize, this chapter addresses the following questions: a) Do experts 
and novices differ in their use of cognitive operations during the classification of 
behavioral problems?, b) Do experts and novices differ with respect to the 
outcome of the classification, in particular the rating of the typicality of 
symptoms? and c) Does the nature of the classification task affect the use of 
cognitive operations? 
Task 
Expert group 1 
Novice group 
Expert group 2 
A 
X 
X 
В 
X 
X 
С 
χ 
Ν 
(η=12) 
(η=12) 
(η=10) 
Figure 4.1: The design of the study 
A: Classifying new symptoms In terms of CBCL syndromes; B: Rating new symptoms with respect to CBCL 
syndromes: С Intuitive clustering of the original CBCL-symptoms. 
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4.2 Method 
Design and Subjects 
The study involved three groups of subjects and three tasks. The assignment of 
tasks to groups is shown in Figure 4.1. 
The first group of experts consisted of 12 diagnosticians, selected with the help 
of a list of all of the institutions in the Netherlands involved in mental health 
services. They had been engaged in clinical practice for several years and were 
familiar with the diagnosis of behavior problems in children 6 to 11 years old. Six 
different work settings were chosen which are representative of the entire mental 
health field. From each setting two diagnosticians were selected, one clinical 
psychologist and one special educator, one male and the other female (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 
Composition of the two groups of experts 
Expert Group 1 Experience In years 
Setting 
Mental Health Services (RIAGG) 
Hospital for children or 
Medical Child Institution 
Special education treatment 
institution 
Clinic for child psychiatry 
School Consultation Center 
Remaining (Day care center) 
1 Male Psychologist 
2 Female Special Educator 
3 Female Psychologist 
4 Male Special Educator 
5 Male Psychologist 
6 Female Special Educator 
7 Male Psychologist 
8 Female Special Educator 
9 Female Psychologist 
10 Male Special Educator 
11 Female Special Educator 
12 Male Psychologist 
19 
12 
17 
8 
25 
27 
1Б 
7 
12 
16 
10 
2 
Expert Group 2 
Setting 
Hospital forchi ldren or 1 Female Psychologist 9 
Medical Child Institution 2 Male Special Educator 5 
Special education treatment 3 Male Psychologist 9 
institution 
Clinic for child psychiatry 4 Female Psychologist 8 
5 Male Psychologist 8 
6 Male Special Educator 10 
7 Male Special Educator 17 
8 Male Psychologist 3 
9 Male Special Educator 11 
10 Female Special Educator 4 
A second group of subjects consisted of novices: 12 female students at the 
University of Nijmegen, 6 majoring in Psychology and 6 in Special Education. 
Starting from the beginning of an alphabetical list (in the case of Special 
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Education) or from the end (Psychology) students were invited by telephone to 
participate, until the required number of subjects was reached. There was also a 
second group of experts which was similar to the first one but not quite as 
representative with respect to work setting and gender (see Table 4.1). None of the 
experts in the first group was using the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) in his 
or her work, although most of them did know of its existence. As to the novice 
group, the CBCL had not yet been studied in their courses. In the second expert 
group, only one diagnostician was using the CBCL system in his practice (the 
other 9 subjects were not familiar with the CBCL). 
Classification tasks and procedure 
The three tasks used in this study were all concerned with classifying sympto ms in 
one way or another. In the construction of the tasks we used the empirical 
classification system as developed by Achenbach because it is the best validated 
and reliable system in the field of child psychopathology (Achenbach, Verhuist, 
Baron, & Althaus, 1987; cf. chaps. 2 and 3 of this thesis). This classification system 
is based on ratings obtained with the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), a 
parents' report on the problem behavior of their child. 
Taks A: Classifying new symptoms in terms of CBCL syndromes. 
In Task A, 'new' symptoms had to be classified by means of the syndrome system 
provided by the CBCL. Fourty-seven problem behaviors that were observed in 
clinical practice but that are not included in the CBCL system served as new 
symptoms (cf. Krol & De Bruyn, 1990, and the description of Study 1 in chap. 3 of 
this thesis. The 47 items are listed at the end of Table 3.3). The problem behaviors 
were printed on small cards, the CBCL syndromes on larger cards. Each of the 
syndrome cards listed the CBCL items defining that syndrome, printed in a 
random order. 
There were seven cards for the syndromes of boys and seven for those of girls. 
The labels of the syndromes were not shown on the cards. One miscellaneous 
card contained CBCL items that do not occur together in any single syndrome. 
Six subjects of each group received the girls' syndromes plus the miscellaneous 
card and six the boys' syndromes plus the miscellaneous card. 
Subjects were instructed to consider whether, in their experience, the problem 
behaviors on the small cards belonged to any of the syndromes. They were 
instructed to think aloud during the task. The role of the interviewer was 
nondirective, although she prompted the subjects to verbalize their thoughts. As 
soon as the task was completed, the subjects were asked to answer a few questions 
concerning their education, their place of work, and their number of years of 
experience. 
The thinking-aloud protocols of Task A provided information with respect to 
the cognitive processes involved in symptom classification. The outcomes of Task 
A provided information with respect to the embedding of problem behaviors in a 
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well-defined empirical classification system. 
Task B: Rating new symptoms with respect to CBCL syndromes. 
In Task В the syndrome cards and the instructions were changed, partly for 
reasons not relevant to the present study. The items defining the syndromes were 
printed on the cards in descending order of factor loading; the factor loadings 
themselves were not printed on the cards (see Table 4.2 for an example card and 
Appendix A for a listing of all syndromes in Dutch). 
Table 4.2 
Example of a syndrome card where the CBCL Items defining the syndrome are listed in descending order of their 
factor loading 
Syndrome card 4 
1 Acts t o young for her age 
62 Poorly coordinated or clumsy 
61 Poor school work 
8 Can't concentrate, can't pay attention for long 
41 Impuls iveoractswithoutthmking 
64 Prefers playing w i t h younger children 
13 Confused orseemsto be in a fog 
38 Getsteased a lot 
10 Can't sit still, restless, or hyperactive 
79 Speech problems 
23 Disobedient at school 
102 Underactive, slow moving, lacks energy 
17 Day-dreams or gets lost in her thoughts 
Factor loading' 
65 
65 
58 
55 
48 
41 
40 
38 
38 
35 
33 
33 
31 
The factor loadings were not written on the cards 
To control for memory effects subjects were given the syndromes from the gender 
group that were not used in Task A. The subjects received the syndrome cards one 
by one, in random order. They had to indicate a "typicality rating" for each 
problem behavior in relation to each syndrome on a scale from о to 9, with '9' 
meaning that a problem behavior is very much a part of the syndrome and 'o ' that 
it does not belong to the syndrome at all. Subjects were instructed to refrain from 
thinking aloud. The outcomes of Task B, like those of Task A, also provided 
information with respect to the embedding of problem behaviors in a well-
defined empirical classification system. 
Task C: Intuitive clustering of the original CBCL symptoms. 
In Task С expert diagnosticians were asked to cluster the original items of the 
CBCL from their own points of view. Subjects were first given a set of 112 small 
cards containing the problem behaviors and child characteristics as used by the 
CBCL. From this set they could select the behaviors and child characteristics with 
which they were familiar. Problem behaviors and characteristics which they met 
in their practice but which were not in the CBCL set, could be written down on 
new cards. Next, subjects were asked to sort the collected behaviors and 
characteristics into clusters containing items that in their own clinical experience 
frequently co-occurred. They were allowed to form as many clusters as they 
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wanted and to put the same item in more than one cluster. They were instructed 
to think aloud during this task. In this task the question is whether the same 
cognitive processes are involved in sorting the original CBCL items into clusters 
and in classifying new symptoms into the CBCL system. The question of 
whether the outcome of the sorting process is in agreement with the empirically 
established system of clusters is dealt with in chapter 5. 
Table 4 3 
Definitions of cognitive operations used In a psychodiagnostic classification task. 
1. Asking fororgiving Information 
Questions about or remarks on the problem behavior, the syndrome or items of a syndrome, e g 
'I don't consider "naughty" that to be a problem' 
'I don't understand what is meant, the behavior is not concrete ' 
T h e description of the behavior is too vague' 
2. Associating 
Looking for or mentioning associated behaviors and/or characteristics This is done by using phrases like 'the child 
will also have behavior χ and characteristic y', or by talking about an image of a child, or by giving an example of a 
child These 'associations' are formulated as concrete behaviors or characteristics, e g 
'What kind of child panics easily7 well I think a child who is afraid of losing control over the situation' 
This child goes his own way* (= Syndrome 1 ) 
'This chi Id has a very good memory' (= Syndrome 2) 
3. Abstracting or labeling 
Assi gningalabel,an abstraction or an interpretation to a problem behavior, syndrome or item of a syndrome This is 
done by referring to a problem group, e g , children with attachment problems or contact disorder, or by mentioning 
a personality type, e g neurotic Unlike 'associations' these labels or abstractions are not concrete behaviors This 
cognitive operation is concerned with the grouping or ordering of behaviors, characteristics or syndromes under a 
broader denominator, e g 
'You often see this (ι e , the problem behavior) m children found in the domain of psychiatry* 
'These (the problem behaviors) all have to do with social contact' 
'This is the neurotic syndrome' (Syndrome 3) 
'I have put syndromes 1 and 2 together, they are all extravert behaviors and those are the introvert syndromes 7, 5, 
and3' 
4 Explaining 
Explaining a behavior, a syndrome or an item of a syndrome by mentioning reasons or causes for the problematic 
behavior or syndrome This operation is concerned with the explanation of problems and syndromes, e g 
'lam looking for the reasons of this behavior' 
These are behavior problems caused by a lack of structure' 
'You will often see this conglomeration of behaviors (Syndrome 2) when a fundamental disturbance in the relation 
between mother and child is involved' 
5-7 Matching 
Matching comparing the different concepts with each other Phrases like 'this looks like', 'this is the same as', 'this 
belongs to' and 'you see this behavior in' are used 
The following distinction is made concerning the result of the matching 
S. Neutral Matching 
Comparing of concepts without a definite conclusion It is not clear if the concepts match or do not match, e g 
'I am wondering between syndrome 6 or 5 is applicable' 
Б. Identifying (positive match) 
Identifying, comparing of concepts resulting in a positive match 
'That (ι e , problem behavior) belongs to syndromes 1 and 2' 
7. Differentiating (negative match) 
Differentiating, comparing of concepts resulting m a negative match 
'I don't think that he panics easily, number one' (ι e . Syndrome 1 ) 
Note In the coding system, the names of the cognitive operations were omitted to encourage the coders to look at 
the content, ι e the definitions of the operations 
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Tasks A and В were presented in two seperate sessions, three weeks apart. Task A 
preceded Task B, so as to obtain classification results that were unaffected by the 
instructions and materials of Task B. For the experts, a two-hour time-limit was 
in effect for Task A; a few subjects did not complete the task on time, but some of 
them went on to complete it anyway. Novices were likewise not allowed more 
than two hours for Task A, and three of them did not complete it. All subjects 
completed Task В and С on time. Sessions with the diagnosticians were 
conducted at their own offices, whereas sessions with the no\ices were conducted 
at the University. The first author administered Task A and B, whereas two 
instructors administered Task С at the offices of the diagnosticians. 
Coding the thinking-aloudprotocoh 
As yet, no category system has been accepted to describe the cognitive operations 
involved in the part of the diagnostic process that involves classifying problem 
behaviors. We used the generic model of classification called heuristic classific­
ation (Breuker, 1986; Clancey, 1985) during the development of our category 
system. Seven categories were distinguished (see Table 4.3 ). 
To identify the cognitive processes involved in classification, we analyzed the 
verbal protocols from Tasks A and С using the guidelines of Ericsson and Simon 
(1984). The protocols were transcribed verbatim. The analysis of the protocols 
involved two activities. First, we segmented the text into units. A segment or unit 
was defined as a piece of text containing enough information to associate it with a 
code. Second, we assigned codes corresponding to cognitive operations (see Table 
4.3). When a segment was insufficiently self-contained, for example because it 
included anaphoric references like 'this' or 'that', at most two immediately prece­
ding or following segments were consulted in order to obtain the information 
required for coding it (for details, see Krol, 1990). 
The reliability of the system was checked by having two persons code four 
randomly selected pages of each protocol. Then, kappa (Cohen, i960) was used as 
an index of agreement. Agreement with respect to segmenting a protocol section 
into coding units ranged from .61 to .95, with a mean of .86 over all 22 protocols. 
The kappa values for agreement in coding cognitive operations ranged from .44 
to .97, with a mean of .65; sixteen values were "moderate" (between .41 and .60), 
thirteen were "substantial" (between .61 and .80), and five were "almost perfect" 
(between .81 and i.oo)( Landis & Koch, 1977; Popping ,1983). 
Data analysis 
The first expert group and the novice group were compared with respect to the 
cognitive operations they used in classifying symptoms in Task A, first by means 
of a univariate analysis of variance with the total frequency of operations as the 
dependent variable, and second, by means of a multivariate analysis of variance 
involving the relative frequencies of the different operations. A similar 
comparison was made between the first and the second expert group to reveal 
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potential task effects. 
To compute the agreement between the expert and the novice group with 
respect to the outcome of Task A, (the classification of 47 problem behaviors into 
CBCL syndromes), we first determined for each problem behavior a mean 
classification score for each group by counting the number of times an expert or 
novice classified it in terms of a specific syndrome and divided this sum by the 
number of subjects in each group. This score indicated which CBCL syndrome 
the behavior belonged to according to the expert group (n=io) or according to the 
novice group (n=9). The ns are lower than the number of subjects per group (12) 
because the scores of the subjects who did not complete Task A are not included. 
Most subjects in both groups classified a given problem behavior in terms of 
more than one syndrome. Then for each syndrome we correlated the 47 mean 
classification scores of the expert group with the scores of the novice group (using 
the Pearson product-moment correlation). 
Table 4.4 
Relative f requencles(li 
Cognitive 
operation 
1. Asking 
2. Associating 
3. Labeling 
4. Explaining 
5. Neutral Matching 
6. Identifying 
7. Differentiating 
Cognitive 
operation 
1. Asking 
2. Associating 
Э. Labeling 
4. Explaining 
5. Neutral matching 
6. Identifying 
7. Differentiating 
11 % ) o f the cognitive o| 
Expert group 
1 
10.8 
23.3 
13.3 
4.1 
17.7 
24.1 
6.8 
2 
7.3 
2 2 2 
25.5 
5.8 
23.3 
13.9 
2.0 
Novice group, 
1 
3.6 
15.7 
6.9 
0 
27.3 
20.4 
26.0 
2 
3.4 
2.8 
3.4 
0 
61.4 
202 
8.9 
»rat ions for each expert and novice* 
1. Task A 
3 
6.3 
17.5 
12.4 
4.7 
13.4 
30.0 
15.7 
.Task A 
3 
4.5 
9.8 
2.6 
0 
40.5 
36.1 
6.5 
4 
1.9 
10.5 
13.1 
2.1 
40.3 
22.6 
9.5 
4 
3.7 
1 1 J 
7.5 
0.3 
40.1 
252 
12.0 
5 
13.6 
19.2 
7.7 
10.7 
30.8 
14.2 
3.8 
5 
2.9 
12.4 
7.3 
0.9 
41.8 
22.0 
12.7 
6 
8.1 
18.6 
12.0 
3.2 
33.8 
20.7 
3.5 
6 
7.1 
17.4 
9.4 
0 
44.2 
14.3 
7.5 
7 
3.9 
14.0 
16.4 
4.1 
28.9 
17.0 
15.9 
7 
1.5 
11.0 
1.0 
0.1 
29.2 
24.4 
32.7 
β 
12.4 
12.7 
15.4 
2.7 
39.9 
93 
7.5 
8 
9.6 
12.8 
4.9 
0 
44.5 
21.6 
6.7 
9 
10.0 
10.8 
18.9 
0.9 
39.3 
18.5 
1.6 
9 
2.3 
8.7 
4.4 
1.3 
42.3 
14.1 
26.9 
10 
7.8 
6.0 
11.8 
0.6 
40.6 
20.5 
12.7 
10 
5.2 
9.0 
6.8 
1.0 
3 6 2 
20.9 
20.9 
11 
14.4 
5.6 
26.6 
10.9 
21.0 
19.6 
1.6 
11 
2.2 
5.7 
10.7 
0 
52.1 
8.0 
21.2 
12 
13.3 
12.3 
10.0 
2.4 
31.2 
20.3 
9.7 
12 
4.8 
2.5 
4.0 
0 
38.5 
19.1 
31.2 
EKpertgroup2.TaskC 
Cognitive 
operation 
1. Asking 
2. Associating 
3. Labeling 
4. Explaining 
5. Neutral matching 
6. Identifying 
7. Differentiating 
1 
12.9 
12.9 
39.4 
7.6 
0.0 
22.7 
1.5 
2 
5.1 
2.5 
84.6 
1.3 
0.4 
4.3 
1.7 
3 
3.5 
13.9 
74.1 
6.1 
0.3 
0.9 
M 
4 
9.6 
22.3 
39.9 
6.1 
1.9 
153 
5.0 
5 
6.0 
10.0 
62 
6.0 
0 
16.0 
0 
6 
13.1 
23.0 
37.6 
6.9 
0.6 
12.8 
6.0 
7 
12.9 
12.5 
59.6 
3.5 
1.0 
6.8 
3.9 
8 
7.9 
7.1 
65.9 
11.7 
0.8 
2.4 
4.3 
9 
16.1 
5.2 
61.8 
14.6 
0.4 
1.1 
0.7 
10 
13.1 
26.6 
43.2 
3.5 
0.9 
6.6 
6.1 
'The percentages refer to the number of times a segment was assigned to each category divided by the total number 
of segments in the protocol (i.e., the total number of operations). 
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Agreement between experts and novices regarding the typicality ratings of the 47 
new problem behaviors with respect to the CBCL syndromes was computed as 
follows: For each problem behavior and each of the boys' syndromes, six ratings 
were available in each group; and similarly for the girls' syndromes. For each 
syndrome, the 47 mean typicality ratings of the experts and the 47 mean 
typicality ratings of the novices were correlated using the Pearson product-
moment correlation, which provided an overall index of agreement in typicality. 
Furthermore, we applied a t-test to the two mean typicality scores for each 
problem behavior, separately. 
Finally, for each syndrome we correlated the mean classification score of each 
problem behavior (from Task A) with the mean typicality score of each problem 
behavior (from Task B). In this way we obtained an index of consistency of the 
judgements over the two tasks. 
The actual embedding of the problem behaviors into the empirical class­
ification system is summarized. 
4.3 Results 
Cognitive operations of experts and novices during the classification of new symptoms 
in terms of CBCL syndromes. 
The relative frequency of each cognitive operation for each subject is given in 
Table 4.4. 
Table 4.5 shows the mean relative frequencies of the seven cognitive operations 
as a function of experience ( experts versus novices) and as a function of framing 
(Task A versus Task C). 
ТаЫе4.5 
Mean relative frequency of cognitive 
group 
expert group 1 
novice group 
univariate p<.05 
ι operations as a function of expertise 
cognitive operatio 
1 
9.2 
4.2 
* 
2 
14.4 
9.9 
ns In Task A 
3 
15.2 
5.7 
* 
4 
4.4 
3 
* 
and task. 
5 
30.0 
41.5 
* 
6 
19.2 
20.5 
7 
7.5 
17.7 
* 
cognitive operations of experts 
task 
task A 
(expert group 1) 
task С 
(expert group 2) 
1 
9.2 
10.2 
2 
14.4 
13.6 
3 
15.2 
56.8 
4 
4.4 
6.7 
5 
30.0 
.6 
6 
19.2 
8.8 
7 
7.5 
3.0 
univariate p<.05 
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The univariate analysis of variance with the total frequency of operations in Task 
A as dependent variable showed no significant difference between the expert 
group and the novice group (Р(і,зі)=.ооз, p=.957). The mean number of 
cognitive operations in Task A was 1024 for the expert group and 1014 for the 
novice group. 
A multivariate analysis of variance with the mean relative frequencies of the seven 
cognitive operations as dependent variable and group (2 levels) as independent 
variable showed a significant effect (Wilks' lambda = .380, F(7,25)=5.825, p<.ooi). 
Subsequent univariate tests demonstrated for five operations a significant effect 
( a = .05). In comparison with novices, experts, that is diagnosticians with clinical 
experience, more often asked for information or gave their opinion (Operation 
i)(F(i,3i)=ii.526, p=.oo2); they also labelled or abstracted more often (Operation 
3)(F(i,3i)=5.977, p=.02o). Although explaining (Operation 4) appeared rarely in 
both groups, it appeared more frequently in the expert group(F(i,3i)=ii.466, 
p=.oo2). Neutral matching (Operation 5) appeared most frequendy in both 
groups but was used significandy more by the novices (Р(і,зі)=і2.9б4, p=.ooi). 
The novices also differentiated (Operation 7) more often than the experts 
(F(i,3i)=i3.75o)p=.ooi). 
The two groups were similar in their use of associating (Operation 2) and positive 
matching or identifying (Operation 6). 
Classification of the symptoms in terms of the CBCL syndromes 
The average classification score for each item into each girls' syndrome was based 
on five subjects for both the expert group and the novice group. For the boys' 
syndromes, this score was based on five subjects for the expert group and four 
subjects for the novice group. The average classification score for each item into 
the girls' syndrome Aggressive" is given in Appendix В as example. 
Table 4.6 
Correlation over problem behaviors between the experts' and the novices' mean classification scores. 
Syndrome number* 
1 2 3 4 5 Б 7 
boys'syndromes .77 .69 .71 .75 .51 .12 .58 
girls'syndromes .76 .74 .73 .75 .66 .77 .27 
* floys J = agrressive; 2 « delinquen f 3 = depressive; 4 = hyperactive; 5 = socially withrawn; 6 = somatic complaints; 7 = 
non-communicative. Girls 1 s aggressive; 2 = cruel; 3 = depresssive; 4в hyperactive; 5 s schizoid-obsessive; 6 в socially 
withdrawn; 7 = somatic complaints. 
The correlations (the Pearson product-moment correlation) between the mean 
classification scores of the expert group versus the novice group, shown in Table 
4.6, turned out to be high (ranging from .51 to .77) except for the boys' Syndrome 
6 (r=.i2) and the girls' Syndrome 7 (r=.27), both of which are "somatic complaint" 
syndromes. 
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Typicality raring of symptoms 
The correlations between the average typicality scores of the expert group versus 
the novice group turned out to be very high (see Table 4.7). ^ 
Table 4.7 
Correlations over problem behaviors of the experts' and novices' typicality scores. 
Syndrome number* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
boys'syndromes 84 90 88 87 67 85 83 
girls'syndromes 86 91 91 75 85 84 83 
*Boyi 1 = agrressive, 2 ш delinquent, 3 χ depressive, 4 = hyperactive, 5 = socially withrawn, 6 = somatic 
complaints,7=non-communicabve Girls 7= aggressive, 2 = cruel, 3= depressive, 4 = hyperactive, 5 - schizoid-
obsessive, 6= socially withdrawn, 7= somatic complaints 
The t-tests on the mean typicality scores for each problem behavior separately 
showed no more differences in the typicality scores of experts and novices than 
would be expected by chance (fewer than 5% of these tests showed significant 
results). This indicates that experts and novices generally agreed in their 
judgements of the typicality of a certain problem behavior for a syndrome. 
Cognitive operations in diffèrent classification tasks 
The mean total number of operations was considerably higher in task A 
(1024 ) than in Task С (267). A univariate analysis of variance confirmed this 
(F(i)3i)=30.493, p<.ooi). A muldvariate analysis of variance with the mean relat­
ive frequencies of the seven operations as dependent variable and task as 
independent variable also showed a significant effect (Wilks' lambda = .125, 
F(7)25)=25.i07) p<.ooi). Univariate tests showed a significant task effect for three 
operations (a =.05). As can be seen in Table 4.5, neutral matching (Operation 5), 
the Operation that occurred most often in Task A, is the one least often used in 
Task С (F(1,31)=77.071, p=.ooo) and identifying or positive matching (Operation 
6) was also used more often in Task A (F(i,3i)=13.571, p=.ooi). In Task C, labelling 
(Operation 3) was used considerably more often, in fact it turned out to be the 
most frequently used Operation (Р(і,зі)=іоз.590, p=.ooo). No significant 
differences were found in the occurrence of informing (Operation 1), associating 
(Operation 2), explaining (Operation 4) and differentiating (Operation 7). 
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Table 4.9 
Overview of the symptoms considered typical (average typicality score 26.0. η =24 ) f or each syndrome. 
Syndrome number* Щ} 
Number of 
typical 
symptoms 
Boys Girls 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 
Items 
0 
6.0 2 
6.7 3 
6.4 6.7 3 
6.2 1 
7.3 1 
8.0 8 3 7.2 4 
1 
6.7 3 
7.0 3 
6.4 2 
62 6.7 3 
6.6 2 
72 2 
6.7 2 
0 
6.5 3 
6.0 2 
6.6 1 
7.9 3 
6.1 6.7 4 
0 
6.0 6.0 6.6 3 
2 
6.8 1 
0 
7.0 6.9 4 
6.7 7.7 3 
6.7 1 
0 
6 J 1 
1 
6.7 3 
0 
6.5 1 
6.6 2 
0 
6.2 7.0 6.8 6.0 6.3 6 
1 
1 
1 
6.9 1 
0 
2 
0 
6.8 3 
1 
Sum 18 15 7 5 5 3 7 7 8 4 0 2 2 0 83 
'Boys 1 = agrressive; 2 = delinquent; 3 = depressive; 4 = hyperactive; 5 s socially withrawn; 6 m somatic complaints; 7 = 
non-communicative. Girls 1 = aggressive; 2 = cruel; 3 » depresssive;4* hyperactive; S=schizoid- obsessive; 6 » socially 
withdrawn; 7 a somatic complaints. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
6.1 
8.0 
8.0 
6.1 
72 
72 
6.7 
7.4 
7A 
6.7 
6.2 
6.5 
7.9 
72 
62 
6.4 
7.1 
7.1 
7.4 
7.5 
7.7 
62 
7.7 
6.7 
8.4 
6.7 
72 
6.9 
6.7 
6.7 
7.8 
6.5 
8.1 
7.6 
7.0 
7.5 
8.5 
83 
62 
6.5 
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.76 
.73 
.62 
.73 
.73 
.75 
.53 
.67 
.72 
.82 
.58 
.90 
.66 
.75 
.65 
.72 
.56 
.67 
.52 
.76 
.45 
.42 
.72 
.76 
.68 
.68 
.52 
.26 
.68 
.73 
.58 
.73 
Comparing the classifications of the symptoms 
with the typicality ratings of the symptoms 
The correlations between classification scores and typicality ratings ranged from 
.45 to .76 in the expert group, with a median of .63, and from .26 to .90 in the 
novice group, with a median of .73 (see Table 4.8). Thus the novice group seems a 
bit more consistent in their judgement than the expert group. 
Table 4.8 
Correlations between of the classifications and the typicality ratings of the sym ptoms for each syndrome. 
Syndrome number* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 median 
boys'syndromes 
experts 
novices 
girls' syndromes 
experts 
novices 
*Boys 1 = agrresslve; 2 = delinquent; 3 = depressive; 4 = hyperactive; 5 = socially withrawn; 6 = somatic complaints; 7 = 
non-commun/catiVe. Girls 1 = aggressive; 2 = cruel;3 « depresssive;4 = hyperactive; 5 = schizoid- obsessive; 6 = socially 
withdrawn; 7 = somatic complaints 
Summarizing the actual embedding of the problem behaviors into the syndromes 
To obtain more systematic information on the embedding of the 47 problem 
behaviors into the predefined CBCL syndromes we computed a summary 
typicality score for each problem behavior and each syndrome by averaging the 
experts' and novices' typicality scores. The outcome of the t-tests justified this 
procedure. Next we defined a symptom as typical for a syndrome if it obtained an 
average typicality score of 6.0 or more (remember that the summary score can 
range from о to 9) and determined which symptoms were considered typical for 
which syndromes ( see Table 4.9). 
From this table it can be seen that 18 symptoms were considered typical for 
boys' Syndrome 1 (aggressive) and 15 for boys' Syndrome 2 (delinquent). If one 
compares the number of items considered typical for boys' and girls' syndromes, 
the difference is remarkable: 60 symptoms typical for the boys' syndromes and 23 
for the girls' syndromes. 
Nine out of the 47 symptoms were not considered typical for any syndrome. 
About half of the symptoms (24) were considered typical for more than one 
syndrome. For example, symptom 38, "easily hurt", was scored as typical for six 
syndromes. However, one should take into account that the correspondence in 
items between certain boys' and girls' syndromes is substantial ( see Table 4.10). 
A minority of the symptoms (14) were rated as typical for only one syndrome. 
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Table 4.10 
Number of corresponding Items forthe girls' and boys' syndromes 
Girls' syndrome number* 
Boys'syndrome number* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 19 7 0 4 0 0 0 
2 1 6 0 1 0 0 0 
3 0 0 8 0 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 8 0 2 1 
5 1 2 2 2 0 3 0 
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
7 1 0 3 0 1 5 0 
'Boys 1 = agrressive; 2 = delinquent; 3 » depressive; 4* hyperactive; S « socially withrawn; 6 = somatic complaints; 7 = 
non-communicative. Girls 1 = aggressive;2 = cruel; 3 = depresssive; 4 = hyperactive; 5 = schizoid-obsessive; 6 = socially 
withdrawn; 7 = somatíc complaints. 
4.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to gain insight into the cognitive processes underlying 
psychodiagnostic classification. This was done with the ultimate goal of looking 
for heuristic classification rules that could serve as support for an existing 
empirical classification system. 
We identified seven cognitive operations that experienced diagnosticians use 
in classifying problem behavior. Five of them had discriminating validity in the 
sense that they were more or less often used by diagnosticians than by novices. 
Furthermore, we found that the nature of the classification task did have an effect 
on the classification approach of the expert. The relative frequency of three of the 
five discriminating operations was comparable in both task conditions. 
Unfortunately, limited time prevented us from analyzing differences in 
sequential use of the cognitive operations. Finally, we found that the typicality 
ratings of the diagnosticians were not different from those of the novices. This last 
finding may raise some doubt as to the expert status of our experienced 
diagnosticians. It seems necessary to analyze our somewhat contradictory 
findings before going on with an attempt to translate the "expert" operations into 
rules. 
Some of our results are compatible with Kolodner's model of the evolution of 
expertise (1984; Kolodner & Simpson, 1986). Our results suggest that experience 
has taught the diagnostician to change his reasoning process by questioning, 
abstracting or labelling the problem behavior more often during classification. 
This supports the change in reasoning processes that Kolodner's model 
postulates. It is also consistent with expert-novice shifts that Elio and Scharf 
(1990) describe in the physics domain. They report a qualitative analysis of the 
problem statement as being characteristic of an experts approach. 
On the other hand, according to Kolodner and Simpson (1986), experience 
would also reorganize the structure of domain knowledge. Elio and Scharf (1990) 
also stress the importance of changes in the organization and in the content of 
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domain-specific knowledge as a result of experience. Our measure of the 
typicality of problem behavior relates to the cognitive structure in which the 
domain-specific knowledge is organized. The classification and judgement of 
typicality reflect conceptions subjects have about the co-occurrence of problem 
behaviors. As the cognitive structure is supposed to change as a result of 
experience, we expected a difference in classification and typicality ratings 
between experienced diagnosticians and novices. Yet no difference was found. 
We do not need to doubt the validity of our classification and typicality ratings. 
In the few empirical studies which have addressed the same task domain of 
classifying problem behaviors (e.g., Chan & Jackson, 1982; Horowitz, Wright, 
Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981a; Horowitz, Post, French, Allis, & Siegelman, 1981b), 
it was also found that the cognitive structure of the more trained or experienced 
subjects did not differ from that of a less experienced or less trained group. Still, 
they did find differences between the two groups in terms of the weighting 
strategy involved in judgment (Chan & Jackson, 1982) and the number of 
features involved in prototyping (Horowitz et al., 1981a). Therefore, these studies 
can be seen as instances in which experienced diagnosticians do differ from less 
experienced persons in processing information about problem behavior, 
although they do not differ from them with respect to the structure of the domain 
knowledge. 
If we accept Kolodner's model of expert learning, we must conclude that the 
diagnosticians in this study occupy some intermediate position on the imaginary 
scale of expertise. Such an intermediate position is in accordance with Hamms 
description (1988) of the Dreyfus and Dreyfus theory of expertise, which 
distinguishes five stages one must go through to become an expert. However, the 
interesting question then becomes why persons who received a lot of training and 
do have a lot of experience (some over 20 years) in the clinical psychological 
domain did not learn enough to become full-fledged experts in the sense of 
Kolodner's model. In Kolodner and Simpsons (1986) view, expert learning results 
from the interaction between problem solving on the one hand and experience 
(including feedback) on the other hand. The feedback that clinicians receive in 
the mental health field is often flawed; this may account for the fact that so little is 
learned from experience (Garb, 1989). Insufficient learning from experience 
accounted for the inaccuracy of expert predictions in the educational field, 
according to IJzendoorn and Bus (in press). The specialists in this domain are 
rarely forced to question and correct their diagnostic results. 
Furthermore, we believe that an effective interaction only takes place if the 
person has access to background knowledge in a domain-specific knowledge 
base. This belief is strengthened by Elio and Scharf s conclusion that: "expert 
problem-solving depends primarily on having the appropriate domain-specific 
knowledge and not on any unusual intellectual abilities'X^o, p. 580). We are 
convinced that marked differences exist in the quality of the domain-specific 
knowledge bases in different professions. We hypothesize that in the clinical 
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psychological domain the minimal domain-specific knowledge base that 
candidate experts should use in order to learn from experience is still in the 
making. 
We do agree with Shanteau (1988) that "The definition of who is an expert is 
vital to any study of expert decision making" (p. 206). He favours a definition in 
terms of social competence. The term "expert" refers to those considered by 
colleagues to be the best at making decisions. Elaborating on ideas about expert 
learning as presented by Kolodner and Elio and Scharf we emphasize the 
importance of an appropriate domain-specific knowledge base. If our hypothesis 
is correct, it would be difficult in the profession of clinical psychology to find 
persons who are judged to be experts by their colleagues. And if such experts were 
found, we would expect to find fewer differences in cognitive structures between 
them and novices than between such experts and novices in a domain such as 
clinical medicine, where clinicians have access to and are supported by better-
developed domain-specific knowledge bases. 
4.5 Implications for further research 
The results of this study show that experts and novices have the same conceptions 
about the co-occurrence of problem behavior, which indicates that the 
prototypes of experts and novices are much alike. This result challenges the expert 
status of the classification knowledge of experienced diagnosticians. Therefore we 
considered it important to focus our further research on the value of the clinical 
classification knowledge as expressed in prototypes. This is be done in the next 
chapter by comparing the clinical prototypes of experienced diagnosticians with 
empirical prototypes. 
5 Empirical content of intuitive prototypes of experts 
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5.1 Introduction 
Classification of dysfunctional behavior is an important task in clinical decision 
making (Achenbach, 1985; Blashfield, 1984; De Bruyn, 1985; Rispens, 1986; 
Rutter, Tuma & Lann, 1988). It focuses or guides, perhaps unintendedly, the 
generation of hypotheses concerning the conditions which elicit or sustain the 
identified problem. It narrows down the field in terms of causes, treatment and 
prognosis and, according to Rutter (1975), it provides a shorthand language for 
communication with other professionals. 
In the study reported in the previous chapter, we focused on the classification 
behavior of experienced diagnosticians. In this chapter we will focus on a dif-
ferent aspect: intuitive prototypes, i.e., the classification knowledge incorporated 
in cognitive structures of experienced diagnosticians. The sample of diagnos-
ticians in the study of chapter four was fairly representative, and most of the 
subjects had some knowledge of the CBCL-system (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1983), the classification system with which we confronted them in that study. 
Nevertheless, it appeared that only one of the 22 used the CBCL-system in 
practice. The diagnosticians seemed to rely during the classification task on their 
experience (as recorded in cognitive structures or memory). (Of course the in-
structions for the tasks stimulated them to use knowledge obtained from ex-
perience.) In view of the biases that strongly influence cognitive processes, it can 
be questioned whether it is advisable to rely so strongly on memory when one has 
to classify problem behaviors. 
Research on intuitive prototypes in psychopathology has demonstrated that 
the prototype view is in correspondence with the way how clinicians actually 
think about and use diagnostic categories (Cantor, Smith, French & Mezzich, 
1980). Prototypes (whether "intuitive" or "empirical") can be regarded as classes 
or categories in which features are organized. In the prototype view of class-
ification, category membership is a matter of degree. In the domain of child 
psychopathology this means that problem behaviors can be more or less typical 
for a certain prototype. 
There are different viewpoints as to the value of these intuitive prototype. 
Chan and Jackson assert that "to the extent that implicit personality theory 
[comparable with intuitive prototypes] arises from the observation of co-
occurrence of behaviors in people, it reflects the distribution of traits in people 
and provides a relatively valid foundation for the judgement of specific targets" 
(1982, p.5). However, Chapman and Chapman (1982) proved that subjects see a 
correlation between two events as being stronger than it actually is. So in view of 
this "illusory correlation" it is quite possible that intuitive prototypes do not 
reflect the structure of reality, but contain sets of features that people think of as 
occurring together. The issue of whether these cognitive structures or prototypes 
reflect the structure of reality has been raised (Horowitz, et al., 1981a; Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Bream, 1976). However, we know of no study 
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that compared the intuitive prototypes of clinicians with the structure of reality 
or determined the empirical content of these prototypes. 
The present study addresses the value of intuitive prototypes by comparing 
them with empirical prototypes. By intuitive we mean that the structure is 
acquired through the practice of the art, through the classification of subjectively 
selected features. By empirical we mean that the structure is acquired through 
multivariate analysis of systematically collected features. 
We assume that experience, i.e. the observation and classification of problem 
behaviors in children, has created a cognitive structure in the memory of the 
diagnostician that includes impressions of the frequency of co-occurrence of 
problem behaviors. If two behaviors are assumed to co-occur relatively 
frequendy, then when either one is given, the other one is more likely to be 
expected. These cognitive structures can be seen as intuitive prototypes, i.e., the 
categories or classes of the implicit classification knowledge of the clinician. 
Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, and Parad (1981a) describe a method for 
obtaining intuitive prototypes of clinicians. They asked clinicians to list the most 
common characteristics that they think of when they imagine, for instance, a 
typical aggressive-impulsive child. They viewed this composite of features as a 
cognitive structure that depicts an idealized member of that category. The 
method of presenting stimuli and listing associated features or attributes is 
commonly used in basic research on prototypes (see e.g., Rosch et al., 1976) and 
also in research on psychopathological prototypes (Cantor et al., 1980; Chan & 
Jackson, 1982). For example, Cantor et al. (1980) asked clinicians to list clinical 
features that characterize the prototypical patient. 
In this study we address the following questions: a) What is the correspon-
dence between an empirical and a clinical, intuitive ranking of symptoms in 
syndromes? b) What is the correspondence between an empirical and a clinical, 
intuitive clustering of symptoms? c) Do the same problem behaviors that 
clinicians think of as co-occurring within an incompletely specified syndrome 
also co-occur empirically? 
5.2 Method 
Design and subjects 
The study involved the same two groups of experts that took part in the study on 
diagnostic classification reported in the previous chapter. 
The design of the study in figure 5.1 shows the assignment of the tasks to the 
subject groups. 
Tasks and procedure 
We developed three tasks assumed to invoke intuitive prototypes of the subjects, 
in particular the notions diagnosticians have of the co-occurrence of problem 
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behaviors. These prototypes contain features-in the case of our study problem 
behaviors-that are more or less typical for that prototype or diagnostic category. 
For the construction of the tasks we made use of the empirical classification 
system developed by Achenbach and adapted for a Dutch population by Verhuist 
(1985; Verhulst, Koot, Akkerhuis & Veerman, 1990). We used the items of the 
CBCL, a standardized format to record the behavioral problems and com­
petencies of children as reported by their parents. We used the 7 empirical 
syndromes for boys aged 6-11 and the 7 empirical syndromes for girls aged 6-11 
that were found in the Dutch population (Achenbach, Verhuist, Baron & 
Althaus, 1987a; Verhuist, Achenbach, Althaus &C Akkerhuis, 1988). In addition, 
we used the core syndromes, i.e., clusters of co-occurring problem behaviors that 
are found in different age and gender groups and thus reflect a very steady 
empirical grouping of problem behaviors (Achenbach, Conners, Quay, Verhuist 
& Howell, 1989; Koot & Verhulst, 1990). In Appendices A and С complete 
descriptions of the empirical syndromes for boys and girls aged 6-11 and the core 
syndromes are given. 
Task 
1 2 3 
rank cluster complement N 
expert group 1 χ (n=12) 
expert group 2 χ X (n=10) 
Figure 5.1 The design of the study 1: Ranking of symptoms In existing empirical syndromes: 2: Intuitive clustering 
of the original CBCL symptoms; 3: Complementing Incompletely specified syndroms. 
Task i: Ranking of symptoms in existing empirical syndromes 
In Task i, presented to the first expert group, we asked subjects to rank the items 
of an existing empirical syndrome. Each syndrome was put on a card with the 
defining items printed in a random order. The labels of the syndromes were not 
included on the cards. There were seven cards representing the syndromes of the 
boys and seven cards representing the syndromes of the girls. To facilitate ranking 
performance, the items of each syndrome were also printed separately on small 
cards. The subjects received the seven syndrome cards of one gender group one by 
one, in a random order, and the matching set of small cards. They were asked to 
rank the items in the syndrome according to the typicality of the items for that 
particular syndrome according to their experience, starting with the most typical 
item. The outcomes of Task ι provide evidence on the correspondence between 
an ordering based on clinical experience and an ordering based on empirical data. 
Task 2: Intuitive cltistering of the original CBCL symptoms 
A description of this task has already been given in chapter 4, but it is repeated 
here for the sake of convenience. 
In Task 2, diagnosticians were asked to cluster the original items of the CBCL 
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according to their own points of view (9 subjects were not familiar with the 
CBCL). Subjects were first given a set of 112 small cards containing the problem 
behaviors and child characteristics as used by the CBCL. From this set they could 
select the behaviors and child characteristics with which they were familiar. 
Problem behaviors and characteristics which they had encountered in their 
practice but which were not in the CBCL set could be written down on new 
cards. Next, the subjects were asked to sort the collected behaviors and 
characteristics into clusters containing items that in their own clinical experience 
co-occurred frequently. They were allowed to form as many clusters as they 
wanted and to put the same item into more than one cluster. In this task, we 
focused on the question of whether the outcomes of an intuitive clustering are in 
agreement with an empirically established system of clusters as represented in the 
core syndromes. 
Tasks: Complementing incompletely specified syndromes 
In Task 3, diagnosticians were asked to complement seven incompletely specified 
syndromes presented on vignettes. Each vignette contained one randomly chosen 
third of the symptoms of a core syndrome of the CBCL. To imitate clinical 
practice, we put a name on the vignette, as illustrated in the example below. 
Yvonne refuse! to talk and Is shy and timid. She Is unhappy and sad. 
The seven vignettes were given to the subjects on separate pieces of paper one by 
one in random order. We asked the diagnostician to complement the artificial 
case description by reporting which additional problem behaviors they expected 
to be present in that particular child. The outcome of this task provides 
information on which behaviors are judged to co-occur with the behaviors listed 
in an incomplete description of an empirical core syndrome. We investígate 
whether these behaviors are similar to the behaviors that empirically co-occur. 
The tasks were administered in the same session(s) as the tasks of a previous 
reported study (see Chapter 4). For Task 1 no time limit was set. All subjects 
completed this task in less than 30 minutes. For Task 2, a one-hour time limit was 
agreed upon and for Task 3 five minutes for each case description. Tasks 2 and 3 
were administered in one session for most subjects. Task 2 was always given before 
Task 3. For two diagnosticians Task 3 was administered in another session because 
of lack of time. The sessions with the diagnosticians took place at their own 
offices, while the sessions with the novices took place at the University of 
Nijmegen. Task 1 was administered by the author. Tasks 2 and 3 by two assistants. 
Data Analysis 
The data were mosdy analyzed in a qualitative way. This section contains a 
detailed description of the procedures used to analyze the data and is fairly 
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extensive. We often refer to the Appendices to illustrate the procedures. For the 
analysis of the data we used the empirical classification knowledge obtained with 
the CBCL in a Dutch population (Koot & Verhulst, 1990; Verhulst, Koot, 
Akkerhuis & Veerman, 1990). 
Analysis of the ranking of symptoms 
For each subject, rank correlations (Spearman's rho) were computed between the 
empirical order of the items in each syndrome and the clinical order of the items. 
The factor loading of the items, as found by Verhulst in a Dutch population, 
determined the ranks of the items in the syndromes and provided the empirical 
order (see Appendix A). The ranks experts gave to the items in task one 
determined the clinical order of the items in each syndrome. In order to examine 
the possibility that some syndromes are better known than others, we counted the 
number of significant correlations (α=.ιο) for each syndrome. 
Analysis of intuitive clustering 
We first counted the number of items not selected from the original CBCL 
itempool, (representing problem behaviors clinicians were not familiar with), 
and the number of items added to the CBCL itempool. Next we counted how 
many intuitive clusters had been formed and the number of items in each cluster. 
The resemblance between the intuitive clusters and the core syndromes was 
computed by the following procedure, which is best clarified by an example (see 
Table 5.1). 
Table S.I 
Illustration of method for computing the similarity between an 
syndromes 
intuitive cluster of one diagnostician and the core 
Core syndromes 
number of items 
¡ntuitivecluster 
neurotic (17) 
J= aggressive;2? 
= withdrawn; 8= 
externalizing 
1 4 
(19) (11) 
mixed 
Э 
(9) 
5 6 
(5) (2) 
1 0 0 0 0 
5.9% 
= anxious depressed; 3 • attention problems; A • 
socially inept (boys only); 9 = crue/ (girls only). 
internalizing boys 
only 
2 7 8 
(13) (9) (4) 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
rest 
9 4 0 0 3 
52.9% 23.5% 17.6% 
= delinquents = schizoid; 6=physical complaints; 7 
Suppose a diagnostician has made a cluster labelled "neurotic" consisting of 17 
items. Suppose further that 1 out of 17 behaviors (or 5.9%) occurs in Core 
Syndrome 1 "aggressive"; 9 out of 17 behaviors (or 52.9%) occur in Core 
Syndrome 2 "anxious-depressed"; 4 behaviors (or 23.5%) occur in Core 
Syndrome 7 " withdrawn"; 3 behaviors (or 17.6%) occur in no Core Syndrome. 
This intuitive cluster has the greatest overlap with the empirical core syndrome 
"anxious-depressed". For each core syndrome, the percentage of symptoms in the 
intuitive cluster that fall into that core syndrome indicates the resemblance of the 
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intuitive cluster to the core syndrome. When all items of an intuitive cluster are 
part of a single core syndrome, there is just one single percentage (namely 100%) 
representing the resemblance. Note that this does not imply that the intuitive 
cluster is exactly the same as the core syndrome since the core syndromes can still 
contain more items than the ones present in the intuitive cluster. 
Analysis of the complements ofincompletely specified syndromes 
The correspondence between the behaviors that the subjects judged to be co-
occurring with incomplete syndromes and the behaviors that empirically co-
occur was computed as follows: First two raters separately determined whether 
the complemented behaviors of the diagnosticians were synonymous with CBCL 
items. In case of disagreement the author of the present study was consulted. It 
was not required that the complemented behaviors were literally the same as the 
CBCL items. From the complemented behaviors we deleted the behaviors that 
were added more than once. 
For each vignette we then determined the number of added behaviors that were 
similar to the CBCL items that empirically complement the core syndromes. 
This number of "correctly added" behaviors was divided by the total number of 
items that empirically complement the core syndrome. So the resulting number 
indicates the proportion of empirically established complementary behaviors 
that is in fact recovered or recognized by the clinician. Again we provide an 
example to illustrate the procedure (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 
Il lustration of procedure for computing the proportion of empirically complementary Items uncovered by 
diagnosticians 
Step To be counted Number 
1 All items complemented by the diagnostician 5 
2 Items synonymous wi th a CBCL item 3 
3 Items complemented by the diagnostician more than once 0 
4 'Correctly* complemented items 1 (»a) 
5 Itemsthatempiricallycomplementcoresyndromeseven 6(=b) 
Proportion of 'correct ly* complemented items=a/b 1/6=16.7% 
Suppose a diagnostician has complemented core syndrome 7 which consists of 
nine items, three of which were presented to the subject in the vignette, with five 
behaviors. Three behaviors are synonymous with a CBCL item. Only one item is 
identical to an item that empirically complements the core syndrome. In all six 
CBCL items complement the core syndrome empirically. The similarity between 
the behaviors complemented by the diagnostician and the items that empirically 
complement the core syndrome is 1/6, i.e. 16.7%. 
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5.3 Results 
Ranking of symptoms in existing empirical syndromes 
The rank correlations (Spearman's rho) between the empirical order and the 
clinical order of the items in each syndrome turned out to vary considerably over 
subjects (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 
Ranlccorralatlons(Spearman's rho) between the empirical order and the clinical order of Items In a syndrome 
boys'syndromes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
group 
expert 
2 .33 .24 .32 
4 -.12 .00 .35 
6 .26 -.09 .55*· 
8 -.11 .06 . 7 3 " 
10 .50** -.06 .85*· 
12 . 5 1 * * .04 .40 
girls' syndromes 
1 2 3 
group 
expert 
I .14 -.27 
3 .23 .78** 
5 .41*· . 6 1 " 
7 -.40 .27 
9 .38** .52** 
I I .00 -.02 
**p<.05;*p<.10 
Boys 1 = agrressive; 2 = delinquent; 3 = depressive; 4 = hyperactive; 5 - socially withrawn; 6 E somatic complaints; 7 s 
non-communicative. Girls 1 = aggressive; 2 ш cruel; 3 = depresssive; 4 я hyperactive; 5 s schizoid-obsessive; 6 = socially 
withdrawn; 7 в somatic complaints. 
For each expert it was possible to have 7 significant rank correlations (at α =.io). 
Since there were 12 subjects (diagnosticians) the maximum number of significant 
rank correlations is 7 χ 12 = 84. The data show that in the expert group 28 out of 84 
(or 33%) of the orderings correspond significandy to the empirical ordering. 
In Table 5.3 it can be seen that the following syndromes were ordered relatively 
often in correspondence with the empirical rankings: Syndrome I, "aggressive" 
and Syndrome 4 "hyperactive", for both boys and girls; Syndrome 2 for the girls, 
"cruel", and Syndrome 3, "depressive", and Syndrome 7, "non communicative" 
for the boys. 
.41 
.36 
.04 
.55** 
.52* 
. 7 0 " 
-.14 
-.55 
-.02 
-.26 
.36 
.57* 
.13 
.32 
.39 
.79** 
-.07 
-.29 
.61' 
.36 
.24 
.39 
.71' 
.54' 
.42** 
-.45 
.04 
-.09 
.20 
.13 
.27 
.47* 
.42* 
.34 
.28 
.25 
.04 
.44* 
-.20 
-.10 
.20 
.22 
.52* 
.12 
.40 
-.33 
.63** 
.28 
.43 
.50 
.71** 
.32 
.79** 
.43 
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Intuitive clustering of the original CBCL-symptoms 
Table 5.4 shows that the number of items not selected from the original item pool 
of the CBCL ranges from 1 to 19. The number of items that were added ranges 
from о to 11. Appendix D and E report which items were omitted and which were 
added. 
Table 5.4 
Number of Items not selected f rem and added to the original CBCL Item pool 
Number of Items 
Omitted Added In f Inai Item pool 
Subject 
1 
2 
Э 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Median 
19 
5 
19 
17 
11 
8.7 
7 
0 
11 
0 
3.6 
100 
107 
99 
95 
115 
104 
122 
110 
108 
109 
106.9 
The size of the final itempool the diagnosticians used for the construcdon of their 
clusters varied from 95 to 122 items. 
On the average a diagnostician formed 12 clusters (see Table 5.5). 
Table 5.S 
Overview of the Intuitive clustering (Task 2). 
Numberof Total number Mean number Number of Items 
clusters of Items used of Items per used more than 
per duster once 
Subject 
1 
2 
Э 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mean 
4 
12 
11 
12 
11 
16 
17 
7 
9 
22 
12.1 
104 
107 
188 
140 
114 
111 
212 
193 
126 
199 
149.4 
25.8 
8.9 
17.1 
11.7 
10.5 
6.9 
12.5 
27.6 
14 
19 
15.4 
4 
0 
89 
45 
0 
7 
90 
83 
18 
90 
42.6 
The diagnosticians on the average formed more clusters than were empirically 
found by Koot and Verhulst. The empirical clustering consists of 9 clusters (as 
well as a miscellaneous group): seven core syndromes, one syndrome found only 
in boys, one syndrome found only in girls. Moreover, the clusters of the 
diagnosticians contain on the average more items (15) than the core syndromes 
(10). 
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The labels the diagnosticians gave their clusters are shown in Appendix E In 
Appendix G we present percentages of overlap for all intuive clusters. All in all, 121 
intuitive clusters were compared with 9 core syndromes, resulting in 9x121=1089 
comparisons. If one looks at the percentages of overlap one notices that most 
intuitive clusters have an overlap with more than one empirical cluster. The 
intuitive clusters for which a 100% overlap is reached consist of only one or two 
items. In very few instances (19 out of 1089) an intuitive cluster contains more 
than 50% of the items of one core syndrome (see Table 5.6). 
Table S.6 
Number of times that the ι overlap between an 
each of the 10 diagnostic lans 
number of items 
Subject 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
β 
9 
10 
Core syndromes 
externalizing 
1 
(19) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
4 
(11) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
mixed 
3 
(9) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
1 
Intuitive cluster and 
5 
(5) 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
(2) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a coie syndrome 
Internalizing 
2 
(13) 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
(9) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Included more than 5 0 % . for 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
sum 
0 
1 
1 
0 
3 
2 
4 
1 
1 
6 
Sum 19 
7 = aggressive; 2=anxious depressed; 3 = attention problems;4=delinquent; 5=schizoid; 6=physical complaints; 7 
= withdrawn; в=socially inept (boys only); 9=cruel (girls only). 
So these findings show that intuitive clusters contain items from different core 
syndromes. Pans of the empirical groupings of a core syndrome can be found in 
the intuitive clusters, where they are combined with parts of other core synd­
romes. 
Complementing incompletely specified syndromes 
The percentages indicating the extent to which the diagnosticians recovered the 
items that empirically complement the core syndrome are small (see Table 5.7). 
Two diagnosticians (9 and 10) were able to complement core Syndrome 5, 
"schizoid", with all of the empirically co-occurring behaviors. 
The recovery percentages averaged over the seven syndromes range from 1.1 
percent to 25.7 percent. Four diagnosticians scored just above 20 percent. 
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Tabte5.7 
Similarity between the complemented behavloR of the diagnosticians and the Items that empirically comp­
lemented the core syndrome. 
Core syndrome 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of complements 
(13) (9) (6) (7) (3) (4) (6) Mean 
Complement 
of subject 
9 
10 
0 
23.1 
23.1 
7.7 
0 
11.1 
11.1 
11.1 
22.2 
11.1 
0 
11.1 
0 
22.2 
16.7 
33.3 
50 
16.7 
16.7 
16.7 
0 
16.7 
50 
16.7 
0 
0 
42.9 
0 
42.9 
0 
0 
14.3 
0 
0 
3 3 3 
3 3 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25 
0 
0 
25 
0 
0 
16.7 
0 
33.3 
16.7 
50 
0 
0 
16.7 
0 
0 
9.5 
12.2 
20.7 
9.6 
25.7 
5.1 
1.1 
12 
21.4 
20.9 
7 a aggressive; 2 « anxious depressed; 3 = attention problems; 4=delinquent; S=schizoid; 6 » physical complaints; 7 
ж withdrawn; 8 = socially inept (boys only); 9 = crue/ (girls only). 
Note: Each entry specifies the percentage of remaining behaviors in the core syndrome that the diagnostician comp­
lemented. 
5.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the intuitive classification structures of 
experienced diagnosticians, in particular the empirical content of the intuitive 
prototypes. This was done by comparing intuitive prototypes from diagnos­
ticians with empirical prototypes obtained through multivariate analysis. We 
found that 33% of the intuitive rankings of behaviors in existing syndromes 
corresponded with the empirical rankings based on factor loadings. Specifically 
Syndrome i, "aggressive". Syndrome 4, "hyperactive" for both boys and girls; 
Syndrome 2, "cruel" of the girls, and Syndromes 3, "depressive", and 7, "non-
communicative" of the boys, were ordered more often in correspondence with 
the empirical rankings. Furthermore, we found that the intuitive clusters made 
by the diagnosticians corresponded very poorly with the empirical core 
syndromes. It can be concluded that the intuitive cluster consists of parts from 
different core syndromes. Finally, we found a low similarity between behaviors 
that clinicians judge as co-occurring with an incompletely specified syndrome 
and behaviors that empirically co-occur with that same syndrome. In summary, 
we therefore conclude that intuitive prototypes do not correspond with empirical 
prototypes -in other words, that the empirical content of intuitive prototypes is 
minimal. 
Our study is truly explorative in the sense that we cannot compare our results 
with other research findings. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, we 
do not know of any study that has investigated the empirical content of intuitive 
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prototypes. Before interpreting our findings, we consider it necessary to discuss 
some aspects of the method used. 
First of all, one could question whether the tasks called into play the implicit 
classification structures diagnosticians use in daily practice. It is difficult to 
answer this question, because all three tasks focused on "intuitive" classification 
knowledge, namely the notions diagnosticians have about the co-occurrences of 
problem behaviors as represented in prototypes. As demonstrated by Cantor et 
al.(i98o), the prototypical view of classification is in correspondence with the way 
clinicians actually think about and use diagnostic categories. Diagnosticians are 
often not aware which classification structures they use or have in mind (Van 
Mechelen & De Boeck, 1989). Some even suppress the idea of using classification 
structures at all. The tasks we constructed do not reflect a conscious activity 
during the diagnostic process. Usually, clinicians do not consciously rank 
problem behaviors during clinical assessment as we requested them do to in Task 
1, or verbalize their classification structures as we requested in Task 2. These tasks 
may therefore to some extent be artificial for the clinicians. In Task 3, however, we 
tried to imitate clinical practice by presenting a short case description. This task 
was based on the assumption that, if a clinician has some information about 
certain problem behaviors of a child, he will also have notions about the co-
occurrence of other problem behaviors the child will have. By presenting certain 
problem behaviors we expected to uncover these notions. 
In our study we actually used three different tasks that called into play intuitive 
prototypes of clinicians. The fact that all three tasks showed similar findings, 
namely minimal correspondence between intuitive and empirical prototypes, 
gives us confidence in the replicability of our results. We therefore predict that 
future studies on this topic will show similar findings. 
Now, of course, one can object to the use of the empirical structures as a 
standard of comparison. As far as the ranking task is concerned, we realize that 
perhaps we have been too severe. We expected clinicians to produce a ranking 
similar to the empirical ranking. However, the factor loading of an item or 
symptom, on which the empirical ranking was based, is not intrinsically stable. 
Achenbach himself does not rank the items in a syndrome (personal 
communication, June 1990). In view of this, we decided to liberalize our criterion 
afterwards and checked whether the 50% most typical items for each syndrome 
according to the clinicians' judgement were similar to the 50% most typical items 
determined empirically. The correspondence between the intuitive and empirical 
ranking, as expressed in the average percentage agreement or similarity, became 
63%. Although the correspondence seems to have increased in comparison with 
the aforementioned 33%, we must take into account that a great deal of this 
similarity could occur by chance. Only 14 out of 84 kappa's, or 17%, turned out to 
be statistically significant. 
In the other tasks we used the core syndromes as a comparison criterion. These 
core syndromes can be seen as very solid empirical knowledge that best reflects the 
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reality of co-occurrences of problem behaviors. But for these tasks the difference 
between the intuitive prototypes and empirical prototypes also remained. 
Why do intuitive prototypes deviate from the structure of reality as reflected in 
the core syndromes? In our opinion two factors can account for this. As it is 
assumed that intuitive prototypes or implicit classification structures are based on 
the observation of co-occurences of problem behaviors, the clinical population 
with which a clinician is confronted in his or her practice then becomes an 
important factor for the construction of these prototypes. The population from 
which the empirical syndromes were derived is probably much larger and more 
diverse than the clinical population on which the clinician has constructed his 
prototypes. The setting in which a clinician is working will very much influence 
the observation of co-occurences of problem behaviors and thus the construction 
of intuidve prototypes. A diagnostician who works in a child psychiatric setting 
will deal with a different group of children and will observe different co-
occurrences of problem behaviors than a diagnostician who works in a general 
mental health agency. As a consequence these two persons will have developed 
different prototypes and it is very well possible that they would group the same 
problem behaviors of a child in different clusters. An explanation that resembles 
the previous one is given by Rosch et al. : "One evident aspect of expertise is that 
the expert's knowledge is probably often confined to specific parts of a taxonomy, 
thereby creating unevenness in the experts categorization of that taxonomy" 
(1976, p.432). Someone who is specialized in the assessment of depressive 
disorders in children will have developed a different prototype than someone not 
specialized in depression.The specialist will probably have more differentiations 
within the category depression. The role of "expertise" in the development of 
intuitive prototypes in child psychopathology and the consequences for the 
judgement as to whether a child with certain problem behaviors does or doesn't 
have a certain disorder, needs further examination. It would also be interesting to 
examine if prototypes of clinicians working in the same setting are more alike. 
Another important factor that can account for the deviation between intuitive 
prototypes and the structure of reality is the fact that observational capacity of 
clinicians is biased by phenomena such as "illusory correlation" (Chapman and 
Chapman, 1982) and the "inability to assess covariation" (Achenbach, 1985). 
The apparent differences between intuitive prototypes and the structure of 
reality would make it necessary to view critically one characteristic of experts, i.e., 
the confidence they usually have in their judgements (Shanteau, 1988; in press). 
In view of the results of this study we are obliged to advise clinicians to use the 
available empirical knowledge on the co-occurrence of problem behaviors. Today 
no clinician would judge a child's intelligence profile using his own experience-
based implicit classification structure, instead he or she uses an empirically 
validated test for it, e.g. the WISC-R. Yet, in clinical practice the very same 
clinicians rely heavily on their own possibly biased memory to judge a child's 
psychopathology, even though a more standardized method is available. 
v J Summary and implications 
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In this final chapter we will first summarize the main findings of this thesis. Next 
we will discuss some implications for the notion of an expert and expert 
knowledge in the psychodiagnostic domain, in particular in reladon to the 
development of expert systems. Finally we will make some suggestions for future 
research and for diagnostic practice. 
6.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis is concerned with expert knowledge with a view to developing an 
expert system as a decision aid for psychodiagnostics. We focused on one 
important part of the diagnostic process: the classification of problem behaviors. 
In Chapter 2 we analyzed the role of classification in the diagnostic process and 
the use of classification systems to assist the clinician during this task. We 
discussed two important classification approaches in the field of child 
psychopathology, the DSM-III-R system and the CBCL-system, and we 
concluded that the empirically based CBCL system appears to be the most 
promising one in view of our purposes. We questioned whether the CBCL is 
sufficiendy representative to be used as a data base in a computerized diagnostic 
knowledge system. If certain problem behaviors are not represented in the CBCL 
they will not be detected in a forthcoming case. In Chapter 3 we report an 
empirical study into the content validity of the CBCL. The study demonstrated 
that the items of the CBCL do not cover the broad range of problem behaviors 
reported in diagnostic reports. We concluded that several items should be added. 
These findings raised the question of how to decide whether the added items or 
symptoms are part of the empirically derived syndromes and illustrates a 
functional problem in the use of classification systems: how to deal with 
individual problem behavior that doesn't fit into the classes of a system. Following 
Kleinmuntz, who was able to extract the decision rules an expert was using in the 
classification of MMPI-profiles, we focused our research on the classification 
process of experienced diagnosticians in order to obtain practical guidelines for 
dealing with such a classification problem. In Chapter 4 we present the study on 
how experienced diagnosticians, referred to as experts, classify individual 
problem behavior, in comparison with novices. Inspired by Kolodner's model of 
the evolution of expertise, which assumes that experience reorganizes the 
structures of both the reasoning process and the domain knowledge, we 
examined the differences between experts and novices. We identified seven 
cognidve operations that experienced diagnosticians use in classifying problem 
behavior: (a) asking or giving information, (b) associating, (c) abstracting or 
labelling, (d) explaining, (e) neutral matching, (f) identifying, and (g) 
differentiating. Results showed that five of them were more or less often used by 
experienced diagnosticians than by novices. This finding suggests that experience 
has taught the diagnostician to change his reasoning process by questioning, 
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abstracting or labelling the problem behavior more often during classification 
and supports the change in the reasoning process that Kolodner's model 
postulates. But we also found that the outcomes of the classification and the 
typicality ratings given by the experts were not different from those of the novices. 
Experts and novices have the same conceptions about the co-occurrence of 
problem behavior, i.e., have similar prototypes. This last finding disagrees with 
the change in domain knowledge Kolodner's model hypothesizes and casts doubt 
on the expert status of experienced diagnosticians. We subsequendy focused our 
research on an evaluation of intuitive prototypes, i.e., the classification 
knowledge as represented in cognitive structures of experienced diagnosticians. 
In Chapter j we examined the intuitive classification structures of experienced 
diagnosticians, in particular the empirical content of the intuitive prototypes. We 
compared intuitive prototypes of diagnosticians with empirical prototypes 
derived by multivariate analysis. Results showed that the intuitive clusters made 
by the diagnostician correspond very poorly with the empirical core syndromes, 
but rather consist of parts from different core syndromes. The similarity between 
behaviors that clinicians judge as co-occurring with an incompletely specified 
syndrome and behaviors that empirically co-occur with that same syndrome was 
likewise low. We concluded that intuitive prototypes do not correspond with 
empirical prototypes, in other words, that the empirical content of intuitive 
prototypes is minimal. 
6.2 The notion of an expert and the development of an expert system. 
In this thesis we were confronted with the difficulty of defining "expert" and 
"expertise" in the domain of psychodiagnostics. In general, an expert is someone 
who knows the most about a particular domain and is considered best in solving a 
particular problem typical for that domain. He or she has acquired this 
knowledge or ability by the practice of the art, by experience. Since objective 
standards for evaluating the outcome of the diagnostic process are lacking, it is 
important to evaluate critically the knowledge of the diagnosticians, or their 
expert status (Carroll, 1987). In our study we used two different criteria to 
evaluate the private classification knowledge of experienced diagnosticians. In 
Chapter 4 we used the experience criterion, or expert-novice differences, and in 
Chapter 5 we used an empirical criterion, i.e. the empirical classification 
knowledge as provided by the CBCL. The results of these studies cast doubt on 
the expert status of diagnosticians. 
The correspondence between the classification outcomes of experts and 
novices does not support a change in basic domain knowledge as a result of 
experience ( i.e., dealing with cases); it shows that the diagnosucians in our 
domain are not full-fledged experts in the sense of Kolodner's model. The main 
finding of Chapter 5 -the minimal empirical content of the intuitive classification 
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structures- makes one wonder if it is correct to consider someone an expert whose 
classification structures do not reflect the structure of reality. 
Can we conclude from these results that there are no experts in the 
psychodiagnostic domain? 
First of all it is important to note that the study in this thesis addressed just one 
aspect of psychodiagnostics, the classification of problem behaviors . The results 
of other studies on expert-novice differences (Garb, 1989) as well as studies on the 
validity of prognoses (IJzendoorn & Bus, in press) do support a generalization of 
results from this study to other parts of the diagnostic process. 
However, it can be argued that the selection of experienced diagnosticians as 
potential experts does not allow the aforementioned conclusion that there are no 
real experts. Experts are those who have reached the pinnacle of their profession, 
according to Shanteau, and they can be found in the top of a pyramid framework 
(1988). Our selection of diagnosticians was not pointed at the top of this pyramid 
but at the finding of experienced diagnosticians representative for the different 
work settings in the field. The results of our study thus can be generalized to the 
population of experienced diagnosticians, but they do not sufficiendy justify the 
conclusion that there are no experts in the psychodiagnostic domain. (Only that 
we didn 't find any in our sample.) 
Furthermore, instead of concluding that there are no experts in the 
psychodiagnostic domain, we suggest expanding the notion of an expert with a 
new aspect, i.e. the methodological correctness of his or her diagnostic procedure. 
At this moment, the lack of objective standards for validating the outcome of the 
diagnostic process and the lack of scientific knowledge in child psychopathology 
seems to demand an explicit or transparent diagnostic procedure (for instance the 
normative diagnostic cycle model as described in chapter two) to evaluate the 
expertise of the clinician. We therefore advise incorporating a methodological 
criterion in the notion of an expert and assume that the experienced 
diagnosticians will gain from the application of an accurate diagnostic procedure 
to real cases, which will (it may be hoped) result in expertise. As yet we consider 
the use of a correct diagnostic procedure a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the development of expertise in the psychodiagnostic domain. Experience, 
the dealing with the cases, and the use of adequate substantial domain knowledge 
(empirically and theoretically valid) are the other conditions necessary for the 
development of expertise. 
Very closely related to the notion of an expert is the idea of mimicking the expert 
diagnostician in a computer program, i.e., of developing an expert system. In the 
introduction it was noticed that an expert system as a decision aid is supposed to 
improve the quality of current psychodiagnostic practice. However, in view of the 
poor performance of clinicians found in the present study and other studies in 
clinical psychology (Shanteau, 1988; in press) it is not likely that an expert system 
based on a descriptive model of clinical judgement will improve the quality of the 
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diagnostic practice. Results of this and other studies (Garb, 1989) show that in 
psychodiagnostics the knowledge gained from experience is not the same as 
expertise and thus it is not profitable to base an expert system on the knowledge of 
experienced diagnosticians. 
The question then becomes whether we should skip the idea of developing an 
expert system and focus on the development of other decision aids. However, the 
combination of the large amount of information that has to be processed in the 
diagnostic task with the concept of bounded or limited rationality (cf. Newell and 
Simon, 1972), seems to justify the use of a computerized diagnostic decision aid 
for the diagnostic practice. If we want such a computerized aid or system to be 
considered an expert system, its content should meet the same criteria that we 
applied to the notion of an expert. This means that the system should contain (a) 
a methodologically correct diagnostic procedure, for instance the normative 
diagnostic cycle, (b) adequate substantial domain knowledge, for instance the 
CBCL system, and (c) a reasoning method that learns from experience, for 
instance case-based reasoning. 
In case-based reasoning (CBR) a problem is solved by matching the problem 
description to a previously solved case, using the past solution in solving the new 
problem. In CBR, learning occurs as by-product after each problem solving 
session, in that relevant information from a problem just solved is retained, 
making the new experience available for future problem solving. CBR is a very 
common problem solving method that is also applied in medical diagnosis 
(Aamodt, 1990). One of the requirements Aamodt claims for future knowledge-
based systems is "a problem solving and reasoning method that is able to 
effectively combine reasoning from past cases with reasoning within a competent 
and robust model of more general domain knowledge (1990, p.2)". 
As far as the task of classification of problem behaviors is concerned, this 
implies that the knowledge-based system or expert system should contain 
empirical classification knowledge as provided by the CBCL in combination 
with a case-based reasoning method to deal with the problem behaviors not 
included in the classification system. 
Kolodner and Simpson describe an attempt to implement the case-based 
reasoning method in a computer system for psychiatric diagnosis, called 
SHRINK. This system contains the domain knowledge as provided by the DSM-
III and when complete "will do both diagnosis and treatment of affective (mood) 
disorders based on analogy to previous cases and will also track down and explain 
its failures, correcting the knowledge that was at fault" (1986, p.113). 
We think it is worthwhile to focus research on the possibility of the 
implementation of the case-based reasoning method in a computerized diag-
nostic decision system for the domain of problem behaviors in children. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 85 
6.3 Suggestions for further research and diagnostic practice. 
In view of the disappointing results in studies on expert-novice differences, one 
can question whether research should continue to search for expertise in the field 
of psychodiagnostics. Or one can argue that until now research did not succeed in 
retrieving the expertise of clinicians because the studies didn't use the proper task, 
or selected the wrong subjects, or used an inappropriate elicitation method. 
As far as the task is concerned, it is of course possible that the expertise of 
diagnosticians will show up in other tasks within the diagnostic process, e.g., 
during the generation or testing of hypotheses, or during treatment recom-
mendation. However, this assumption doesn't seem very likely in view of the 
biases that can occur during these tasks, e.g. ignoring base-rates, unwillingness to 
entertain alternative hypotheses (see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Nurcombe & Fitzhenry, 1986) and, related to it, in view of the development of 
decision aids to deal with these biases, e.g. the use of Theorem of Bayes for 
hypothesis evaluation in psychodiagnostics (Wouters, 1989). 
In view of our findings and the discussion concerning the notion of an expert 
we suggest selecting diagnosticians more carefully in future studies that aim to 
find expertise, and to include the methodological criterion. From the finding that 
neuropsychologists who were reputed to be experts made more valid ratings 
(Garb, 1989) it appears that the use of a social competence definition, as suggested 
by Shanteau (1988), can enhance the likelihood to finding real experts and 
expertise. 
With respect to elicitation methods, we note that up to now very litde is 
known about the effect of the elicitation method on the knowledge extracted 
from experts. Relevant research is now being carried out (Brinkman, 1990; 
Burton, Shadbolt, Rugg, & Hedgecock, 1990) and in view of the time-
consuming aspects of some methods, e.g. protocol analysis, it certainly can be 
considered important to investígate this potential method effect further. 
In Chapter 5, it was concluded that the effect of expertise on intuitive 
classification knowledge should be examined in more detail in the future. Rosch, 
Mervis, Wayne, Johnson and Boyes-Bream (1976) have stated that expertise 
creates unevenness in a taxonomy. As yet we do not know what this unevenness in 
taxonomy might consist of, e.g., in a specialist in depression; or on the class-
ification judgement by that specialist. Therefore we strongly advise clinicians and 
candidate clinicians to use the available empirical classification knowledge on the 
co-occurrence of problem behavior and not to rely on their own possibly biased 
memory. 
This thesis addressed the role of experience and demonstrated that someone who 
has gained clinical experience does not automatically become an expert. For 
diagnostic practice and especially the education of candidate diagnosticians, it is 
important to know why so many clinicians do not learn from experience and why 
expertise is not acquired. 
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According to Kolodner and Simpson acquisition of expertise results from the 
interaction between problem solving and experience that includes feedback. In 
Chapter 4 it was concluded that clinicians do not learn from experience because 
they hardly ever receive feedback and the feedback they receive is often flawed 
(Garb, 1989; IJzendoorn & Bus, in press). This implies that clinicians should be 
trained to learn from feedback. We can agree with Garb that research should 
focus on helping clinicians to make the distinction between biased feedback and 
accurate feedback and to design training programs that meet this purpose. Garb 
remarks that for a task in which unbiased feedback is unavailable, clinicians 
should rely more on a decision-making-aid, e.g. a computer program, than on 
their own experience. 
Furthermore, we concluded that effective interaction -and thus acquisition of 
expertise- only takes place if the person has access to a domain-specific knowledge 
base. Yet, a minimal domain-specific knowledge base is still in the making in 
clinical psychology. We think it would be profitable, in parallel with the 
accumulation of this knowledge base, to implement this basic domain knowledge 
in an easily accessible computerized knowledge base for clinicians in diagnostic 
practice. The interaction with an adequate substantial domain knowledge base of 
an expert system can help the clinician to learn from experience. As we mentioned 
before, a good classification of mental disorders, such as the empirically based 
system of Achenbach for the field of child psychopathology, may provide such a 
domain-specific knowledge base. An expert system can also help to train the 
clinician to learn from feedback, by keeping records of its decisions and by 
tracking down and explaining its failures. 
It is obvious that candidate diagnosticians should also be acquainted with the 
domain-specific knowledge base and be trained in learning from feedback. 
To conclude, if this thesis has made something clear then it is the (urgent) need 
for a decision aid for diagnostic practice. The publicity and commotion around 
some diagnostic blunders in recent cases of supposed sexual abuse once more 
illustrates the lack of expertise in the diagnostic field and the trickiness of 
diagnostics. Therefore we suggest focusing research on the design of a decision 
aid. A computerized diagnostic decision program or expert system appears to be 
beneficial as a decision aid in our view, because it can meet the different needs in 
the psychodiagnostic domain. It can provide the clinician with a metho-
dologically accurate diagnostic procedure and with an adequate substantial 
domain knowledge base, and it can contain a case-based reasoning method in 
order to learn from experience. However, considering the complexity of the 
diagnostic task, the development of such a system may take some time. 
Meanwhile we think it necessary to set up training programs for diagnosticians to 
help them deal with the biases that trouble the diagnostic process but are inherent 
to being human: biased observations, biased memories, biased heuristics. 
Finally, in view of these biases, diagnosticians can be considered experts in the 
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sense that they are so persistent in using and having confidence in their intuitive 
judgement. Self-confidence and self-presentation, as well as the creation and 
maintenance of a public image, are considered important psychological 
characteristics of experts that are difficult to learn and cannot easily be replaced by 
a computer program. 
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The referral of a child to a diagnostician is the start of a complex information-
processing and problem-solving process during which decisions are continually 
being made. Research on clinical decision making has repeatedly shown the 
fallibility of this decision process. This is not surprising in view of the large 
amount of information involved and the complexity of the task. To improve 
diagnostic practice it is necessary to develop (computerized) diagnostic decision 
support systems. Especially the expert system as a decision aid is thought to offer 
promising possibilities for improving the quality of current psychodiagnostic 
practice (Ruyssenaars & De Bruyn, 1987). 
This thesis is part of a research project that aims to develop expert systems for 
the domain of psychodiagnostics, and is concerned with the search for expert 
knowledge. In particular one important aspect of psychodiagnostics, the 
classification of problem behaviors, is addressed. 
The knowledge an expert system includes can be roughly divided into two 
types: public and private knowledge. Public knowledge includes the types of 
information found in textbooks or handbooks: definitions, facts and theories. 
Private knowledge consists of rules of thumb or heuristics that enable experts to 
make educated guesses when necessary. This thesis addresses the public 
knowledge ( Chapters 2 and 3), as well as the private knowledge (Chapters 4 and 
5) involved in the task of classification of problem behaviors reported in children 
in the age of 6-11 years. 
Chapter 1 specifies the notion of an expert, reviews research on clinical 
reasoning, focuses on expert-novice differences and the role of experience. An 
expert is defined as someone (a) who has finished his or her professional 
education and is familiar with the public knowledge in the domain and (b) who 
has gained clinical experience and from this experience has learned how to apply 
and use that knowledge. Research shows that cognitive biases influence the 
reasoning processes of expert clinicians. Therefore, the approach of modeling the 
clinical expert, an approach often used in expert system development, requires 
caution. The exploration of private knowledge in the domain of psycho-
diagnostics presupposes a validation ofthat knowledge. However, it is difficult to 
define objective criteria to validate the expert knowledge in the domain of 
psychodiagnostics (Shanteau, 1988). Research that has focused on expert-novice 
differences in order to determine the value of expert knowledge, offers an 
inconsistent picture of the relationship between experience, problem solving, and 
expertise. This raises questions on the role of experience in the expert's reasoning 
processes. According to Kolodner and Simpson (1986), the first role of experience 
is to refine and modify the reasoning process. Successful experiences reinforce 
already known rules or previous hypotheses, whereas failures require analysis of 
the reasoning and knowledge that was used and modification of faulty rules and 
knowledge. The second role of experience is to provide exemplars upon which to 
base later decisions. Analogies to previous cases guide and focus later decision 
making. However, the added value Kolodner and many others assume experience 
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provides, is not always demonstrated in studies (Garb, 1989). In this thesis the 
role of experience for a psychodiagnostic classification task is examined in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
Chapter 2 presents the public knowledge that is available in the domain of 
psychodiagnostic classification. Psychodiagnostic classification is defined as the 
ordering or grouping of problematic behaviors (the phenomena) of the 
individual case into syndromes (the groups or types). It is part of the diagnostic 
process and takes place during the second phase of the diagnostic cycle described 
by De Bruyn, i.e. the problem identification (1985,1990). Although classification 
as a cognitive process has received little attention in research on psychodiag-
nostics, several classification systems have been developed to assist the diagnost-
ician during this task. Some basic requirements for an adequate classification 
system for child psychopathology, were proposed by Rutter and Gould (1985). 
Two systems that seem to be most important for the domain of child 
psychopathology, i.e. the DSM-III-R system and the CBCL system, are described 
and compared with respect to some general issues, i.e. (a) categorical versus 
dimensional, (b) categories versus prototypes, (c) reliability, and (d) validity. In 
view of our ultimate goal, the construction of a diagnostic knowledge based 
system, it is concluded that the empirically based assessment approach of the 
CBCL system is the most solid one to be used as a database for a such a system. 
Chapter 3 reports an empirical study into the content validity of the CBCL. 
Despite the favourable judgement of the empirically based assessment method, it 
is questioned whether the CBCL is sufficiendy representative to be used as a data 
base in a computerized diagnostic knowledge system. If certain problem 
behaviors are not represented in the CBCL they will not be detected in a forth-
coming case. The study demonstrates that the items of the CBCL do not cover 
the broad range of problem behaviors reported in diagnostic reports. It is con-
cluded that several items should be added. These findings subsequently raise the 
question of how to decide whether the added items or symptoms are part of the 
empirically derived syndromes and illustrate a functional problem in the use of 
classification systems: how to deal with individual problem behavior that doesn't 
fit into the classes of a system. Following Kleinmuntz, who was able to extract the 
decision rules an expert was using in the classification of MMPI-profiles, we 
focused our research on the classification process of experienced diagnosticians in 
order to obtain practical guidelines for dealing with such a classification problem. 
Chapter 4 reports the study on how experienced diagnosticians, referred to as 
experts, classify individual problem behavior, in comparison with novices. 
Inspired by Kolodners model of the evolution of expertise (described in Chapter 
1) we examined the differences between experts and novices. We identified seven 
cognitive operations that experienced diagnosticians use in classifying problem 
behavior: (a) asking or giving information, (b) associating, (c) abstracting or 
labelling, (d) explaining, (e) neutral matching, (f) identifying, and (g) 
differentiating. Results show that experienced diagnosticians and novices differed 
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in the use of five of these cognitive operations. This finding suggests that 
experience has taught the diagnostician to change his reasoning process by 
questioning, abstracting or labelling the problem behavior more often during 
classification and supports the change in the reasoning process that Kolodners 
model postulates. But we also found that the outcomes of the classification and 
the typicality ratings given by the experts are not different from those of the 
novices. This last finding disagrees with the change in domain knowledge 
Kolodners model hypothesizes and casts doubt on the expert status of 
experienced diagnosticians. Why did persons who received a lot of training and 
do have a lot of experience (some over 20 years) in the clinical psychological 
domain, not learn enough to become full-fledged experts in the sense of 
Kolodners model? We concluded that an effective interaction between problem 
solving on the one hand and experience (including feedback) on the other hand 
can only take place if a person has access to background knowledge in a domain-
specific knowledge base. However, in the clinical psychological domain the 
minimal domain-specific knowledge base that candidate experts should use in 
order to learn from experience is still in the making. 
The results of this study show that experts and novices have the same 
conceptions about the co-occurrence of problem behavior, which indicates that 
the prototypes of experts and novices are much alike. We subsequendy focused 
our research on an evaluation of intuitive prototypes, i.e., the classification 
knowledge as represented in cognitive structures of experienced diagnosticians. 
In Chapter 5 the intuitive classification structures of experienced diagnosticians 
are examined, in particular the empirical content of their intuitive prototypes. 
We compared intuitive prototypes of diagnosticians with empirical prototypes 
derived by multivariate analysis. Results show that the diagnostician's intuitive 
clusters correspond very poorly with the empirical syndromes. The similarity 
between behaviors that clinicians judge as co-occurring with an incompletely 
specified syndrome and behaviors that empirically co-occur with that same 
syndrome was likewise low. We conclude that intuitive prototypes do not 
correspond with empirical prototypes, in other words, that the empirical content 
of intuitive prototypes is minimal. The effect of expertise on intuitive 
classification knowledge should be examined in more detail in the future. As yet 
we do not know what sort of unevenness or bias expertise creates in a taxonomy as 
used, e.g., by a specialist in depression; or on the classification judgement by that 
specialist. Therefore clinicians and candidate clinicians are advised to use the 
available empirical classification knowledge on the co-occurrence of problem 
behavior and not to rely on their own possibly biased memory. 
In the final chapter the main findings of this thesis and its implications for the 
notion of an expert and expert knowledge are discussed, in particular in relation 
to the development of expert systems. Also some suggestions for future research 
and for the diagnostic practice are made. 
This thesis used two different criteria to evaluate the private classification 
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knowledge of experienced diagnosticians, i.e. the experience criterion, (expert-
novice differences), and an empirical criterion, (the empirical classification 
knowledge as provided by the CBCL). The results of these studies cast doubt on 
the expert status of diagnosticians. Instead of concluding that there are no experts 
in the psychodiagnostic domain, it is suggested to expand the notion of an expert 
with a new aspect, i.e. the methodological correctness of his or her diagnostic 
procedure. At this moment, the lack of objective standards for validating the 
outcome of the diagnostic process and the lack of scientific knowledge in child 
psychopathology seems to demand an explicit or transparent diagnostic 
procedure (for instance the normative diagnostic cycle model as described in 
Chapter 2 ) to evaluate the expertise of the clinician. It is assumed that the 
experienced diagnosticians will gain from the application of an accurate 
diagnostic procedure to real cases, which will (it may be hoped) result in expertise. 
Results of this and other studies (Garb, 1989) implicate that it is not profitable 
to base an expert system on the knowledge of experienced diagnosticians. If we 
want a computerized aid or system to be considered an expert system, its content 
should meet the same criteria that we applied to the notion of an expert. This 
means that the system should contain (a) a methodologically correct diagnostic 
procedure, for instance the normative diagnostic cycle, (b) adequate domain 
knowledge, for instance the CBCL system, and (c) a reasoning method that learns 
from experience, for instance case-based reasoning. 
As to future research it is suggested to select diagnosticians more carefully in 
studies that aim to find expertise and to further investigate the effect of the 
elicitation method. 
For the diagnostic practice it is considered important to stimulate an effective 
interaction between problem solving and experience, and thus acquisition of 
expertise. Therefore clinicians and candidate clinicians should be trained to learn 
from feedback, and basic domain knowledge should be implemented in an easily 
accessible computerized knowledge base. 
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De verwijzing van een kind naar een diagnost is de start van een complex 
informatieverwerkings- en besluitvormingsproces. Onderzoek naar klinische 
besluitvorming heeft herhaaldelijk de onvolmaaktheid van dit besluitvormings-
proces aangetoond. Dat is niet verwonderlijk gezien de grote hoeveelheid 
informatie die bij dit proces betrokken is en de complexiteit van de taak. De 
ontwikkeling en het gebruik van (gecomputeriseerde) diagnostische beslissings-
ondersteunende systemen is nodig om de diagnostische praktijk te verbeteren 
(Ruyssenaars & De Bruyn, 1987). 
Dit proefschrift maakt deel uit van een onderzoeksproject dat als doel heeft 
expertsystemen ten behoeve van de psychodiagnostiek te ontwikkelen. Het 
proefschrift richt zich vooral op een belangrijk onderdeel van het psycho-
diagnostische proces, namelijk de classificatie van probleemgedragingen. 
De kennis in een expertsysteem kan ruwweg worden verdeeld in twee typen: 
publieke kennis en private (niet publieke) kennis. Publieke kennis omvat 
informatie zoals die staat in studie- of handboeken: definities, feiten en theorieën. 
Private kennis bestaat uit de vuistregels of heuristieken die een expert gebruikt om 
-indien nodig- een gefundeerde schatting te maken. Dit proefschrift richt zich 
zowel op de publieke kennis (hoofdstukken 2 en 3), als op de private kennis 
(hoofdstukken 4 en 5) voor de taak van classificatie van probleemgedragingen van 
6-11 jarige kinderen. 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het begrip expert gespecificeerd en wordt onderzoek naar 
klinisch redeneren besproken, in het bijzonder met de nadruk op expert-noviet 
verschillen en de rol van ervaring. Een expert is gedefinieerd als iemand (a) die 
zijn of haar professionele opleiding beëindigd heeft en bekend is met de publieke 
kennis van het domein en (b) die klinische ervaring heeft opgedaan en daarvan 
heeft geleerd hoe die publieke kennis toe te passen en te gebruiken. Onderzoek 
heeft aangetoond dat cognitieve vertekeningen (biases) het redeneerproces van de 
diagnost beïnvloeden. Daarom moet het modelleren van de klinische expert -een 
benadering die vaak gebruikt wordt bij de ontwikkeling van een expertsysteem-, 
met de nodige voorzichtigheid geschieden. Een inventarisatie van de private 
kennis in het psychodiagnostische domein vereist tevens een validiatie van die 
kennis. Het is echter moeilijk om objective criteria te definiëren waarmee de 
expertkennis in het psychodiagnostische domein gevalideerd kan worden 
(Shanteau, 1988). Onderzoek waarin expert-noviet verschillen gebruikt werden 
als evaluatiecriterium voor expertkennis, laat geen eenduidige relatie zien tussen 
ervaring, probleemoplossend gedrag en expertise. Dit roept vragen op over de rol 
van ervaring in het redeneerproces van de expert. Volgens Kolodner en Simpson 
(1986) verfijnt en modificeert ervaring het redeneerproces. Succesvolle ervarin-
gen bekrachtigen de reeds bekende regels of hypothesen. Fouten daarentegen 
vereisen een analyse van het redeneerproces en de kennis die daarbij gebruikt 
werd, en een verandering van de foute regels en kennis. Als tweede rol van 
ervaring noemen zij het verschaffen van voorbeelden waarop latere beslissingen 
gebaseerd kunnen worden. Overeenkomsten met vroegere casus begeleiden en 
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richten latere besluitvorming. De toegevoegde waarde die ervaring volgens 
Kolodner en vele anderen verschaft, wordt lang niet altijd aangetoond in 
empirische studies (Garb, 1989). In dit proefschrift is de invloed van ervaring op 
de uitvoering van een psychodiagnostische classificatie taak onderzocht, en 
beschreven in hoofstuk 4 en 5. 
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we ons gericht op de beschikbare publieke kennis op 
het gebied van psychodiagnostische classificatie. Psychodiagnostische classificatie 
is gedefinieerd als het ordenen of groeperen van problematische gedragingen (de 
symptomen) van de individuele casus (een kind) in syndromen (de groepen of 
typen). Classificatie maakt deel uit van het diagnostische proces en vindt plaats 
gedurende de 'probleem identificatie', de tweede fase van de diagnostische cyclus 
volgens De Bruyn (1985,1990). 
Classificatie als cognitieve activiteit heeft weinig aandacht gekregen in onder-
zoek naar psychodiagnostiek, maar er zijn wel verschillende classificatiesystemen 
ontwikkeld om de diagnosi bij deze taak te assisteren. Rutter en Gould (198$) 
hebben beschreven aan welke eisen een geschikt classificatiesysteem moet 
voldoen. Wij hebben twee systemen beschreven die belangrijk zijn voor de 
psychopathologie bij kinderen: het DSM-III-R systeem en het CBCL systeem. 
Deze twee systemen zijn vergeleken op een viertal aspecten: (a) categorisch versus 
dimensioneel, (b) categorieën versus prototypen, (c) betrouwbaarheid, en (d) 
validiteit. De empirisch gefundeerde classificatiekennis van het CBCL systeem 
blijkt de meest solide basis te zijn voor een diagnostisch kennissysteem. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een empirische studie naar de inhoudsvaliditeit van de 
CBCL beschreven. We onderzochten of het itembestand van de CBCL vol-
doende representatief is om gebruikt te worden als databestand in een gecom-
puteriseerd diagnostisch kennissysteem. Als bepaalde probleemgedragingen niet 
voorkomen in het systeem kunnen ze ook niet bij een nieuwe casus ontdekt 
worden. De studie toont aan dat de items van de CBCL de brede range van 
probleemgedragingen niet volledig dekken. Om de CBCL en de bijbehorende 
empirische kennis te kunnen gebruiken als een vaste component van een 
diagnostisch kennissysteem is een uitbreiding van het itembestand gewenst. De 
vraag is dan of de toegevoegde, extra items al dan niet passen bij de empirisch 
verkregen syndromen. Deze vraag illustreert een probleem dat inherent is aan het 
gebruik van classificatiesystemen: wat moet je doen met individueel probleem-
gedrag dat niet in de categorieën van het systeem past. Om praktische richdijnen 
te verkrijgen voor het omgaan met een dergelijk classificatieprobleem hebben we 
ons onderzoek gericht op het classificatieproces van ervaren diagnosten. Dit is 
gedaan in navolging van Kleinmuntz, die in staat was om de beslisregels te 
achterhalen die een expert gebruikte bij het classificeren van MMPI-profielen. 
De studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, onderzoekt hoe ervaren diagnosten indi-
vidueel probleemgedrag classificeren, in vergelijking met novieten. Geïnspireerd 
door het model van Kolodner over de evolutie van expertise (beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 1) is het verschil in classificatieproces en-uitkomst tussen experts en 
SAMENVATTING 111 
novieten onderzocht. We identificeerden zeven cognitieve operaties die ervaren 
diagnosten gebruikten tijden het classificeren van probleemgedragingen: (a) 
vragen naar of geven van informatie, (b) associëren, (c) abstraheren of een label 
geven, (d) verklaren, (e) neutraal vergelijken, (0 identificeren, en (g) differen-
tiëren. De resultaten laten zien dat ervaren diagnosten en novieten verschillen in 
het gebruik van 5 cognitieve operaties. Deze bevinding suggereert dat de diagnosi 
door ervaring geleerd heeft om zijn redeneerproces te veranderen door het 
probleemgedrag meer te bevragen, meer te abstraheren en van een label te 
voorzien tijdens het classificeren. Dit ondersteunt de veronderstelling van 
Kolodner dat ervaring het redeneerproces verandert. Maar we vonden ook dat de 
opbrengst van de classificatie en de 'typicaliteits beoordeling' door experts niet 
verschilt van die door de novieten. Dit laatste resultaat is niet in overeenstemming 
met de verandering in domeinkennis die het model van Kolodner veronderstelt 
en hiermee wordt de expertstatus van ervaren diagnosten in twijfel getrokken. 
Waarom hebben personen die een opleiding hebben gehad en veel ervaring 
hebben in de klinische praktijk (sommige meer dan 20 jaar) niet voldoende 
geleerd om volledige experts te worden in de betekenis die Kolodner op basis van 
haar ervaringsmodel aan de term expert geeft? Wij komen tot de conclusie dat er 
geen effectieve interactie tussen probleemoplossen en ervaring heeft plaats gehad 
omdat de diagnosten niet genoeg feedback kregen over hun genomen 
beslissingen en omdat ze niet konden beschikken over ondersteunende kennis in 
een domeinspecifiek kennisbestand. We veronderstellen dat voor de klinische 
psychologie een minimaal domeinspecifiek kennisbestand nog in ontwikkeling 
is. 
De resultaten van deze studie tonen ondermeer aan dat experts en novieten 
dezelfde concepten hebben over het samen-voorkomen van probleemgedra-
gingen. Dit geeft aan dat de intuïtieve prototypen van experts en novieten veelal 
hetzelfde zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we de intuïtieve prototypen van ervaren diagnosten 
onderzocht, in het bijzonder de empirische dekking ervan. We hebben intuïtieve 
prototypen vergeleken met - via multivariate analyse verkregen - empirische 
prototypen. We lieten diagnosten drie classificatietaken uitvoeren en vergeleken 
de opbrengst met de empirische classificatiekennis behorende bij de CBCL. 
Resultaten laten zien dat de intuïtieve clusters van de diagnosi weinig 
overeenkomsten vertonen met de empirische clusters. We concluderen dat de 
intuïtieve prototypen niet overeenkomen met empirische prototypen of anders 
gezegd dat de empirische dekking van de intuïtieve prototypen minimaal is. Aan 
diagnosten wordt geadviseerd om gebruik te maken van de beschikbare em-
pirische kennis over het samenvoorkomen van probleemgedragingen en niet 
teveel te vertrouwen op hun eigen, mogelijke vertekende (biased) geheugen. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk zijn de belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek 
en de implicaties voor de begrippen van een expert en expertkennis besproken, 
speciaal in het licht van de ontwikkeling van een expertsysteem. Ook zijn er 
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aanbevelingen gedaan voor verder onderzoek en voor de diagnostische praktijk. 
Dit proefschrift heeft twee criteria gebruikt om de private, classificatiekennis 
van ervaren diagnosten te evalueren, namelijk het criterium ervaring (expert-
noviet verschil) en een empirisch criterium ( de empirische kennis van de CBCL). 
Door de resultaten van de studies is de expertstatus van ervaren diagnosten in 
twijfel getrokken. In plaats van te concluderen dat er geen experts zijn op het 
gebied van de psychodiagnostiek, doen we de suggestie om het begrip expert uit te 
breiden met een nieuw aspect, namelijk de methodologische correctheid van zijn 
of haar diagnostische procedure. Het gemis aan objectieve criteria waarmee de 
opbrengst van het diagnostische proces gevalideerd kan worden en het gebrek aan 
wetenschappelijke kennis op het gebied van psychopathologie bij kinderen, 
maken het belangrijk om de expliciteit en doorzichtigheid van de toegepaste 
diagnostische procedure te betrekken bij de beoordeling van de expertise van een 
diagnost. We veronderstellen dat de diagnost profijt zal hebben van het gebruik 
van een correcte diagnostische procedure op echte casussen en dat dit dan 
hopelijk zal resulteren in expertise. 
De resultaten van deze en andere studies (Garb, 1989) impliceren dat het niet 
zinvol is een expertsysteem te baseren op de private kennis van diagnosten. Als we 
een gecomputeriseerd diagnostich kennissysteem willen beschouwen als een 
expertsysteem dan moet de inhoud van dat systeem voldoen aan dezelfde eisen 
die we aan het begrip expert hebben gesteld. Dit houdt in dat het systeem (a) over 
een methodologische correcte diagnostische procedure moet beschikken, 
bijvoorbeeld de normatieve diagnostische cyclus, (b) geschikte domeinkennis 
moet bevatten, en (c) over een redeneermethode moet beschikken waarmee het 
kan leren van ervaring, bijvoorbeeld 'case-based reasoning'. 
Voor verder onderzoek wat als doel heeft om expertise te vinden op het gebied 
van de klinische psychologie bevelen we aan de diagnosten zorgvuldig te selec-
teren en het effect van de uitlokkingsmethode op de verkregen kennis nader te 
onderzoeken. 
Voor de diagnostische praktijk is het belangrijk om een effectieve interactie te 
stimuleren tussen probleemoplossen en ervaring, en zo het verkrijgen van exper-
tise te bevorderen. Hiervoor moeten diagnosten geuaind worden om optimaal 
gebruik te maken van feedback en moet basale domeinkennis geïmplementeerd 
worden in een gecomputeriseerd kennisbestand dat makkelijk toegankelijk en te 
gebruiken is. 
Appendices 
Because the study was performed in Dutch, some detaib and data of the study are 
given in Dutch in the Appendices. 
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Appendix A 
The empirical syndromes of the CBCL as found in a Dutch clinical population*. 
Syndromes of girls aged 6-11 
1. AGGRESSIVE (AGRESSIEF) 
95. Driftbuien of snel driftig .71 
3. Spreekt veel tegen of maakt veel ruzie .70 
86. Koppig, stuurs of prikkelbaar .70 
22. Is thuis ongehoorzaam .68 
104. Is erg luidruchtig .66 
87. Verandert plotseling van stemming .65 
88. Mokken, pruilen .64 
68. Schreeuwt veel tegen of gilt veel 64 
19. Eist veel aandacht op .61 
93. Praat te veel .58 
27. Snel jaloers .57 
94. Plaagt veel .54 
10. Kan met stil zitten, onrustig of overactief .51 
26. Lijkt zich met schuldig te voelen na zich misdragen te hebben .51 
109. Dremerig, jengelig .48 
74. Speelt de clown, doet raar of 'gek' om de aandacht te trekken .46 
41. Impulsief of onnadenkend gedrag .44 
90. Vloeken, schuttingtaai .43 
16. Wreed, pesterig of gemeen voor anderen .43 
45. Zenuwachtig, gespannen .42 
8. Kan zich niet concentreren, kan niet lang de aandacht bij iets houden .40 
2. CRUEL (WREED) 
81. Steelt van huis .60 
82. Steelt buitenshuis 59 
43. Liegen of bedriegen .57 
21. Vernielt spullen van andere gezinsleden of andere kinderen .54 
16 Wreed, pesterig of gemeen voor anderen .48 
37. Vecht veel .44 
48. Andere kinderen mogen haar niet .43 
94. Plaagt veel .40 
25. Kan niet goed opschieten met andere kinderen .39 
57. Valt andere aan of valt anderen lastig 39 
26. Lijkt zich niet schuldig te voelen na zich misdragen te hebben .39 
20. Vernielt eigen spullen .39 
53. Eet te veel .38 
7. Opscheppen, stoer doen .37 
3. DEPRESSIVE (DEPRESSIEF) 
35. Voelt zich waardeloos of minderwaardig .67 
103. Ongelukkig, verdrietig of gedeprimeerd .64 
12. Klaagt over zich eenzaam voelen of in de steek gelaten voelen .63 
33. Klaagt erover of heeft het geval dat niemand van haar houdt .60 
52. Te veel last van schuldgevoel .57 
112. Maakt zich zorgen .56 
32. Vindt dat zij perfect moet zijn .52 
34. Heeft het gevoel dat anderen het op haar gemunt hebben .51 
31. Is bang dat zij iets ondeugends of slechts zou kunnen denken of doen .47 
* Tfte ¡terns defining the syndromes are presented in descending order of factor loading. 
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71. Schaamt of geneert zich snel .45 
30. Is bang om naar school te gaan .40 
38. Wordt veel geplaagd .36 
45. Is te angstig of te bang .35 
89. Achterdochtig .34 
I I . Klampt zich vast aan volwassenen of is te afhankelijk .33 
14. Huilt veel .32 
75. Verlegen, schuchter .30 
4. HYPERACTIVE (HYPERACTIEF) 
1 . Gedraagt zich te jong voor haar leeftijd .65 
62. Onhandig, slechte coördinatie .65 
61. Slechte schoolresultaten .58 
8. Kan zich niet concentreren, kan niet lang de aandacht bij iets houden .55 
41. Impulsief of onnadenkend gedrag .48 
64. Speelt het liefst met jongere kinderen .41 
13. In de war of chaotisch in het denken .40 
38. Wordt veel geplaagd .38 
10. Kan niet stil zitten, onrustig, of overactief .38 
79. Spraakproblemen .35 
23. Is ongehoorzaam op school .33 
102. Traag,langzaam, te weinig energie .33 
17. Dagdromen of gaat geheel op in haar gedachten .31 
5. SCHIZOID-OBSESSIVE (SCHIZOIDE - OBSESSIEF) 
47. Nachtmerries .58 
100. Slaapmoeilijkheden .58 
70. Ziet dingen die er niet zijn .57 
40. Hoort dingen die er niet zijn .53 
29. Is bang voor bepaalde dieren, situaties, of plaatsen, uitgezonderd de school .50 
50. Is te angstig of te bang .50 
76. Slaapt minder dan de meeste kinderen .44 
85. Vreemde gedachten .35 
92. Slaapwandelen of hardop praten in de slaap .34 
9. Kan bepaalde gedachten niet uit zijn/haar hoofd zetten; .33 
obsessies 
54. Oververmoeid .33 
31. Is bang dat zij ¡ets ondeugends of slechts zou kunnen doen of denken .31 
6. SOCIALLY WITHDRAWN (SOCIALE TERUGTREKKING) 
III. Teruggetrokken, komt niet tot contact met anderen .68 
69. Gesloten, anderen weten niet wat er in haar omgaat .61 
80. Kijkt met lege of 'wezenloze' blik .52 
75. Verlegen, schuchter .49 
65. Weigert om te praten .49 
102. Traag, langzaam, te weinig'energie' .46 
17. Dagdromen of gaat geheel op in haar gedachten .42 
84. Vreemd gedrag, doet vreemd aan (geef aan) .36 
42. Vindt het fijn om alleen te zijn .36 
7. SOMATIC COMPLAINTS (SOMATISCHE KLACHTEN) 
(lichamelijke klachten zonder duidelijke medische oorzaak) 
56b. Hoofdpijn .68 
56c Misselijkheid .65 
51. Last van duizeligheid .62 
56f. Maagpijn, buikpijn- of krampen .52 
56a. Pijnen .47 
56d. Moeilijkheden met zien .41 
77. Slaapt meer dan de meeste kinderen overdag en/of 's nachts .31 
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Syndromes of the boys aged 6-11 
1. AGGRESSIVE (AGRESSIEF) 
3. Spreekt veel tegen of maakt veel ruzie .74 
104. Is erg luidruchtig .72 
22. Is thuis ongehoorzaam .71 
94. Plaagt veel .68 
95. Driftbuien of snel driftig .67 
86. Koppig, stuurs of prikkelbaar .66 
41. Impulsief of onnadenkend gedrag .65 
87. Verandert plotseling van stemming .65 
19. Eist veel aandacht op .64 
10. Kan met stilzitten, onrustig of overactief .59 
68. Schreeuwt of gilt veel .59 
37. Vecht veel .57 
74. Speelt de clown, doet raar of gek om de aandacht te trekken .53 
88. Mokken pruilen .53 
23. Is ongehoorzaam op school .53 
7. Opscheppen, stoer doen .52 
16. Wreed, pesterig of gemeen voor anderen .52 
90. Vloeken, schuttingtaai .51 
26. Lijkt zich met schuldig te voelen na zich misdragen te hebben .49 
27. Snel jaloers .48 
20. Vernielt eigen spullen .46 
93. Praat te veel .46 
57. Valt anderen aan of lastig .41 
8. Kan zich met concentreren, kan niet land de aandacht bij iets houden .40 
2. DELINQUENT (DELINQUENT) 
81. Steelt van huis .71 
82. Steelt buitenshuis .70 
106. Vandalisme, vernielen .66 
21. Vernielt spullen van anderen gezinsleden of van andere kinderen .62 
43. Liegen of bedriegen .58 
72. Brandstichten .57 
20. Vernielt eigen spullen .52 
15. Wreed voor dieren .47 
97. Bedreigt andere mensen .35 
39. Gaat om met kinderen die in moeilijkheden verzeild raken .32 
16. Wreed, pesterig of gemeen voor anderen .32 
23. Is ongehoorzaam op school .31 
3. DEPRESSIVE (DEPRESSIEF) 
33. Klaagt erover of heeft het gevoel dat niemand van hem houdt .64 
103. Ongelukkig, verdrietig, gedeprimeerd .63 
35. Voelt zich waardeloos of minderwaardig .63 
34. Heeft het gevoel dat anderen het op hem gemunt hebben .63 
12. Klaagt over zich eenzaam voelen of in de steek gelaten voelen .62 
112. Maakt zich zorgen .47 
30. Is bang om naar school te gaan .46 
91. Praat erover dat hij zichzelf zou willen doden .42 
89. Achterdochtig .38 
52. Te veel last van schuldgevoel .36 
9. Kan bepaalde gedachten met uit zijn hoofd zetten;obsessies .31 
4 HYPERACTIVE (HYPERACTIEF) 
61. Slechte schoolresultaten .54 
8. Kan zich niet concentreren, kan niet lang de aandacht bij iets houden .50 
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17. Dagdromen of gaat geheel op in zijn gedachten .50 
13. In de war of chaotisch in het denken .48 
102. Traag, langzaam, te weinig energie .47 
80. Kijkt met lege of wezenloze blik .47 
1. Gedraagt zich te jong voor zijn leeftijd .46 
62. Onhandige, slechte coördinatie .44 
77. Slaapt meer dan de meeste kinderen overdat en/of 's nachts .35 
79. Spraakproblemen .31 
5 SOCIALLY WITHDRAWN (SOCIALE TERUGTREKKING) 
25. Kan niet goed opschieten met andere kinderen .62 
48. Andere kinderen mogen hem niet .61 
38. Wordt veel geplaagd .57 
64. Speelt het liefst met jongere kinderen .47 
42. Vindt het fijn om alleen te zijn .43 
111. Teruggetrokken, komt niet tot contact met anderen .43 
34. Heeft het gevoel dat anderen het om hem gemunt hebben .32 
84. Vreemd gedrag, doet vreemd aan .30 
6. SOMATIC COMPLAINTS (SOMATISCHE KLACHTEN) 
(lichamelijke klachten zonder medische oorzaak) 
56.C Misselijkheid .76 
56.a Pijnen .67 
56.b Hoofdpijn .66 
56.f Maagpijn, buikpijn, of krampen .63 
51. Last van duizeligheid .61 
56.g Overgeven .51 
54. Oververmoeidheid .38 
7. NON-COMMUNICATIVE (NIET-COMMUNICATIEF) 
75. Verlegen, schuchter .58 
69. Gesloten, andere weten niet goed wat er in hem omgaat .55 
65. Weigert om te praten .53 
71. Schaamt of geneert zich sne .42 
111. Teruggetrokken, komt niet tot contact met anderen .41 
99. Overdreven netjes of schoon .39 
80. Kijkt met lege of wezenloze blik .38 
42. Vindt het fijn om alleen te zijn .37 
92. Slaapwandelen of hardop praten in de slaap .34 
89. Achterdochtig .31 
88. Mokken, pruilen .31 
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Appendix В 
Example of the average classification score and the average typicality score for each item 
into the girls' syndrome 'Aggressive" . 
Syndrome 1 girls: aggressive 
average classification score the average typicality score 
expertgroup novicegroup expertgroup novicegroup 
n=5 n=5 n=6 n=6 
items 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
.6 
.6 
.8 
.4 
.4 
.4 
1.0 
.4 
.2 
.4 
.6 
.8 
.4 
.6 
.4 
.6 
.2 
.4 
.2 
.8 
.6 
.2 
.2 
.2 
1.0 
.4 
.2 
.4 
.2 
.4 
1.0 
.8 
.2 
.6 
.8 
.4 
.2 
1.0 
1.0 
.2 
.2 
.4 
.4 
1.0 
.2 
1.0 
.4 
.4 
.2 
1.0 
.6 
.2 
.2 
3.3 
4.1 
3.1 
5.8 
5.5 
4.5 
3.0 
4.3 
6.6 
5.8 
4.3 
2.0 
5.0 
.6 
3.0 
3.5 
6.1 
6.0 
.5 
5.6 
5.8 
2.0 
2.8 
6.1 
1.6 
4.0 
6.8 
3.5* 
1.3 
1.0 
3.5 
1.8 
6.6 
.8 
1.5 
4.0 
6.0* 
1.5 
2.1 
3.8 
6.1 
1.0 
3.3 
5.3 
3.0 
5.5 
4.1 
2.5 
5.0 
5.1 
7.0 
5.0 
3.1 
1.8 
4.6 
6.8 
5.3 
3.5 
.3 
6.1 
2.0 
3.3 
4.3 
6.8 
6.0 
.3 
5.3 
5.5 
2.0 
2.0 
4.6 
1.5 
3.8 
7.1 
1.0* 
.6 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
6.6 
1.6 
.3 
4.6 
3.5* 
1.6 
1.3 
4.5 
4.6 
.5 
.1 
4.0 
2.1 
5.5 
2.8 
* The items for which the typicality ratings significantly differ between the expert versus 
the novice group are marked with an asterisk (*=p<.0S) 
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Appendix С 
Core syndromes copied from Koot & Verhulst (1990)* . 
Kemsyndroom 1: Agressief (Aggressive) 
3 
7 
16 
19 
22 
26 
27 
41 
104 
68 
74 
37 
86 
67 
88 
90 
93 
94 
95 
ruzie maken 
opscheppen 
pesterig 
aandacht opeisen 
thuis ongehoorzaam 
voelt zich niet schuldig 
snel jaloers 
impulsief 
luidruchtig 
schreeuwen 
gek doen 
vecht veel 
koppig prikkelbaar 
stemmingswisselingen 
mokken 
vloeken, schelden 
praat te veel 
plaagt veel 
driftbuien 
Kemsyndroom 2: Angstig depressief (Anxious Depressed) 
29 bang angstig 
31 bang iets verkeerds te doen 
30 bang voor school 
33 voelt zich onbemind 
52 te veel schuldgevoel 
35 voelt zich minderwaardig 
34 voelt zich achtervolgd 
12 eenzaam 
32 wil perfect zijn 
45 zenuwachtig, gespannen 
71 schaamt zich snel 
103 ongelukkig, verdrietig 
112 maakt zich zorgen 
Kemsyndroom 3: Aandachtsproblemen (Attention Problems) 
1 gedraagt zich t e jong 
8 kan zich niet concentreren 
10 onrustig, overactief 
13 in de war, chaotisch 
17 dagdromen 
41 impulsief 
61 slechte schoolresultaten 
62 onhandig, slechte coördinatie 
80 lege blik 
* The numbers refer to the number of the CBCL-items and the bolded items are used in the 
vignettes of Task 3. 
Kernsyndroom 4: Delinquent (Delinquent) 
105 alcohol, drugs 
39 slechte vrienden 
43 liegen, bedriegen 
21 vernielt spullen van anderen 
23 ongehoorzaam op school 
67 loopt weg van huis 
72 brandstichten 
81 steelt van huis 
82 steelt buitenshuis 
101 spijbelen 
106 vandalisme 
Kernsyndroom 5: Schizoid (Schizoid) 
40 hoort geluiden, stemmen 
66 dwanghandelingen 
85 vreemde gedachten 
70 ziet dingen 
84 vreemd gedrag 
Kernsyndroom 6: Lichamelijke klachten (Physical complaints) 
56a pijnen 
51 duizeligheid 
56b hoofdpijn 
56c misselijkheid 
56f maagpijn. buikpijn 
56g overgeven 
Kernsyndroom 7: Teruggetrokken (Withdrawn) 
42 liever alleen 
65 weigert te praten 
69 gesloten 
71 schaamt zich snel 
75 verlegen schuchter 
80 lege blik 
102 te weinig actief 
103 ongelukkig verdrietig 
11 teruggetrokken 
Restgroepen 
Alleen voor jongens: 
8 sociaal onhandig (socially inept) 
25 niet opschieten met andere kinderen 
38 wordt geplaagd 
48 niet geliefd 
64 speelt lieftst met jongere kinderen 
Alleen voor meisjes: 
9 gemeen (cruel) 
16 pesterig, gemeen 
21 vernielt spullen van anderen 
20 vernielt eigen spullen 
57 valt anderen aan 
37 vecht veel 
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Appendix D 
Items omitted from the original CBCL item pool by the diagnosticians in Task 2.* 
Diagnostician 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 
4 
14 
15 
18 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
5 
12 
28 
5 
12 
15 
30 
31 
5 
18 
28 
29 
30 
31 
39 
71 
97 
18 
34 
40 
36 
54 54 
57 
91 91 
96 
99 
101 101 
105 
110 110 
28 28 28 
42 
51 51 51 51 
52 
58 58 
59 
60 60 
65 65 
67 67 
68 
70 70 70 
72 
73 73 
77 
81 
82 
83 83 83 
85 
89 
92 92 
93 
98 
104 
105 105 105 105 105 
Total number of omissions 
19 5 19 17 1 11 1 4 7 3 87 
* The numbers are CBCL item numbers 
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Appendix E 
Items added to the CBCL item pool by diagnosticians in Task 2 
Diagnostician 1 
1. oninvoelbaar gedrag 
2. impulsief 
3. gedraagt zich ouder 
4. star 
5. geringe distantie tot volwassenen 
6. egocentrisme 
7. regressie, terugval naar jongere leeftijd. 
Diagnostician 2 
geen gedragingen toegevoegd 
Diagnostician 3 
1. ontwikkelingsretardatie 
2. gehoorproblemen 
3. fysische problemen 
4. motorische problemen 
5. mondmotoriek 
6. oppositioneel gedrag/verzet zich snel 
Diagnostician 4 
geen gedragingen toegevoegd 
Diagnostician 5 
1. heimwee 
2. slaafs gedrag 
3. aggressie gericht op bepaalde sexe 
4. handtastelijk gedrag 
Diagnostician 6 
1. broekpoepen 
2. gokverslaving 
3. eigen aggressie structureren 
Diagnostician 7 
1. paniekreactie 
2. depersonalisatie 
3. echolalie 
4. macropsie/micropsie 
5. gokverslaving 
6. separatieproblemen 
7. coprolalie 
8. keelgeluiden, kuchen 
9. lichamelijk handicap 
10. epilepsie/ absences 
11. lichamelijke ziekten 
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Diagnostician 8 
1. klachten waarvan vermoed wordt dat ze een organisch substraat hebben, te weten, 
cerebraal tekortdan wel dysfunctie. 
2. klachten waarvan vaststaat dat er een cerebraal tekort of dysfunctie aan ten grondslag 
ligt en een evaluatie van de consequenties voor het neuropsychologisch functioneren 
wordt gevraagd. 
Diagnostician 9 
1. conformisme 
2. dominant 
3. narcisme 
Diagnostician 10 
geen gedragingen toegevoegd 
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Appendix F 
Overview of intuitive clusters, including the cluster labels. 
Diagnostician 1 
1. neurotisch 
2. hyperactiviteit 
3. stoornis in contactname 
4. depressief gedrag 
Diagnostician 2 
1. concreet gedrag: a. somatisch 
b. agressie naar de ander 
с agressie op zichzelf gericht 
d. slaapproblemen 
e. psychotisch / bizar 
f. zmdelijkheidsproblemen 
g bizar gedrag 
h. restgroep (concreet) 
2 relationeel 
3 negatief gewaardeerd / normatief 
4. neurotisch gedrag 
5. rest 
Diagnostician 3 
1. emotionele problemen 
2. verzet gedrag (agressie a g.v. opvoeding) 
3. oppositioneel gedrag (agressie vanuit kind zelf) 
4. ontwikkelmgsretardatie 
5. functiestoornissen/motoriek 
6. spraak-, taalproblemen 
7. somatische problemen 
8. bizar gedrag / psychiatrisch 
9 stoornis in sexuele ontwikkeling 
10. (met gelabeld) 
11. restgroep 
Diagnostician 4 
1. neurotisch / depressief 
2. actmg-out gedrag 
3 impulsief 
4. psychotisch 
5. kleinkmderlijk gedrag 
6. contact 
7. functiestoornis 
8. lage zelfwaardering 
9. stoornis in sexualiteit 
10. gedrag 
11 eetproblemen 
12 restgroep 
Diagnostician 5 
1. sociale kwetsbaarheid 
2. agressie 
3. milieuproblematiek 
4. hersenbeschadiging / hyperactiviteit 
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5. vreemd gedrag 
6. angstig 
7. sexueel getint gedrag 
8. neurotisch / dwangmatig 
9. normoverschrijdend 
10. somatisch 
11. slaapproblemen 
Diagnostician 6 
1. geparentificeerd gedrag 
2. verwaarloosd 
3. te snel, te veel autonomie 
4. te weinig autonomie 
5. (geblokkeerd in) agressie 
6. eetproblemen 
7. sexuele problemen 
8. identiteitsproblemen 
9. counterfobisch / grote mate van onzekerheid 
10. dwangmatig 
11. mishandeld / angst voor de ouder 
12.a-vitale kinderen / autistiform 
13. neurologisch ongaaf /ADD-achtig 
14. loyaliteitsproblemen / stabilisator van spanning bij e ouders 
15. psychotiform / wanen 
16. rest 
Diagnostician 7 
1. obsessioneel / neurotisch 
2. psychotici 
3. gedragsproblemen · 
4. oppositioneel 
5. zwakzinnigen 
6. infantielen / afhankelijken 
7. agressie-regulatie problemen 
8. ADHD 
9. allergie 
10.Gilles de la Tourette / licht-organisch 
11. lichamelijke handicaps 
12. hechtingsproblematiek 
13. lichamelijke ziektes 
14.te dik 
15.sexuele identiteitsproblemen 
16. kind dat niets mankeert 
17. rest 
Diagnostician 8 
1. mutisme 
2. depressief /sociaal-geïsoleerd 
3. ADHD 
4. acting-out / psychopathiforme pubers (is verlengde fase-problematiek van groep 3) 
5. organisch trage kinderen 
6. dwangmatig / obsessief-compulsief 
7. zwakbegaafden 
Diagnostician 9 
1. opofferend / actief-afhankelijken 
2. zich aanbiedend / psychosomatosen 
3. dominant / passief gereserveerder! 
4. autonoom 
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5. afstandelijk /acting-out 
6. terughoudend 
7. onderdanig /ambivalent 
8. hulpeloos /passief-afhankelijk 
9. rest 
Diagnostician 10 
1. depressief 
2. identiteitsprobleem 
3. enuresis 
4. ontwikkelingsretardatie 
5. psychopathic 
6. psychosomatiek 
7. slaapmoeilijkheden 
8. ontwikkelingsachterstand en pedagogische verwaarlozing 
9. sexueel excessief gedrag 
10.borderline 
11. neurotisch 
12.achterdochtige persoonlijkheid 
13. dwangmatig 
14. praakproblemen 
15.encopresis 
16. object-relatie problemen 
17. ontwikkelingspsychotici 
18. regulatiestoornis 
19. eetstoornissen 
20.secundaire milieu problemen 
21. (met gelabeld) 
22. vloeken /schuttingtaai 
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Appendix G 
Overview of the percentages expressing the similarity between the intuitive clusters and 
the core syndromes.* 
Diagnostician 1 
Core syndrome numbei 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
number 
of items (19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1 (32) 18.8% 6.3% 
2(29) 24.1% 10.3% 
3 (21) 13.8% 
4(22) 9.1% 9.1% 
3 
(9) 
6.3% 
17.2% 
9.1% 
5 
(5) 
3.4% 
9.5% 
9.1% 
6 
(2) 
3.4% 
internalizing 
2 
(13) 
25% 
3.4% 
7 
(9) 
3.1% 
6.9% 
9.5% 
4.5% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
9.4% 
9.1% 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
3.1% 
10.3% 
rest 
28.1% 
20.7% 
57.1% 
50% 
Diagnostician 2 
Core syndrome numbei 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
number 
of items (19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1 (17) 5.9% 
2 (17) 35.3% 
3(22) 31.8% 9.1% 
4 (51) 5.9% 13.7% 
5(7) 42.9% 
3 
(9) 
23.5% 
9.8% 
5 
(5) 
5.9% 
6 
(2) 
3.9% 
28.6% 
internalizing 
2 
(13) 
52.9% 
9.1% 
3.9% 
7 
(9) 
23.5% 
5.9% 
9.1% 
2% 
14.3% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
13.6% 
3.9% 
rest 
17.6% 
35.3% 
27.3% 
5 1 % 
14.3% 
* The percentage expresses how many items of a core syndrome are found in each intuit­
ive cluster: 1 = aggressive; 2 = anxious depressed; 3 = attention problems ;4 = delinquent S 
= schizoid; 6 = physical complaints; 7 = withdrawn; 8 = socially inept (boys only); 9 = cruel 
(girls only). 
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Diagnostician 3 
number 
of items 
Core syndrome number 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
(19) ( ID 
intuitive cluster 
1 (51) 11.8% 
2(35) 
3(33) 
4(30) 
5(8) 
6(10) 
7(8) 
8(9) 
9(3) 
10(4) 
42.8% 17.1% 
42.4% 12.1% 
6.7% 
25% 
3 
(9) 
9.8% 
8.6% 
12.1% 
23.3% 
25% 
20% 
11.1% 
5 
(5) 
3.9% 
3.0% 
11.1% 
50% 
6 
(2) 
2% 
internalizing 
2 
(13) 
15.7% 
6.7% 
20% 
7 
(9) 
11.8% 
26.7% 
12.5% 
40% 
12.5% 
33.3% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
3.9% 
2.8% 
6.1% 
3.3% 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
3.9% 
11.4% 
12.1% 
rest 
37.3% 
17.1% 
12.1% 
33.3% 
62.5% 
20% 
87.5% 
44.4% 
100% 
25% 
11(5) 40% 60% 
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Diagnostician 4 
number 
of items 
Core syndrome numbei 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
(19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1(36) 
2(26) 
3(18) 
4(12) 
5(13) 
6(9) 
7(8) 
8(8) 
9(6) 
10(6) 
11(3) 
30.8% 34.6% 
27.8% 
15.4% 
11.1% 
12.5% 
16.7% 
3 
(9) 
13.9% 
3.8% 
33.3% 
25% 
7.7% 
11.1% 
25% 
12.5% 
16.7% 
16.7% 
5 
(5) 
2.8% 
33.3% 
6 
(2) 
5.6% 
12.5% 
internalizing 
2 
(13) 
13.9% 
3.8% 
37.5% 
7 
(9) 
8.3% 
3.8% 
5.5% 
8.3% 
12.5% 
25% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
44.4% 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
11.5% 
5.5% 
11.1% 
rest 
55.6% 
11.5% 
27.8% 
33.3% 
76.9% 
22.2% 
50% 
12.5% 
83.3% 
66.7% 
100% 
12(4) 25% 25% 25% 25% 
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Diagnostician 5 
Core syndrome number 
externalizing mixed internalizing boys girls 
only only 
1 4 3 5 6 2 7 8 9 rest 
number 
of items (19) (11) (9) (5) (2) (13) (9) (4) (5) 
intuitive cluster 
1 (20 10% 10% 15% 25% 15% 25% 
2(18) 
3(14) 
4(11) 
5(10) 
6(10) 
7(6) 
8(7) 
9(9) 
10(8) 
50% 22.2% 
7.2% 28.6% 
18.2% 
10% 
16.7% 
33.3% 33.3% 
54.5% 
10% 40% 
14.3% 
25% 
14.3% 
50% 
42.9% 
7.2% 
9.1% 
10% 
10% 10% 
5.6% 
14.3% 
22.2% 
22.2% 
28.6% 
18.2% 
30% 
30% 
83.3% 
42.9% 
11.1% 
75% 
11(6) 100% 
132 APPENDICES 
Diagnostician 6 
number 
of items 
Core syndrome number 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
(19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1(4) 
2(15) 
3(4) 
4(8) 
5(23) 
6(3) 
7(5) 
8(2) 
9(10) 
10(4) 
11(5) 
12(9) 
13(15) 
14(3) 
15(6) 
26.7% 40% 
25% 25% 
12.5% 12.5% 
4.3% 4.3% 
50% 20% 
25% 
13.3% 
16.7% 
3 
(9) 
25% 
25% 
33.3 
33.3% 
16.7% 
5 
(5) 
25% 
66.7% 
6 
(2) 
8.7% 
20% 
internalizing 
2 7 
(13) (9) 
25% 
25% 
12.5% 
26.1% 13% 
20% 20% 
25% 
44.4% 
6.7% 
33.3% 33.3% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
12.5% 
26.7% 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
20% 
4.3% 
20% 
rest 
50% 
13.3% 
25% 
25% 
39.1% 
100% 
40% 
100% 
10% 
25% 
100% 
22.2% 
20% 
33.3% 
16(1) 100% 
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Diagnostician 7 
number 
of items 
Core syndrome number 
externalizing mixed 
1 
(19) 
intuitive cluster 
1 (26) 3.5% 
2(28) 
3(31) 
4(13) 
5(10) 
6(37) 
7(10) 
8(23) 
9(6) 
10(5) 
11(1) 
12(16) 
13(1) 
14(2) 
15(3) 
16(1) 
3.6% 
29% 
4 
(11) 
3.6% 
35.5% 
53.8% 23.1% 
10% 
13.5% 
10% 
21.7% 
16.7% 
18.8% 
2.7% 
8.7% 
100% 
3 
(9) 
7.7% 
10.7% 
6.5% 
7.7% 
10% 
16.2% 
10% 
21.7% 
20% 
100% 
12.5% 
100% 
50% 
33.3% 
5 
(5) 
7.7% 
14.3% 
6 
(2) 
7.7% 
2.7% 
internal 
2 
(13) 
42.3% 
7.1% 
10.8% 
8.7% 
25% 
lizing 
only 
7 
(9) 
11.5% 
10.7% 
5.4% 
16.7% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
3.8% 
7.1% 
6.5% 
7.7% 
20% 
5.4% 
20% 
girls 
9 
(5) 
3.6% 
12.9% 
7.7% 
4.3% 
6.3% 
rest 
15.4% 
39.3% 
9.7% 
60% 
43.2% 
60% 
34.8% 
66.7% 
80% 
37.5% 
50% 
66.7% 
17(1) 100% 
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Diagnostician 8 
Core syndrome numbei 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
number 
of items (19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1(1) 
2(43) 2.3% 
3(33) 33.3% 30.3% 
4(57) 31.6% 10.5% 
5(18) 
6(43) 2.3% 
3 
(9) 
9.3% 
3% 
10.5% 
16.7% 
14% 
5 
(5) 
5.6% 
9.3% 
6 
(2) 
4.7% 
2.3% 
interna 
2 
(13) 
27.9% 
6.1% 
1.8% 
11.1% 
23.2% 
lizing 
7 
(9) 
100% 
14% 
3% 
27.8% 
11.6% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
7% 
3% 
5.3% 
22.2% 
7% 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
2.4% 
12.1% 
8.8% 
rest 
23.6 
9.1% 
31.6% 
16.7% 
30.2% 
7(34) 11.8% 2.9% 11.8% 3% 3% 11.8% 2.9% 11.8% 5.9% 35.3% 
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Diagnostician 9 
number 
of items 
Core syndrome number 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
(19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1(9) 11.1% 
2(17) 
3(12) 
4(13) 
5(22) 
6(14) 
7(16) 
8(24) 
5.9% 
8.3% 
61.5% 
27.3% 31.8% 
14.3% 14.3% 
6.3% 12.5% 
3 
(9) 
22.2% 
17.6% 
16.7% 
15.4% 
4.5% 
14.3% 
6.3% 
4.2% 
5 
(5) 
16.7% 
12.5% 
6 
(2) 
5.9% 
internalizing 
2 
(13) 
33.3% 
5.9% 
7.1% 
45.8% 
7 
(9) 
11.1% 
25% 
21.4% 
12.5% 
boys 
only 
8 
(4) 
8.3% 
15.4% 
4.5% 
7.1% 
6.3% 
8.3% 
girls 
only 
9 
(5) 
18.2% 
6.3% 
rest 
22.2% 
64.7% 
25% 
7.7% 
13.6% 
21.4% 
62.5% 
16.7% 
9(3) 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
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Diagnostician 10 
number 
of items 
Core syndrome numbei 
externalizing mixed 
1 4 
(19) (11) 
intuitive cluster 
1(23) 
2(5) 
3(6) 
4(7) 
5(19) 
6(6) 
7(7) 
8(21) 
9(7) 
10(13) 
11(16) 
12(8) 
13(14) 
14(1) 
15(7) 
16(9) 
17(13) 
18(6) 
19(5) 
20(2) 
21(7) 
26.3% 36.8% 
16.7% 
47.6% 9.5% 
14.3% 
30.8% 
25% 18.8% 
14.3% 
11.1% 
7.7% 
3 
(9) 
4.3% 
14.3% 
23.1% 
6.3% 
15.4% 
33.3% 
100% 
5 
(5) 
15.4% 
12.5% 
14.3% 
23.1% 
interna 
6 
(2) 
16.7% 
lizing 
2 
(13) 
30.4% 
16.7% 
14.3% 
18.8% 
12.5% 
28.6% 
11.1% 
boys 
only 
7 
(9) 
26.1% 
14.3% 
4.8% 
7.1% 
11.1% 
15.4% 
girls 
only 
8 
(4) 
13% 
60% 
50% 
42.9% 
15.8% 
50% 
42.9% 
19% 
42.9% 
23.1% 
18.8% 
37.5% 
21.4% 
42.8% 
33.3% 
23.1% 
50% 
40% 
42.9% 
9 
(5) 
10.5% 
12.5% 
rest 
26% 
40% 
50% 
42.9% 
10.5% 
16.7% 
42.9% 
9.5% 
28.6% 
28.6% 
37.5% 
28.6% 
100% 
42.8% 
33.3% 
15.4% 
16.7% 
60% 
57.1% 
22(8) 12.5% 25% 37.5% 25% 
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